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Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian Nos 6, 8, 9, 1980

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## POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: SOCIALISM VERSUS CAPITALISM

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5 Mar 80 pp 14-22

[Article by Dr Phil Sci, Prof, Col N. Tabunov: "The Ideological Duel Between Two Systems"; this article is recommended for use in officer Marxist-Leninist training groups in their study of the topic "The Ideological Duel Between the Two Systems, and the Tasks of the Struggle Against Bourgeois and Opportunist Ideology. The Need for Raising the Political Vigilance of Army and Navy Soldiers"]

[Text] Leninism--an immortal, developing teaching--reflects the better qualities of the working class: its revolutionary spirit, its intolerance of an order of compulsion and oppression and the latter's ideological henchmen, its capability for sober, objective evaluation of events, and its ineradicable confidence in the triumph of communism. All of the life and activities of V. I. Lenin, which were devoted to the cause of the proletariat, were an embodiment of these qualities.

The greatest revolutionary in theory and politics, Vladimir Il'ich firmly and consistently defended Marxist principles. At the beginning of 1917, deeply disturbed by all sorts of revisionist hit-and-run attacks on the viewpoints of the founders of scientific communism, in one of his letters he declared quite categorically that he could not endure any attacks upon Marx and Engels. "No, these are real people!", he wrote. "We must learn from them. We must not stray away from this soil" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 49, p 378).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is developing and reinforcing the remarkable Leninist tradition of intolerance of bourgeois ideology. In the duel between the two social systems, the party is waging a purposeful, offensive, and uncompromising struggle of increasing power against the insidious intrigues of imperialist propaganda and against bourgeois, opportunist, and revisionist ideology, and it is nurturing the Soviet people and soldiers of the armed forces in the spirit of high political vigilance.

The ideological struggle is an inherent component of the social-class struggle, which is being waged in the spiritual sphere, reflecting the antagonistic contradictions existing between classes and between social groups, and having a significant influence upon the behavior and activities of the people, in correspondence with their interests and ideals.

What is important to clarifying the essence of the ideological struggle is not the statements of concrete theorists and even their schools, but rather an understanding of the laws behind this struggle, of the most important theoretical conceptions and principles expressed by them. "...we must take as our foundation not individuals and not groups," V. I. Lenin taught, "but analysis of the class content of social trends, and ideological-political analysis of their main, significant principles" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 151).

The ideological struggle is subject to the action of a number of laws. Most important among them is the dominant influence of the nature of the economic and political conflicts suffered by classes and social groups upon the content of the ideological struggle. The founders of scientific communism substantiated the fact that the ideas of the individual are a reflection of real life, that "even the foggy constructs stirred within the brains of people are necessary products, unique sorts of distillations of their material life process..." (Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 3, p 25), and the latter is associated most closely with the means of production of material blessings--that is, with the economy. Economic relations manifest themselves as the interests of the people, the differences in which being the origin of conflicts. The economic interests of the bourgeoisie entail acquisition of maximum profit, wrested out of the working class and all laborers through merciless exploitation. The economic interests of laboring masses are represented by a desire to rid themselves of this exploitation.

The economy finds its concentrated expression in politics, in the struggle for political power, for confirmation and development of a political system satisfying class interests. Explaining the essence of this law, V. I. Lenin wrote: "People have always been and will always be the ignorant sacrifices of deceit and self-deceit in politics, until such time that they learn to seek, behind all moral, religious, political, and social phrases, declarations, and promises, the interests of the particular classes involved" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 23, p 47).

Today's basic social classes, as defined by their influence upon the process of history (the working class and the bourgeoisie) are not homogeneous. The core of the international revolutionary working class is the industrial proletariat. But the class also contains semiproletariat (proletariat having their origins in the petty bourgeoisie, peasants, and white-collar workers), the working aristocracy (a relatively highly paid stratum of workers), and the working bureaucracy (that part of the privileged workers participating in administration). In turn, the

bourgeoisie is represented by different social groups: monopolistic, upper, middle, and petty; in developing countries we can distinguish the national and pre-imperialist (compradoric) bourgeoisie. Peasants oppressed by landowners occupy an important place in the social structure of many countries, especially developing countries. In addition, strata such as the intelligentsia and white collar workers exist side-by-side with these classes and groups. All of these classes and social groups differ in their living conditions, their way of life, and their economic and political interests, which naturally generates differing ideological-political trends in today's world.

However, despite the complexity and mosaic pattern of the social structure of the modern world, two basic social trends are dueling within it. One of them is represented by the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. The other manifests itself as reinforcement and growth of the power of socialism, as selection of a socialist orientation by an ever-increasing number of developing countries.

The economic and political duel between these basic trends also predetermines the content of the current ideological struggle. What are the social paths of mankind's development, and what is the future of the people? What social structure provides the best conditions for comprehensive development and spiritual elevation of the personality, and provides the latter with the most democratic rights and the greatest freedom? Which path of mankind's development guarantees unity of social and scientific-technical progress, and achievement of a harmonious relationship between society and nature? Can we avoid a world war involving the use of mass destruction weapons? Such is far from a complete list of the global economic and sociopolitical problems at the focus of the ideological battles of modern times.

One of the main laws revealing the nature and direction of the current ideological struggle is the duel between Marxist-Leninist ideology and bourgeois ideology.

The essence of Marxist-Leninist ideology is represented by consistent expression of the fundamental interests of the working class and of all laborers. It is a scientific theory, tested by the experience of socialism, which provides an objectively accurate picture of the world and a dependable reference point for practical activity. Its typical traits include adherence to scientific and proletarian party principles, a humanitarian orientation, optimism, international solidarity in the defense of the interests of the laborers, and a revolutionary transforming nature.

Bourgeois ideology is the exact opposite of Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is typified by an antiscientific, anticommunist, anti-Soviet, and anti-socialist orientation. Zionism--the warring ideology of nationalistically oriented upper Jewish bourgeoisie--is a special variant of bourgeois ideology. Arising at the end of the 19th century as a reaction of this bourgeoisie to development of the socialist movement, it transformed from

the very beginning into a weapon against socialism, and later into a means of colonial oppression of the peoples of the Near East.

The socialist structure in the world is complex due to the existence of revolutionary-democratic and opportunist ideology in addition to Marxist-Leninist and bourgeois ideology. Revolutionary-democratic ideology (in the developing countries) has an anti-imperialist orientation, and it leans toward Marxism-Leninism, though not always consistently. Opportunist ideology exists in the world workers' movement in the form of social reformism, which rejects the revolutionary path in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, and which believes that the sole possible path is reform. It exists in the world communist movement in the form of revisionism, the representatives of which are consciously reexamining the most important principles of Marxism-Leninism. Rightist revisionists essentially occupy the same position as do social reformists, in the same barrel with bourgeois ideology. "Leftist" revisionists say that they are faithful to Marxism-Leninism, claiming that they are the true bearers of its revolutionary banner, and that therefore they are "left" of true Marxist-Leninists, whom they label as "dogmatists" or "revisionists." But the sociopolitical and ideological nature of rightist and "leftist"-revisionists is practically identical. Maoists, for example, began their opposition to Marxism-Leninism from the positions of "leftist" revisionism. However, the logic of desertion from Marxism led them to a political alliance with imperialism.

Nevertheless, despite the presence of numerous ideological trends, the main battle of ideas took shape between Marxism-Leninism and bourgeois ideology. And this is quite natural. The struggle between Marxism-Leninism and bourgeois ideology is an ideological manifestation of the basic contradiction of the era: the struggle between two opposing world social systems--socialism on one hand and capitalism on the other.

A significant trait of this struggle is its uncompromising nature. Having in mind this ideological stand-off, V. I. Lenin wrote: "...the issue can be stated only thus: either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle ground here.... Therefore any belittling of socialist ideology, any deviation from it means growth in the strength of bourgeois ideology" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 6, pp 39-40). The 25th CPSU Congress pointed to this feature of the ideological struggle between Marxism-Leninism and bourgeois ideology, emphasizing that there can be no room for neutrality and compromise in the struggle between the two philosophies.

Growing aggravation is a typical law of the modern ideological struggle. The international conference of communist and workers' parties held in June 1969 asserted: "Mankind began the last third of our century in a situation of growing aggravation in the historic duel between the forces of progress and reaction, socialism and imperialism. The entire world, and all of the main areas of social life, economics, politics, ideology, culture--are the arena of this duel."



The main reason for aggravation of the ideological struggle is the change in the balance of power in the world arena in favor of socialism and other revolutionary detachments of today. As was noted at the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers (1979), a certain law can be asserted in this connection: The more significant the successes of the USSR and the socialist fraternity are, the deeper the crisis of the capitalist system becomes, and the more forcefully the popular masses consciously and spontaneously invade world politics, the more the imperialist circles are intensifying their ideological struggle against real socialism, against the working class and the entire liberation movement, against the forces supporting a firm peace. The bourgeoisie views ideological weapons as a factor compensating for the limited economic, political, and specifically military resources of conflict at its disposal today.

The ideological struggle is becoming more acute owing to the deepening internationalization of social life, and to arising of more and more global problems troubling mankind. These include ecological and demographic problems, the food question, the threat of thermonuclear war, and so on. All of them could be solved only on a global scale, and in the ways suggested by the world of socialism.

The growing aggravation of the ideological struggle is associated with entry of new ideological-political forces into the struggle, forces that vacillate between Marxist-Leninist and bourgeois ideologies. Naturally, neither of the main ideological forces of modern times can remain indifferent to the ideological vacillations of their "satellites," their temporary and permanent allies, and each is exerting maximum effort to strengthen its influence upon them. The ideological struggle is also growing more acute due to expansion of the possibilities for ideological and psychological influence upon the public. These new possibilities are a consequence of the scientific-technical revolution, which has permitted us to improve the resources for delivering information to its addressees many times over.

The bourgeoisie is attempting to reinforce the organization of its ideological struggle, and to improve the means of its conduct. Thus the International Relations Administration, created in April 1978 as the successor to the USA's well known information agency--the USIA--publishes 12 journals in 22 languages, produces more than 90 films each year, and maintains libraries and reading rooms in more than 100 countries. Half of its 8,758 colleagues work abroad.

Bourgeois propaganda is becoming increasingly more sophisticated and insidious. Having been persuaded that the laborers of the socialist countries will not accept any sort of lies, bourgeois propagandists are concealing them increasingly more often beneath the veil of "objectivity." Picking individual facts out of our way of life, they impart an interpretation to them hostile to socialism. Cautioning the people of the USSR and of other countries of the socialist fraternity against unconcern,

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated: "We have learned many things in the decades of our struggle against the attempts by imperialists to undermine or at least retard development of the new world. But the enemy has also learned some things during this time. He has become more cunning, and more refined in his actions..." ("Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], Vol 2, p 60).

Among the various reactionary theories standing in opposition to Marxist-Leninist ideology, bourgeois opportunist military-political conceptions on the sources and causes of modern wars, on their sociopolitical nature, and on the sociopolitical nature of the military-political alliances opposing one another require special discussion to reveal their true nature.

The political and military leaders of imperialist states, and bourgeois ideologists and propagandists have recently been actively propagating the false premise that socialist countries are the source of military danger. The servants of imperialism are pursuing a number of goals in this regard. First, capitalizing upon such ideological sabotage, they are trying to disguise the militarist, aggressive nature of capitalism, going so far as to even representing it as the bastion of a firm peace. Second, this ideological sabotage has the purpose (according to the intent of its creators) of persuading world society that the Marxist-Leninist thesis that peace and socialism are inseparable has supposedly not withstood the test of time, and that as a social structure, socialism is supposedly also plagued by military conflict and is unable to put an end to what is supposedly the historic fate of the people--enduring the ravages of war from time to time, and therefore that we should not tie the future of mankind in with socialism. Third, such ideological sabotage is directed against the movement of the proponents of peace, and it pursues the goal of dulling the vigilance of the peoples, instilling within them the fatalistic thought of the inevitability of war, and justify the arms race pursued today by the military industrial complex of the imperialist state.

These falsifications are "substantiated" by fabrications of a "Soviet military threat," of "increases in new types of arms" in Warsaw Pact armies, and of "wars between socialist countries." In this case China's armed aggression against Vietnam in February of the past year and the international action of socialist armies aimed at suppressing counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia in 1968 are being exploited to the fullest. Introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government to protect the sovereignty of this country and its revolutionary achievements against external counterrevolutionary forces served as an excuse for a new explosion of propagandist anti-Soviet hysteria.

The Maoists are making their "contribution" to the fatalistic conception of the inevitability of war, for which socialist countries are supposedly to blame. Chinese Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian stated the following in the journal HONGQI: "We must base ourselves on the premise that the war



will begin, and therefore we must prepare for a war which will begin soon, and which will attain a large scale, even nuclear...." The Beijing leadership is not making it any secret that in their opinion China's military danger lies with the Soviet Union.

What is the real situation with the sources of war? Marxism-Leninism is based on the idea that contradictions inherent to the antagonistic method of production based on private ownership of the means of production are the deep-lying source of social revolutions and wars. Describing this source of wars in application to capitalism, V. I. Lenin noted: "War is not in contradiction to the foundations of private ownership; instead, it is a direct and inevitable development of these foundations. In capitalism, uniform economic development of individual businesses and individual states is impossible. In capitalism, no sources for occasionally restoring the disturbed equilibrium other than crisis in industry and war in politics are impossible" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 353). By themselves, however, economic factors do not lead to war spontaneously. War develops consciously. Its immediate cause is rooted in politics, which are a concentrated expression of the economic interests of classes. Considering the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and further militarization of imperialist countries, the CPSU asserted the following in its program: "Imperialism is the sole source of military danger." The events of the past years confirmed the truth of this conclusion, and at the same time introduced some new factors into international life that require analysis from the standpoint of dialectical materialism.

The essence of these new factors is that young states arising from the ruins of colonial empires have begun realizing one of two trends of historic development possible to them in the modern era--the noncapitalist or the capitalist path. The noncapitalist path was selected by a number of countries existing in a stage of precapitalist social relations and countries that had halted their movement along the capitalist path. But because of differences in the developmental levels of these countries, the movement toward socialism has assumed a wide range of levels. For some countries this path has acquired the form of a socialist orientation, while others have begun building the foundations of socialism directly.

Experience has shown that a hard path must be traveled from a socialist orientation and even a direct commitment to build socialism to actual construction of the foundations of socialism. A country intending to develop a socialist society right away or in the future faces numerous difficulties: a burdensome legacy insidiously left behind by imperialism (unresolved conflicts of economic, political, ethnic, religious, and territorial nature), internal counterrevolution, and outside pressure by neocolonial policy.

Inasmuch as in contrast to all societies preceding it, socialism, a qualitatively new social structure, does not arise spontaneously but is built consciously, the correctness of the course taken toward socialism

depends to a decisive degree on whether or not the given country possesses a Marxist-Leninist party that consistently adheres to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Even if the country's basic resources of production have been socialized but the political superstructure has not been brought into correspondence with its economic base, the possibility of deviation or even retreat from a socialist orientation is not excluded.

Giving a high assessment to the role of the economic base, V. I. Lenin at the same time cautioned against making it absolute, against exaggerating the importance of public ownership, which may even fail to become the motive force of social development, if the country's policies, which rule over the economy, are not guided by a Marxist-Leninist party. It is very important to socialize property, but it is no less important, and in certain circumstances it is more important, to determine how and in whose interest the resources of production are to be used. This depends significantly upon the nature of the political superstructure. While based on economics, V. I. Lenin said, "Socialism cannot at all be reduced entirely to economics alone." The foundations of socialism can be said to be consolidated when "the state's democratic organization, a democratic army, and so on" rise up from this economic base existing as their foundation ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 22).

The social tragedy of present-day China is that its leaders, adhering to the ideals of Mao, have betrayed the ideals of revolution and socialism, they have deformed the political superstructure created in the late 1950's, they have militarized their economy, they have deserted to the camp of imperialism and reaction, and they have allied themselves with the latter in the struggle against world socialism and the international communist, workers' and national liberation movement. The Peoples Republic of China is structuring all of its relations with neighboring socialist countries not on the principles of socialist internationalism, and not even on the principles of peaceful coexistence, but rather on the principles of hegemonism. Socialism is not what was responsible for the war between China and Vietnam. The betrayal of socialism by Beijing leaders was what led to it.

Repudiating the myth of socialism as a source of military danger, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, CPSU Central Committee Secretary, Comrade A. P. Kirilenko emphasized: "Socialist foreign policy, which issues forth from the very essence of the new structure, was, is, and will be a policy of peace and brotherhood of nations, a policy of equitable cooperation. Deviation from the principles of socialism, the transition to the positions of chauvinism and expansion, is the source of hostility toward other peoples, and of aggression. It stands to reason that socialism cannot bear any responsibility at all for such actions."

The international events of recent times confirmed the truth of the Marxist-Leninist thesis that socialism and peace are inseparable. This thesis states: There are no resources of war, nor can there be, within

the nature of socialist states led by parties of the Marxist-Leninist type that consistently follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism in their domestic and foreign policy. War between such socialist states is excluded. China's aggression against Vietnam is not a war between socialist states, but a war between a country whose leadership betrayed the ideals of socialism, and a country that is consistently building the foundations of socialism and was forced to defend itself against the aggressor. Such is the truth about the recent fabrications of bourgeois ideologists attempting to prove socialism to be the source of war.

Falsifications concerning the Marxist-Leninist teaching on just wars are also being stubbornly spread. These falsifications are fabricated mainly by aggressive military circles. They consciously and prejudicially reject the just nature of wars in defense of socialism or the achievements of revolutions of national liberation, feeling that only those wars that are fought in defense of the interests of the so-called "Free World"--that is, capitalism--are just and holy.

Ideologists with a pacifist orientation proceed with other motives. They base themselves on the idea that a nuclear missile war would lead to such disastrous consequences that any talk about which of the warring sides is right becomes meaningless. While in the past we were able to divide wars into just and unjust, they believe that such division would have to be abandoned in the case of modern warfare.

The danger of spreading such viewpoints is that they are aimed at negating the objective criteria by which we evaluate the justness of a war, at clouding over the fundamental difference between the aggressor and his sacrifice, at moral-political disarmament of people waging just wars, and at falsifying the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war.

According to Marxism-Leninism the objective criterion used to determine whether a war is just or unjust is the sociopolitical orientation of the war, which can be determined from the political goals pursued by the warring sides, which are governed by their economic and political interests. If a warring side pursues the goal of protecting progressive achievements against the forces of reaction, of relieving national oppression, and of repelling aggression, then that side is waging a just war.

To reject the notion that war may be fought justly would be the same as equating the rights of an aggressor and his sacrifice. As long as there will be war, wars will continue to be divided into just and unjust.

"There is no force on earth," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "that can halt the relentless process of renewal of social life. Wherever colonialism exists, there we will find a struggle for national liberation. Wherever there is exploitation, we will find a struggle for liberation of labor. Wherever there is aggression, we will also find an effort to repel it" ("Leninskii sud," Vol 4, p 136). And from the side of forces fighting for social progress, all of these wars are by nature just. It stands to reason that

True Marxist-Leninists believe their task to be not to reexamine their own relationship to dividing wars into just and unjust, but rather to prevent world war, to exclude it from the life of society.

The theoretical error made by some subjectively honest Western scholars standing on pacifist positions and rejecting division of wars into just and unjust under modern conditions, is that they confuse the sociopolitical nature of a war (as being just or unjust) with its basic historic significance. Describing the latter, V. I. Lenin implied interaction of a number of factors: the scale of the war, the nature of the weapons employed, the internal and external conditions of the warring countries, and, naturally, the sociopolitical nature of the war. The justness or unjustness of a war has a significant influence upon its consequences--that is, upon its basic historical significance. And today, the justness or unjustness of a war continues to exert an influence. The role of this factor continues to grow. However, Marxist-Leninists predicting the basic historic significance of a concrete war account for other factors as well, particularly the nature of the weapons employed and the battleworthiness and combat readiness of the armies--that is, they do not limit themselves to an analysis of just the sociopolitical nature of the war, instead taking account of all the factors in their dialectical interaction, which is what defines the basic historical significance of the war.

Western ideologists are especially zealously falsifying the sociopolitical nature of the military-political union of the Warsaw Pact countries and the combat union of their armies; such ideologists pursue the goal of weakening and destroying this union, of inflaming the nationalist feelings of its participants, and of "proving" "inequality of relationships" supposedly existing between them.

Falsification of the policies of the Warsaw Pact countries is aimed at deceiving public opinion, and mainly the peoples of the NATO countries, and at preparing them to accept the notion that war is inevitable. (R. Nibur) (USA), one of the founders of the school of "political realism," explained the meaning of this sabotage in plain terms back in 1950: "The idea that war is inevitable is just one logical step away from the conception of preventive war, since if it is inevitable that we will have to fight the Russians, why not choose the time most convenient for us to get things going?" Such statements lie at the basis of the viewpoints held by today's falsifiers of the Warsaw Pact, which is defensive by its nature.

It is important to keep in mind that the adventurist "doctrines" of the proponents of war are dangerous not just in relation to some single country or group of countries. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in his speech at an election meeting of laborers of the Baumannskiy election district in Moscow during February of this year, they carry a threat to the peace and security of all nations and peoples. And repelling these malicious designs is a job for all who need peace and treasure it.



The need for raising the political vigilance of soldiers in the socialist armies is acquiring important significance in the ideological duel. Political vigilance is the capability for predicting change in sociopolitical events, for evaluating them from a class standpoint, and for determining one's line of behavior correspondingly. Typical traits of the political vigilance of soldiers in a socialist army are: a capability for freely orienting oneself in sociopolitical events in general, and in military-political events in particular; a deep understanding of the domestic and foreign policy of the Marxist-Leninist party and the socialist state; an ability to approach evaluation of events from the positions of Marxist-Leninist party principles; exclusion, from one's behavior and activities, of all that does harm to the interests of the motherland, the socialist state, and the socialist fraternity; prompt implementation of precautionary measures guaranteeing preservation of state and military secrecy; prompt adoption of an active position in relation to military-political events, one promoting maintenance of high combat readiness of the military units and formations.

Political vigilance is associated most intimately with formation of communist consciousness. This is why the role and significance of the party's ideological work and political indoctrination among the laborers, to include soldiers of the armed forces, is growing today. The task is to insure, by improving all of the forms and methods of party-political work, an aggressive nature for the ideological work being conducted in the troops.

Bourgeois ideologists, opportunists, and revisionists of various persuasions are unable to halt, by their social demagoguery and ideological eccentricities, neither the decay of capitalism, nor assumption of a noncapitalistic path by more and more new countries, nor the powerful growth of the forces and influence of world socialism. He who tries to do so is fated to ruin.

Not a single year, not a single month passes without cries of the "crisis of Marxism," without numerous predictions of "its final downfall." But the great teaching of the international working class continues to live despite the anticommunists, and its influence continues to develop and grow stronger. As V. I. Lenin predicted, Marxism fears impending trials neither in science nor in practice.

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## POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: SEMINAR ON DEVELOPED SOCIALISM

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5 Mar 80 pp 23-25

[Article: "Recommendations for a Seminar"]

[Text] A seminar on the topic "Developed Socialism--a Natural Step of Communist Development. The 25th CPSU Congress on the Party's Economic Strategy in the Present Stage" deals with an important and pressing problem of modern times. The main goal of the seminar is to help officers understand more deeply the fundamental premises of Marxist-Leninist theory on the origin, development, and improvement of socialist society, and on the need for creating a powerful material-technical base as one of the most important prerequisites for transition of socialism into communism.

Discussion of the following issues is recommended in the seminar: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the stages and basic traits of socialist society. 2. Development of the productive forces and production relations of mature socialism. 3. The 25th CPSU Congress on the CPSU's economic strategy and on the unique features of the 10th Five-Year Plan. 4. The party's concern for constantly raising the country's military-economic potential.

It would be suitable at the seminar to present a summary on the topic "Raising the Effectiveness and Quality of Social Production and Its Influence on Growth of the Country's Defense Capabilities." The main attention should be concentrated here on revealing the objective need for raising production effectiveness and work quality, for constantly raising labor productivity, for improving the use of fixed productive capital, and for increasing emphasis on thrift. All of this is going a very long way to promote growth in the country's economic and defensive power.

It should be noted in the discussion of the first issue that the society of developed socialism built in our country is the most important result of the selfless labor of the Soviet people, and a natural stage in development of the communist formation.

The founders of scientific communism persuasively demonstrated that the new classless society, the path toward which was opened by the proletarian



revolution, can in no way arise immediately in finished form. It must pass through two phases in its development--socialism and communism. It was entirely clear from a theoretical standpoint that the new society would rise from one stage to the next. But it was difficult to predict exactly what the distinguishing characteristics of these stages would be. The question as to the transitory stages leading to communist society, Engels wrote, "is the most difficult of all existing questions..." (Marks, K. and Engels's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 36, p 108).

The basic premises concerning the stages of socialist society are worded more definitely in the works of V. I. Lenin. Investigating the prospects of socialist development, he based himself on an analysis of the new order that had just begun to develop, and of the trends born within it. However, the first concretely historic experience of socioeconomic transformation in our country would not yet permit detailed forecasts. This is why V. I. Lenin noted: "We do not know and cannot know how many more stages there will be in transition to socialism" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 48). At the same time he laid special emphasis on the fundamental need for orienting ourselves toward final victory, toward consolidation of socialism for a subsequent transition to communism. Vladimir Il'ich described the highest stage of socialism preceding communism as "whole," "complete socialism," as "developed socialist society," and so on (see "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 36, pp 139, 255, 300; Vol 40, p 104).

Relying upon these ideas of Lenin, the CPSU and the fraternal parties developed, through collective effort, a clear conception of developed socialist society, which has been fully confirmed by practice. Referring to concrete historical facts, the documents of CPSU congresses, conferences, and central committee plenums, and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the seminar participants should reach a clear understanding of the stages leading to developed socialism.

As we know, for the first two decades following Great October the laborers of our country completed socialist industrialization, agricultural collectivization, and a cultural revolution under the guidance of the party and with the working class in the lead. During this period classes of exploitation disappeared, and real equality of people, sociopolitical and ideological unity of society, friendship and cooperation among socialist nations, and true freedom to the laborers confirmed themselves. All of these historic achievements signified that socialism has basically been built in our country.

The party's 18th congress (1939) defined the content of the new period in development of Soviet society as one of the completion of socialism's construction and a gradual transition to communism. But completion of this task was interrupted by the Great Patriotic War. Its victorious conclusion made it possible to return to economic development. Formation of the world socialist system and consolidation of the USSR's economic

and defensive power altered the balance of power in the world arena in favor of socialism and created a firm guarantee against restoration of capitalism in our country. Thus not only the complete but also the conclusive victory of socialism was insured.

Further growth in the USSR's economic potential, a gradual growing together of classes and social groups, and the rise in the material and cultural level of the people were responsible for formation of the basic traits of mature socialism. In November 1967 Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in a report "Fifty Years of Socialism's Great Victories" that developed socialist society has been built in our country. This premise was later documented more concretely in the proceedings of the 24th and 25th party congresses. The basic traits of mature socialism are revealed most substantially in the preamble of the new USSR Constitution, and in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's article "A Historic Landmark on the Road to Communism," published in the journal PROBLEMY MIRN I SOTSIALIZMA, No 12, 1977.

It would be important to base examination of the second issue on the fact that the means used to produce material blessings make up the foundation of the existence and development of all societies. Productive forces, and mainly the implements of labor, are the most mobile and revolutionary element of the society. Their change would lead in the end to transformation of the society's economic and all other relations. "...the social relations under which individuals produce--social production relations," wrote Marx, "change and transform in response to change and development of the material resources of production and of the productive forces" (Marks, K., and Engel's, P., "Soch.," Vol 6, p 442). This general sociological law, which was discovered by Marx, also extends to the conditions of mature socialist society. According to this law, in order that we can achieve a transition to communism, we would have to build the material-technical base of communist society. The ways of its creation are spelled out in the CPSU Program and in decisions adopted by the congresses and the plenums of the Communist Party.

The material-technical base of communism will be characterized in quantitative respect by a powerful production potential. It is presently being attained mainly as a result of intensification of production, improvement of its effectiveness, and growth of labor productivity.

Transformation of developed socialism into communism also makes it objectively necessary to make qualitative changes in the material-technical base. Such changes include: complete and integrated electrification, mechanization, and automation of production; proportionate development of all sectors of the national economy--presence of highly developed heavy, light, and food industry, agriculture, transportation and communications, construction industry, trade, and communal-personal services; sensible distribution of productive forces, coupled with the most uniform development of different regions of the country; the most effective and sensible use of natural, material, and labor resources; planned, scientific organization of production, labor, and control on the scale of the entire society.

These quantitative and qualitative changes in the material-technical base of the society will insure a wealth of material and spiritual blessings, full development of the individual's creative capabilities, and communist transformation of production relations. All laborers will assume an equal position in the production system as united owners of the national means of production, distributing the social product that belongs to them in accordance with their needs.

Discussing the third issue, it should be kept in mind that further growth of the country's economic power, expansion and fundamental renewal of production capital, and maintenance of stable, balanced growth in heavy industry make up the core of the party's economic strategy in the 10th Five-Year Plan and in the long-range future. A new major step will be made in 1976-1980 to raise our country's production potential. Industrial production will increase by 36 percent, and agricultural production will rise by 16 percent. Special attention is being devoted in the current five-year plan to accelerated development of power engineering, heavy and transportation, and chemical and petrochemical machine building, electrical engineering industry, and atomic power machine building.

The program for economic development of our country planned by the 25th CPSU Congress is being implemented successfully not only through growth in production but also through all-out improvement of its effectiveness and quality. Emphasis on effectiveness is the most important feature of the 10th Five-Year Plan, and it is an inherent part of the CPSU's economic strategy.

Examining the principal tasks of the party's economic strategy, it should be clarified that their completion has the main objective of satisfying the extensive program of social development and improvement of the people's standard of living. Today, in mature socialism, emphasizes Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, a noticeable turn of the economy to increasingly fuller satisfaction of the diverse material and cultural needs of the people has become possible. In other words the highest goal of socialist production today is under the center spotlight of the party's practical policy (see "Leninskiy kurs" [Following Lenin's Course], Vol 6, p 624). As before, the CPSU's policy concerning income and consumption is based on the premise that growth in wages is the principal way to raise the population's income. In addition to increasing wages and the public consumption funds, concern is also being displayed for fully satisfying the population's demand for food and consumer goods.

The most important direction of the party's social policy--and this must be considered in the course of the seminar--is further erasure of the significant differences between workers doing physical and mental labor, between socialist classes and social strata, and between the city and the countryside, which is insuring our society's movement toward complete social uniformity.

Continuous growth of the country's economy and a resulting increase in the welfare of the people would be impossible without organic unification of the scientific-technical revolution with the advantages of socialism. As was noted by the 25th CPSU Congress, "only in the conditions of socialism can the scientific-technical revolution assume a true course, one satisfying the interests of the individual and society. In turn, only on the basis of accelerated development of science and technology can the concrete tasks of the social revolution be completed, and communist society built" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" (Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress), p 47).

Going on to the fourth issue of the seminar, it should be noted that strengthening the country's defense capabilities and its armed forces is something that we are forced to do, since imperialism was and continues to be a source of military danger. Sufficiently powerful and organized forces against relaxation of tension and against confirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations are operating in the capitalist world. At the fault of these forces, especially certain circles in the USA, the world situation became noticeably more complex at the turn of this decade. Intensifying its pressure upon its allies and drawing them onto the dangerous road of militarism, the government of the USA is developing more and more long-range arms programs, it is expanding its network of military bases in different regions of the world, it is creating a "cold war" atmosphere, and it is speaking the language of force and dictatorship to other countries.

This is why our party is constantly concerned for the security of the country, and for improving the armed forces. The seminar participants must be shown that together with its high potentials in production, science, and technology, the economy of developed socialism will permit us, as was noted by CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, to create, within the shortest time, any armaments upon which the enemies of peace and socialism might rest their hopes.

In conclusion the lesson leader should summarize the seminar's proceedings, emphasizing that in view of the international situation's aggravation, raising vigilance and combat readiness has become an especially pressing task of the soldiers. And this in turn requires that they exert even greater effort in military labor.

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VICTORY DAY ARTICLE: MARSHAL LOSIK

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 80 signed to press  
5 Mar 80 pp 37-44

[Article by HBU, Mar Armd Trps O. Losik: "The Triumph of Soviet Art of War]

[Text] Three and a half decades have passed since the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945, the hardest and cruelest of all wars ever experienced by our motherland. It was a war without historic precedence in terms of its scale, savagery, and intensity, it was a war for the liberty and independence of the socialist motherland, for the future of mankind, for the latter's rescue from the agonies of fascism. The Soviet people, a hero people, honorably endured the severe trial. They raised the Leninist banner, the banner of Great October, the banner of socialism, enwreathed with glory, high above our planet and carried it victoriously through the fire of the war years.

The world-historic victory of the Soviet people and their armed forces in their fight against the strike forces of international imperialism was a triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideology, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, of the fraternal friendship among the peoples of the USSR, and of the inviolable moral-political unity of the Soviet society. This victory persuasively demonstrated the decisive advantages of our social and state structure over the capitalist structure, the power of its economy, the supremacy of Soviet arms, and the high level of Soviet art of war.

Creative development of Soviet art of war during the Great Patriotic War and practical implementation of its conclusions and recommendations proceeded under the direct guidance of the Communist Party. All problems associated with warfare were resolved by the party on the granitic foundation of Marxism-Leninism, with a consideration for and with the use of the fundamental laws governing the course and outcome of the war. The party assumed real unbending leadership over the popular masses, accepting the role of organizer and inspiration of all of their victories. In a savage struggle with the enemy, it strictly followed Lenin's premise on the unity of political, economic, and military leadership. This allowed it to hammer



the people and army together even more strongly, to impart a whole people's nature to the war, and transform the country into a single military camp. Prior to the Great Patriotic War, history never witnessed wars in which the interests of the people, the state, the army, and the ruling party were so distinctively merged into one.

Following the commandments of V. I. Lenin, the Communist Party insured the most effective utilization of the country's economic, moral-political, scientific-technical, and military potentials for the complete defeat of the enemy. Its daily influence upon all areas of the war's strategic leadership and on the organization, training, and combat activities of the troops was exercised through the State Defense Committee, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the General Staff, the commands of the arms and services, and the military councils of the fronts, fleets, and armies. Providing direct guidance to military activities, the party imparted a creative, innovative nature to our military theory. After generalizing and critically rethinking troop combat practices, the party boldly and decisively replaced obsolete combat strategy and tactics with new forms which fully insured attainment of political goals and attainment of strategic objectives spelled out by the party's Central Committee in different stages of the war.

The progressive nature of Soviet art of war revealed itself during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 both in the Supreme High Command's art of strategic leadership of the armed forces, and in the art of the frontal and army commanders, and of all commanders in our armed forces. The tremendous services performed by Soviet military leaders and troop commanders of all ranks, and the heroism and military proficiency of our army's soldiers in the war were recognized by all the world. Nevertheless, despite the obvious facts, a number of bourgeois historians, filling the social order of their bosses, are attempting to falsify history, to do everything to diminish the role of Soviet art of war and the heroism of the Soviet people in the combat successes of our army. They deceitfully assert that the Russian winter, absence of good roads, and the vastness of Russia's expanses were the causes of the fascist army's defeat in the war, and that our armed forces achieved their victory only owing to a manyfold superiority in troops and combat equipment, and so on.

The groundlessness and deceitfulness of such assertions become entirely obvious upon inspection of any seriousness whatsoever. After all the winters, the roads, and the vast expanses of our country equally affected the actions of both the fascist army and the Soviet troops. As far as numerical superiority is concerned, bourgeois falsifiers of history should recall that our army won its historic victory at Moscow at a time when overall superiority in men and equipment was on the side of the fascist German troops. Even the battle of Stalingrad, as well as subsequent offensive actions by the Soviet Armed Forces in the winter campaign of 1942-1943, were fought by our army at a time when it did not enjoy a numerical superiority over the enemy. It was not "military luck" and not "some sort of coincidences" that led the

Soviet people and their army to the brilliant victory. The victory became possible owing to the fact that our glorious Leninist party led the holy war of all the people. It became possible because our economy, policy, and ideology were superior to the economy, policy, and ideology of fascist Germany. It became possible also because our armed forces were more powerful than the German Wehrmacht--the most sophisticated war machine of imperialism, and because Soviet art of war surpassed the art of war of fascist Germany.

Soviet art of war underwent improvement throughout the entire war. From the first days of combat activities the Supreme High Command Headquarters attached tremendous significance to generalizing combat experience and to deeply pondering and meticulously analyzing the course of the armed conflict. The very first directives and orders published by the Headquarters contained important conclusions on the nature of the defensive engagements and provided instructions on the changes that had to be made in the means of combat application of the arms and services of the armed forces. In the initial period of the war, when fascist Germany made a surprise invasion of USSR territory together with its satellites following its treacherous violation of the nonaggression pact, the main task of the Soviet Armed Forces was to block the enemy's road into the heart of the country, to wear him down with an active defense, to halt his progress, and to create the conditions for a subsequent counteroffensive. During this period our military theory successfully resolved, in unity with practice, important issues in the art of war such as the means for creating strategic defenses, the methods for organizing and conducting defensive operations, the use of strategic and operational reserves in defense, and the means of restoring the strategic front of defense.

The defenses of our armed forces were typified by deep disposition, extensive maneuver of reserves, swift restoration of the violated fronts, and high aggressiveness. Its aggressiveness revealed itself in counterstrikes and frequent offensive operations, and in air strikes against the enemy's main groupings, his airfields, and important economic and political centers of Germany.

Despite the fact that the Red Army was forced to abandon a significant part of the country's territory in summer and fall 1941, it inflicted tremendous losses upon the enemy. In five and a half months of fighting on the Soviet-German front, the fascist German army lost over 750,000 enlisted men and officers--that is, 2.5 times more than in all of the preceding period of the Second World War.

In the winter campaign of 1941-1942 our army enriched itself with valuable experience--a transition from strategic defense to a counteroffensive was made for the first time. The counteroffensive at Moscow and the following general offensive in winter 1942 were models of strategic operations conducted by groups of fronts. Wearing down the enemy in hard defensive battles, the Soviet troops went over to the counteroffensive and threw him back from the capital of our motherland, chasing him westward. The defeat of the

fascist hordes at Moscow cast to the winds the legend of the fascist German army's invincibility, and foiled Hitler's plans for a "lightning war." The victory at Moscow initiated the war's fundamental turning point, inspired the Soviet people to new acts of heroism, and strengthened their certainty that the enemy would inevitably be crushed.

In the summer-fall campaign of 1942 the Red Army employed strategic defense in different conditions--when the socialist national economy was basically restructured on a war footing and when the troops possessed a greater quantity of weapons than in 1941. Moreover they acquired a significant amount of combat experience, and their proficiency in defensive combat increased. Confirmation of this can be found in the combat activities at Stalingrad and in the Northern Caucasus.

Relying upon the acquired experience, the Soviet military command developed the methods of conducting a strategic offensive combined with defense in a number of important sectors in which offensive actions were unsuitable or impossible due to the general strategic situations. The strategic offensive usually began with a counteroffensive, which transformed into a general offensive and consisted of successive operations conducted by groups of fronts. These operations were prepared for in short time, without the enemy's awareness, the plans for the operations were distinguished by originality, and as a rule they were a surprise to the German command. Mobile troops--tank, mechanized, and cavalry formations and major tank formations--were broadly employed to exploit the success.

Soviet operational art was able to successfully solve extremely complex and important problems such as penetrating prepared enemy defenses and enlarging a tactical breakthrough into a strategic one. This was achieved through artful selection of the axes of the main strikes, and by the massing of men and equipment on them with the goal of creating a decisive superiority over the enemy. Development of the theory and practice of artillery and air offensives, and creation of powerful strike groupings in the decisive sectors had important significance.

Decisive forms of maneuver such as encirclement and division of enemy groupings, and their annihilation in parts were successfully employed in the course of operations. Artful use of these new forms and methods of combat activity permitted us to successfully penetrate the strategic front of enemy defenses in fall 1942 and summer 1943. The victories enjoyed by Soviet troops in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk are persuasive evidence of the high level of Soviet art of war, and of its superiority over the art of war of fascist Germany.

The counteroffensive of Stalingrad is a classical model of an operation intended to encircle and annihilate an encircled enemy grouping. The success of this operation was the product of the originality of its design, correct choice of the axes of the main strikes, which led the troops to the enemy rear by the shortest route, competent and covert concentration of men

and equipment on the decisive axes at the expense of other sectors, and prompt commitment of reserves to the engagement. Also for the first time in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, Soviet art of war was able to solve strategic problems such as exploiting a breakthrough by tank and mechanized formations deep within enemy defenses, creating inner and outer fronts of encirclement, and imposition of an air blockade about a surrounded enemy grouping.

During this operation the enemy suffered tremendous losses: Out of 50 divisions operating within this sector, 32 divisions and 3 brigades were completely annihilated, and 16 divisions suffered serious defeat. The fascist German army had never experienced such disastrous defeat before. The defeat on the Volga shook the fascist empire down to its foundation. For 3 days the funeral bells tolled over fascist Germany, cloaked in mourning, on the occasion of the defeat of its select grouping of 330,000 men.

At the battle of Stalingrad the Red Army displayed heroism and military art that have no equals in the history of war, and it enjoyed a brilliant victory. This initiated the fundamental turning point of World War II. In a message to I. V. Stalin dated 5 February 1943, U.S. President F. Roosevelt called the battle of Stalingrad "an epic struggle, the decisive result of which is celebrated by all Americans." Not only our allies but also former Nazi generals were forced to recognize the superiority of Soviet weapons. Thus, General (G. Derr), a direct participant of the battle of Stalingrad, later wrote: "To Germany, the battle of Stalingrad was the worst defeat in its history, while to Russia it was its greatest victory."

Soviet troops also demonstrated high art in the organization and conduct of a counteroffensive during the battle of Kursk. Correct selection of the moment to go over from intentional defense to counteroffensive, close operational-strategic interaction between groups of fronts, successful penetration of prepared enemy defenses, competent conduct of a simultaneous offensive from two separate axes, and massed use of tank and mechanized troops, artillery, and aviation are what proved Soviet art of war to be superior to that of the German army in this titanic battle. "The giant battle on the Orel-Kursk salient in summer 1943," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "broke the backbone of Nazi Germany and reduced its armored shock troops to ashes."

Our allies also recognized the high level of Soviet art of war demonstrated in the battle of Kursk. On 7 August 1943 Radio London broadcast that "the Germans had never experienced a defeat such as that at Orel and Belgorod, not even in 1918. Generations will remember that the Red Army inflicted a severe blow upon the Germans, thus demonstrating its courage and proficiency."

Following the battle of Kursk the Red Army assumed a powerful strategic offensive, as a result of which by the end of September 1943 our troops attained the Dniepr River along a 700-kilometer front and captured 23 bridgeheads on its west bank, after which they initiated successful combat activities in the right-bank Ukraine and liberated the city of Kiev.



one of the brilliant pages in the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War was the assault landing operation of the 16th Army at Novorossiysk. During this operation an extremely important beachhead was captured and held for 225 days on the shore of Tsemesskaya Bay at Novorossiysk, called the Little Land. This beachhead subsequently played a tremendous role in the liberation of Novorossiysk and the entire Taman' Peninsula from the fascist German invaders. "I believe that the assault landing on the Little Land and the battle for it can serve as a model of military art," writes Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his book "The Little Land."

The victories enjoyed by the Soviet Armed Forces in the summer-fall campaign of 1943 once again persuasively demonstrated to all the world the superiority of our army in combat proficiency, in armament, and in strategic leadership. Our Soviet military strategy, based on an objective consideration of the military-political situation and the real ratios of men and equipment of the sides, took the upper hand in subsequent battles and engagements as well. In the concluding stage of the war the strategic offensive, which was conducted as rule by groups of fronts interacting with strategic aviation, the navy, and partisans, became the dominant means of combat activities of the Soviet troops. Defense was employed only to reinforce lines and to repel enemy counterstrikes. The conduct of a system of mutually related, successive operations by groups of fronts was a new achievement for Soviet art of war. The Soviet Command became proficient in the art of selecting the axes of the main strikes. Unexpected, powerful strikes placed the enemy in a disadvantageous position, forced him to disperse his forces, exhausted his reserves, and hindered their use. Military-political and economic factors were meticulously accounted for and the status of friendly troops and the troops of the enemy was thoroughly evaluated before the axes of successive strikes and their timing were determined. Much attention was devoted to geography.

The conduct of simultaneous strategic operations along almost the entire Soviet-German front was an expression of the higher level of development of Soviet art of war.

The high level of Soviet art of war also manifested itself in the diversity of forms of maneuver employed in offensive operations. One decisive form of maneuver--encirclement of large enemy groupings followed by their annihilation--was employed with special success (the Korsun'-Shevchenko, Belorussian, Iassi-Kishinev, East Prussian, Berlin, and Prague operations). Another broadly employed form of maneuver was that of driving wedges deep (400-600 kilometers) into enemy formations, as a result of which huge holes were punched in enemy defenses, resulting in the isolation of enemy groupings and their annihilation in parts (operations in the right-bank Ukraine, the Vistula-Oder operation, and others). Making a number of simultaneous, powerful strikes along a broad front was also extremely effective, as a result of which the enemy front of defense was fragmented and enemy groupings were subsequently encircled and destroyed in parts (the Belorussian and L'vov-Sandomierz operations). In a number of operations these three forms of maneuver were competently combined.

The art of preparing and conducting offensive operations and battles improved along the lines of increasing the power of the strikes against the enemy, raising the rate of advance, and massing men and equipment on the axes of the main strikes. Up to 60-70 percent of the infantry, 70-80 percent of the artillery, 80-100 percent of the tanks, and almost all aviation were concentrated in the breakthrough sectors, which usually made up more than a tenth of the breadth of the front's zone of advance; this meant an overwhelming superiority over the enemy and swift penetration of his defenses. Soviet troops also successfully employed various forms and methods of operational penetration of defenses in one, two, or several sectors, followed by exploitation of the breakthrough in depth and on the flanks.

Massed use of tank major formations and formations of frontal and army mobile groups made it possible to successfully solve the problem of transforming a tactical breakthrough into a strategic one. Several tank armies and individual tank and mechanized corps were employed with the support of aviation in a number of operations, thus insuring a high rate of advance. Note that in the concluding stage of the war, the average rate of advance was up to 25 kilometers for combined-arms formations, and 50-70 kilometers per day for tank and mechanized formations.

Soviet art of war successfully solved the problem of organizing and conducting relentless pursuit of the enemy. In the largest operations of 1944-1945 our troops pursued the retreating enemy on a broad front and to a great depth, which attained 250-300 kilometers (in the Iassii-Kishinev and Vistula-Oder operations). The enemy was pursued at a high rate by mobile groups, and by specially organized pursuit detachments allocated from combined-arms formations.

Development of the theory and practice of crossing major water obstacles on the move was an outstanding achievement of Soviet art of war during the Great Patriotic War. The history of wars had never before witnessed the examples of surmounting water obstacles on such a grand scale as demonstrated by our troops.

Attainment of surprise, even when preparations for an operation involved concentration of large masses of troops and a significant quantity of combat equipment, as well as major regroupings, had great significance to the successful conduct of operations. Organization and maintenance of interaction acquired qualitatively new content. To solve the associated problems, Soviet military leaders based themselves on the premise that victory in a war, in an operation, and in a battle may be achieved only owing to the joint efforts of all arms and services of the armed forces.

The brilliant victories enjoyed by the Soviet Armed Forces are irrefutable proof of competent troop leadership by the Supreme High Command and by the commanders of major operational formations. Their activities were typified by depth of design, accuracy of computations, and decisiveness in attainment of goals. The strategic leadership provided to the armed conflict was



distinguished by flexibility, concreteness, and centralization. The Supreme High Command Headquarters determined the axes of the main strikes in the different campaigns and operations, assigned missions to the fronts and branches of the armed forces, and indicated the ways and means of executing the missions. At the same time this centralization of leadership did not deprive frontal and army commanders of their personal initiative. It should be emphasized that troop commanders, frontal and army chiefs of staff, and generals and officers of all branches of the armed forces and of all arms and services made a great contribution to the development of Soviet art of war. Their actions were distinguished by competent combination of different means of conducting combat activities, deep foresight, persistence in attainment of goals, competent use of weapons and equipment, and flexible troop command and control. Improvements in the methods and forms of combat activities were the result of the constant creative initiative and high military proficiency of the commanders, and the bravery, fearlessness, and mass heroism of all the personnel. About 13 million orders and medals were awarded to the soldiers, more than 11,600 persons received the Hero of the Soviet Union title and 10,900 orders were awarded to formations, units, and ships of the operating army and navy for distinguishing themselves in battle and for acts of heroism at the front.

During the war the Communist Party of the Soviet Union nurtured and promoted a remarkable group of troop commanders and military leaders, to include G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, I. Kh. Bagramyan, N. F. Vatutin, L. A. Govorov, A. G. Golovko, A. I. Yerezenko, I. S. Konev, N. G. Kuznetsov, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. A. Meretskov, K. S. Moskalenko, F. S. Oktyabr'skiy, I. Ye. Petrov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, P. I. Tolbukhin, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, V. I. Chuykov, and many others.

The victory enjoyed by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War demonstrated to all the world the progressive nature of Soviet art of war, and it showed that it is the highest achievement of the theory and practice of warfare, and that it was superior to the art of war of the fascist Germany army on all counts.

The most important factor resulting in successful implementation of the designs and plans of the Soviet Command was the high morale of the Soviet troops. This confirmed with new force the validity of one of V. I. Lenin's premises: "In any war, victory depends in the end on the morale of those masses that shed their blood on the field of battle."

Ideological conviction, faithfulness to communist ideals, and class consciousness were the nutrient medium, the inexhaustible source of the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, and of their unshakeable morale and steadfastness. These qualities imparted an offensive spirit to our soldiers, encouraging within them a yearning to defeat the invaders as quickly as possible, and to help the peoples of other countries to rid themselves of the fascist yoke.

Discussing the power of the morale of the Soviet soldiers, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev wrote in his book "The Little Land": "When one thinks today... about what fate imposed upon the soldiers, commanders, and political workers of our army, sometimes one cannot even believe that all of this really happened, that anyone could have endured all of this. But endure they did. They endured everything, they survived all trials and won, and they defeated the fascists."

Owing to the high morale of our troops it was possible to make better use of the weapons, combat equipment, and the proficiency of the soldiers. High troop morale not only creates the conditions for maintenance of an offensive spirit, unbending resolve, and the will to achieve victory, but also significantly intensifies specifically the military-technical component of combat power: It activates military proficiency, raises the professional level of commanders, and hones the moral-combat qualities of the personnel.

Party influence and political work made it possible to develop the capability of the soldiers for consciously committing acts of heroism. Purposeful party-political work conducted in the troops and in the fleets actively promoted formation of high ideological and moral-combat qualities in the soldiers. This work corresponded fully with the goals of the armed forces in the war, the operations, and the battles, and it was the most important prerequisite for successful completion of strategic, operational, and tactical missions. Fulfilling the directives of the party Central Committee, the military councils, commanders, political organs, and party organizations raised every soldier's belief in the justice of our cause, and using concrete examples and facts from combat practice and the deeds of our heroes, they developed the soldier's feeling of high responsibility to the motherland, and raised the morale of the warriors.

Thirty-five years have passed since the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War. During these years our country made a long stride forward, and its armed forces became even more powerful. The Communist Party resolves all questions concerning their improvement on the basis of the strong foundation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, creatively utilizing the conclusions of Soviet military science and the experience of the past war, thus making it possible to broadly employ the results of scientific-technical progress for further reinforcement of the power of the army and navy, to successfully introduce scientific methods into practice, and to boldly and accurately forecast the future development of military affairs.

The efforts of Soviet military science are being directed at solving pressing problems in military practice, mainly at reinforcing the power of the army and navy, raising their combat readiness, improving their organizational structure, and finding new forms and methods of combat activities in modern conditions. The CPSU works untiringly to see that Soviet military science, and particularly military strategy, the supreme level of art of war, would develop to its fullest extent. "Soviet military strategy," says CPSU Central

Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. P. Ustinov, "serves a most progressive social structure, and the cause of protecting the achievements of socialism and development of communism. Its development and improvement are proceeding in strict correspondence with the consistently peace-loving course of the CPSU and the Soviet state, and it is directed at effectively completing all of the party's tasks associated with strengthening our defenses and improving the training of the armed forces."

Recently the situation in the world has become noticeably aggravated at the fault of the reactionary imperialist circles of the USA and NATO. President Carter has declared a course of rejection of relaxation, of confrontation, of a continuing arms race, and of reliance upon military power as the principal resource for attaining the foreign policy goals of the USA, which is once again claiming the role of world policeman. The Soviet Union's firm, carefully weighed attitude toward the dangerous turn in the politics of American imperialism is expressed in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's responses to questions from a PRAVDA correspondent and in his speech to voters of the Baumanskiy election district in Moscow on 22 February 1980.

Considering that imperialist and reactionary circles of the USA and NATO are brandishing their weapons, that they are increasing the arms race, and that Beijing's leaders are aligning themselves with them, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are doing everything necessary to dependably protect the sacred borders of our motherland and the countries of the socialist fraternity, to strengthen the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces, and to develop Soviet art of war.

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## MILITARY LIVING CONDITIONS: STATUS REPORT

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5 Mar 80 pp 45-51

[Article by Prof, Dr Mil Sci, Col Gen I. Golushko, Rear Services Chief of Staff, USSR Armed Forces: "Military Living Conditions--At the Level of Today's Requirements")]

(Text) Unweakening attention toward the material and personal conditions of troops and fleet forces has always been and continues to be one of the objective laws of Soviet military development. It is the product of both sociopolitical changes in the structure of Soviet society and growth in the complexity and volume of tasks faced by the army and navy and by the dialectical mutual relationship between the moral-political state of the people and the degree to which their material and spiritual demands are satisfied. Constant improvement of the personal life of the troops, their quartering, and the living conditions of the people are a matter of great importance, a party matter, an issue of policy. "The best army," said V. I. Lenin, "people most devoted to the revolution would be immediately exterminated by the enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied with food, and trained."

The most sensible combination of people, arms, and equipment within a single troop organism has always defined, at all stages of the development of the armed forces, the appropriate criteria of troop training, the daily life of the troops, and their actions in combat. As the resources and means of combat activities developed, and as the socioeconomic and cultural level of the population rose, this combination constantly improved. The corresponding material and personal conditions of army personnel improved as well. This was expressed in creation of a unique order of military and personal life, manifesting itself as the military camp and its foundation, the barracks.

For centuries the barrack and the military order associated with it were a unique reflection of the socioeconomic and cultural level of development of the state and of art of war as a whole. It was permeated through and through by the spirit of the most disturbing lack of rights.



The Great October Socialist Revolution, having fundamentally altered the social status of the people, created real conditions for development of the economy, science and culture, and military affairs, and it initiated new laws in military development and in the material-technical basis for providing personal services to soldiers, founded on new socialist and communist principles. The barrack transformed from the "jailhouse of the people" into, using M. V. Frunze's apt expression, the "home" of the soldier. He wrote: "We want the Red barrack to be an institution that would be not only a place in which the Red Army soldier undergoes military training, but also the place of his indoctrination, both political and cultural, so that the Red Army soldier would joyously look forward to returning to the barracks, so that he would not feel the pain of breaking from his own domestic tranquility, so that he could learn, and so that, on returning home, he would be sufficiently prepared to perform his general civic duties." These words express an entirely different approach to the purpose of the barrack and its new order, an order that came into being because the army itself changed into an army of the people. Barracks life was changed not only in the political but also in the material and personal respects in accordance with the goals, missions, and economic potentials of the Soviet Union at every stage in the development of our armed forces.

The Communist Party and Soviet government have displayed and continue to display extreme concern for constantly improving the material and personal support afforded to Soviet soldiers, feeling this to be an inseparable part of the main task--that of raising the welfare of the Soviet people. The training base, the quarters, the living conditions, and the personal life of our soldiers have changed unrecognizably. And naturally this has great significance to both creation of the necessary conditions for the training of our servicemen, and especially to the political side of things. In his book "The Virgin Soil" Comrade L. I. Brezhnev writes: "When we create a good life for people, we make their life good, we show concern for them. Creating the good life requires more than just an administrative effort; it mainly requires a proper political approach, mistakes in which cost dearly. We always pay extra for our mistakes: with people's lives in war, and with material and moral losses in peacetime."

The way of the soldier is represented by the daily life of army and navy personnel in peacetime and wartime; it is an embodiment of a soldier's satisfied need for housing, food, clothing, and hygiene articles, and of concern for his health, rest, leisure, and spiritual demands. Sociopolitical, economic, and military factors have a great influence upon it, it is organically associated with all of the blessings that are afforded to an equal degree to the Soviet people, and it depends completely on the level of productive forces and production relations in the country. The higher this level, the greater are the possibilities for satisfying the material and spiritual demands of the people, including the soldiers, to the fullest.

All-out satisfaction of the material and personal needs of servicemen is one of the most important prerequisites of high combat readiness in the units

and aboard the ships. The army and navy possess the manpower and equipment needed to successfully solve the problems associated with improving the life of the troops. In particular, this support is represented at the grass-roots level by troop and ship administrative services and the corresponding rear services subunits. Military personal services facilities mainly include housing, mess halls, bakeries, medical stations, communal-personal and trading institutions, and materiel bases and dumps.

The constant development and improvement of the life of the troops is supported by implementation of a number of concrete measures, and it is proceeding in the Soviet Armed Forces on a strictly scientific basis, with a consideration for the constantly rising requirements imposed by the scientific-technical revolution. New forms of equipment and armament have of course fundamentally altered the organization of modern combat and the forms of special and political troop training, and they have imposed stiffer requirements on the moral-psychological qualities developed in the soldiers. In turn, all of this makes it necessary to alter the life of the personnel correspondingly. I am referring not only to changes in the needs expressed by military camps, military units, and entire formations, but also by the individual soldier. Today he experiences greater moral-psychological and physical loads associated with both servicing highly complex modern equipment and with the conditions under which he must fulfill his responsibilities.

Consider for example that not that long ago at all, submarines and surface ships would leave their home base for a limited period of time, and they would correspondingly organize the necessary reserves of fuel, ammunition, and food--everything that is absolutely necessary to soldiers for normal life and for fulfillment of the mission at sea. Today, ships take to the sea for longer periods of time, and moreover the labor of seamen associated with servicing modern equipment has become more complex and more demanding. This has necessitated implementation of a large number of measures to change the rules under which ships are supplied with everything they need, and to fundamentally restructure the life and rest of the personnel, both during a cruise and after it. Thus all of the necessary conditions for the normal life and activities of the personnel have been created aboard modern atomic submarines, which are capable of breaking contact with land for long periods of time. By satisfying the personal needs of the personnel in this way, we do a great deal to help them surmount the moral-psychological load and difficulties associated with both the execution of complex missions and the long time spent away from land.

The tasks of raising the efficiency of the troops, and their readiness to surmount all physical and moral loads and operate with the greatest effectiveness in all situations are acquiring important significance in all arms, services, and branches of the armed forces. As an example modern aviation, which is typified by tremendous speeds and complex instruments and weapon control, makes it necessary to solve, on priority, the problem of creating the necessary conditions for successful pilot

activity. In this case it is also important to consider that in view of the technical, combat, and operational characteristics of an airplane, it is impossible to create a highly independent material-personal potential within an aircraft. Thus an entirely different approach is needed to solving the problems of logistical and medical support, and extreme concern for the individual and attention to his needs must be displayed.

The soldier's way of life reflects the entire order of modern life in the army and navy, the day-to-day routine of the servicemen, as governed by regulations, orders, and missions in peacetime and wartime. Because the nature of the material and spiritual needs and the ways of satisfying them vary among different categories of servicemen, the way of life experienced by each of these categories has its unique features. It should be emphasized in this case that a soldier's way of life is the life of male collectives, consisting for the most part of young people from 18 to 21 years old. Every soldier performs his official duties shoulder-to-shoulder with comrades with a rule. It is together with them that he prepares for forthcoming lessons, eats, tends to his clothing, shares his impressions of the events of the day, and spends his personal time, and his hours of leisure.

We must not fail to consider the unique features of different branches of the armed forces, arms and services, and geographic conditions when organizing the life of the servicemen. However, we must do everything in this case to keep various factors from having an unfavorable influence upon the health of the soldier and upon their mood. On the boundless snow-covered expanses of the north, in the sunny south--wherever the soldier must perform his honorable duty of protecting the socialist fatherland, he must be supplied with everything he needs, and the appropriate conditions must be created to permit successful completion of his tasks.

Another unique feature of military life is that it is basically the creation of the servicemen themselves. Much of the environment depends upon their creativity and initiative, and upon the significance they attach to this complex and important matter. Spiritual callousness and cold indifference are alien to the soldier's environment; it requires creative inquiry, the ability to keenly sense the pulse of phenomena and processes occurring in the life of the armed forces. Without a doubt the soldier's way of life has been and will continue to be harsh and strict, but in the barracks, on duty, and in the combat or special vehicle, in which the soldier spends a long time, everything must always permit him to live, study, and act well there. An intolerance must be shown toward all sorts of shortcomings, and everything that promotes maintenance of high combat readiness must be introduced in to army and navy life and into the personal life of the soldiers.

An all-army conference on improving the personal conditions of the troops was an important stage in continued improvement of the armed forces, and a manifestation of the constant concern displayed by the Communist Party and the Soviet government for soldiers of the army and navy. It was held

in December 1977 under the guidance of CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. Prominent military leaders, executives representing central directorates and services, and representatives of the broad active masses of the troops--commanders, political workers, and rear services specialists--took part in the conference proceedings.

A long and effective discussion of ways to improve the material and personal conditions of the Soviet soldiers and the material-technical base of military life, and of the best ways to complete these tasks in the 10th and 11th five-year plans went on at the conference. "Resolving the issues of material-personal support to the troops," said the USSR minister of defense at this conference, "we must always see what is most important--we must envision the goal in behalf of which we are doing all of this. To us, this goal is to maintain high combat readiness in the broad sense of the term." In his speech he dwelled on the problems associated with bettering the environment of the military camp, and of furnishing the barracks, which have now become the place of rest and cultured leisure of the soldiers, and a center of their indoctrination in a spirit of communist community; he spoke about the problems associated with organizing food services, providing clothing and footwear, maintaining the health of the personnel, and conducting ideological indoctrination and mass cultural functions.

The speech given by the USSR minister of defense and the tasks he posed have become a program of activity for commanders, political workers, and specialists of the rear, and for party and Komsomol organizations concerned with improving the soldier's way of life. The conference noted the ways for mobilizing army society for this important work, and it arrived at recommendations for improving the personal conditions of the soldiers with a consideration for today's possibilities and the new requirements.

More than 2 years have passed since that time. We can now boldly say that a great deal of work has been done in the troops, and it has produced certain fruits. In many enlisted mess halls, for example, the eating environment has become significantly more cultured, the long tables and benches have been replaced by ordinary tables and chairs, the food handling equipment has been improved, and cooking is becoming mechanized. Most of the military camps, barracks, training centers, and cultural-personal institutions now satisfy modern requirements. The quality of food, clothing, and medical, trade, and other forms of support has improved a great deal. Many good stores, tea rooms, coffee houses, and medical stations have been built and reoutfitted in the troops. The personnel are doing a great deal to utilize everything furnished to them in the best way possible, in the most economical and effective way. Every soldier makes his personal contribution to enlarging the material-technical base upon which the soldier's way of life rests, and to developing it; every soldier fights for sensible and economical expenditure of materials and money. Certain successes have been attained in economization of fuel, electric power, solid heating fuel, and other energy resources.



To put it more briefly, much has been done. And great credit for this belongs to the commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations; they have displayed persistence initiative, and creativity in the fight to improve military life.

However, there are still many shortcomings in this important issue, and far from all of the reserves have been utilized yet. We still encounter cases of weak organization of personnel food services, quartering, clothing supply, and medical support. The only explanation for this is the indifferent attitude of the appropriate officials toward their responsibilities, the low exactingness of certain commanders, political workers, and administrators, and their reluctance to delve into the needs of the soldiers on a daily basis.

We cannot achieve further improvement in the personal life of the troops without persistently and successively solving the problems associated with raising the level of rear support. The nature and unique features of modern warfare impose entirely new, high requirements upon the organization of this support. Today as never before, it is important to devote unweakening attention to unifying the rear services units and subunits, and to decisively fight against simplifications and laxity in their training. We must improve their field skills, so that they would be able to move quickly and deploy in the complex conditions of a combat situation. The flexibility and mobility of rear organs, and the ability administrative officers and personnel of rear services subunits have for supplying the troops with everything they need to complete their combat training missions are tested in tactical exercises and drills conducted at training centers.

There is also still more to do to organize effective and purposeful work in the rear enterprises and services, and to improve their material-technical base. The experience of the best of them must be studied deeply and thoroughly, and disseminated boldly and persistently; the stories of those executives who display the greatest initiative and competency should be told clearly. Many good things can be found, for example, in the practical work of Officer V. Osipov, an executive of one of the rear enterprises. The personnel subordinated to him are making a significant contribution to improving the life of the military units. His people work creatively and zealously, and they devote all of their effort to their assigned work.

We know that the excellence with which particular missions are completed and plans are satisfied depends in many ways on the situation in which the soldiers must work, on the microclimate created within the collective, and on the unshakeable desire to continually augment their successes in socialist competition and progress from one summit to the next.

Officer V. Osipov devotes constant attention to unifying the collective, and he supports good initiative; he is demanding of those who show laxity in their work. This concern for subordinates, this attention toward them, the ability to lead them, and a combination of concern and strict exactingness all produce good results.

The same can be said for many executives of rear units and services. Where does the power of these people lie? In outstanding knowledge of their affairs? Yes! In their high organizational capabilities? Doubtlessly! In a conscientious attitude toward their responsibilities? Without this, there can be no such thing as a leader. But I would also like to note the following characteristics: the ability to deeply and thoroughly study subordinates, to develop that which is positive in each of them, to enlighten them, to help them get their wings, as it is said, and to promote constant growth. People value this, and they respond to this concern with good work. An example of this can be found in Osipov's activity.

Captain R. Tsivinskiy was in charge of a subunit. Things were going well, and nothing troubled anyone. Thus many were amazed when they learned that the captain was being appointed to a new post and that his place had been taken over by a young officer. But it soon became clear to everyone that Osipov, having a good knowledge of the political and working qualities of his subordinates, afforded them the possibility for showing their worth in situations of greater complexity than that experienced before. Osipov was perpetually interested in their successes, and he helped them with advice and recommendations. Now the young officers feel confident, and they take joy in their achievements.

When we talk about effective organization of military life, we imply one of the fundamental principles of this important matter--the constant readiness and capability of all services to support the personnel in their missions. This principle is founded on close mutual dependence of combat readiness and the personal life of the troops.

Further improvement of the personal life of the soldiers depends in many ways on the ideological and professional training enjoyed by rear services specialists. V. I. Lenin felt high professional preparedness to be the most important prerequisite of control. "...in order that we can control," he taught, "we must be competent, we must know all of the conditions of production fully and precisely, we must know the technique of this production at its present level, and we must have a certain amount of scientific education." The rear services officer of today is a competent organizer who has an excellent knowledge of his responsibilities; he is an indoctrinator of subordinates, a person of high ideals, culture, and erudition.

Rear services academies and schools play a great role in the training of such specialists. They are doing much to arm the students with a knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, and an understanding of the processes of social life, of the laws and trends of armed conflict, of the laws governing development of military affairs, and of the role and place of economics in war. Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which is the ideological foundation of the moral-psychological steadfastness of the officers, defines the norms of their day-to-day activities.

Implementing the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Further Development of the Higher School and Improvement of the Quality of Specialist Training," the command, the political sections, and all professors and instructors of rear services institutions of higher education have implemented concrete measures to improve training and indoctrination.

Nor should we fail to mention that the level of training enjoyed by rear services officers depends significantly on the presence and status of the training material base. Much attention is devoted to its development and improvement. Thus training rear control points outfitted with modern communication resources and automation have been created at the Military Order of Lenin Academy of Rear Services and Transportation. True concern is shown for preparing highly qualified personnel in the Military-Medical Order of Lenin, Red Banner Academy imeni S. M. Kirov. Technical information transmission resources, testing equipment, training films, and television are being extensively introduced in all VUZ's. The training laboratory equipment has been significantly renewed.

Making fuller use of the reserves for improving the training of rear services specialists is not the task of just the VUZ's alone. Their graduates continue their training in the troops, learning from their practical activity. One of the important tasks is to create a situation in which every officer would receive maximum political and professional knowledge every day, every hour, to nurture his desire to constantly improve himself and grow, and to increase his contribution to the common goal of raising the unit's combat readiness. A great deal of responsibility for completing this task lies with the commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations of the rear services units and subunits. Experience has shown that wherever the training of young officers is attended to daily, and wherever adequate persistence is displayed and an effective system has been established for professional training, political training, and ideological indoctrination, these officers develop more quickly, and without any unusual complications. And this in turn has a positive influence upon the entire collective within which they serve.

Discussing the reserves for improving the life of the personnel, we should consider first of all the need for constantly trying to raise the level of organization and purposefulness in the work of rear services subunits, and the responsibility of every rear services specialist for his assigned work; we must decisively block all attempts at justifying any sort of shortcomings in the work by the difficulties of training and sea cruises; from one day to the next we must maintain a high level of ideological and political indoctrination, both within the collectives and in relation to each officer, warrant officer, sergeant, petty officer, private, and seaman. This is an indispensable prerequisite for movement forward, for attainment of the highest results in socialist competition.



The ability to analyze the successes of the collective and of every specialist deeply and thoroughly, from a critical standpoint, to see both the positive and the negative, and to promptly and decisively eliminate all that hinders forward movement is a necessary quality of every leader, of every party committee and party bureau, irrespective of the particular conditions.

I already mentioned that noticeable positive changes have occurred in the work of various rear enterprises and services, and in the trading, personal, medical, and financial services offered to soldiers. But there are still many shortcomings in this work. Some enterprises have not completely solved the problems of raising labor productivity and product quality, production is weakly organized, and high personnel turnover continues to be a problem. There are also shortcomings in military trade, in medical services, and in the work of supply services. All of this is making it acutely necessary to think seriously about the selection and placement of personnel; exactingness toward them must be raised, and they should be indoctrinated in the spirit of high responsibility for assigned work, and intolerability of all sorts of shortcomings. Party committees and bureaus are called upon to actively and constantly help commanders and chiefs solve these problems. Special attention should be turned to seeing that communists would serve as the example in the struggle for high quality completion of missions, and to insure that they play a progressive role in literally everything associated with the life of the enterprise; an atmosphere of high exactingness, adherence to principles, and creativity must be created in the collectives, and the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, and AUCCTU decree "On Further Reinforcement of Labor Discipline and Reduction of Personnel Turnover in the National Economy," and orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate must be implemented competently and persistently. We must always remember in this case that high exactingness toward people must be combined with constant concern for them. The party committees and party bureaus must keep an eye on problems associated with the life, training, personal conditions, and rest of the servicemen, their families, laborers, and white collar workers. People always respond to true concern with good work, with shock labor--this is a truth, and it should never be forgotten.

The tasks of the troops are becoming more complex and more important with every year. They are demanding increasingly greater moral and physical effort from the soldiers. Every rear services specialist must understand that it is his important and honorable duty to create the conditions the soldiers need for successful training and for productive rest, to show concern for their personal life, and to provide the troops with everything required for combat and political training; this is where they can make a concrete contribution to improving the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES: POLITICAL WORK EVALUATED

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[Article by Lt Gen A. Kulakov, First Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, National Air Defense Forces: "The Primary Party Organization--the Party's Foundation"]

[Text] Primary organizations play an important role in the activities of the Communist Party in its function as the leader and guiding force of the Soviet people. They, state the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, are at the forward edge of economic and cultural development, they operate in the very thick of the people, and through all of their work they actively promote unification of party policy with the living creativity of the masses, and successful completion of economic, political, ideological, and educational tasks.

As is stated in the CPSU Charter, primary party organizations make up the party's foundation. This premise was first written into the Charter on V. I. Lenin's initiative at the 8th All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) held in December 1919. "The party cell is the foundation of the party organization"--so read this statement. The definition of the cell and the justification of its role in the life of the party were given by V. I. Lenin still earlier--in November 1905 in his article "On Party Reorganization."

Following the victory of October, generalizing the experience of the Bolshevik party's development and activities, Lenin described the tasks of the party cells in the new era as follows: "...these cells, which are closely associated with one another and with the center of the party, exchanging their experience, doing the work of agitation, propaganda, and organization, and applying themselves decisively in all areas of social life, decisively to all types and factions of the laboring masses, must systematically nurture, through such diverse work, themselves, the party, the class, and the masses" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 191).

It would be impossible not to recall at this point the profound lines of Sholokhov's novel "Virgin Soil Upturned," which is based on a true-life situation

concerning a party cell that at first consisted of but three people. But it fought, it put life into the ideas of the party, and no difficulties of any sort were able to shake the faith of the communists in the work of Lenin, or the firm conviction of people forged together by a unified will into a single party collective. And imagine how many party cells of this sort there were!

As the scale of socialist development grew and as the role of the party increased, the party's organizations--its cells--grew and strengthened as well. The need for reorganizing them came about owing to expansion of the functions and tasks. Considering this, the 17th Party Congress (1934) transformed the cells into primary party organizations.

The role of the primary party organizations, serving as the party's foundation, is implied by Lenin's principles of party membership, which require every communist to join a party organization and participate actively in its work. It is in the primary organizations that applicants are accepted into the CPSU, that the activities of party candidates and members are monitored, that they develop as active political warriors, and that they undergo a school of ideological maturity.

Organized on the basis of place of employment, the party organizations are a universal form of unification of CPSU members and candidates into party collectives, into the cells making up our party. It is precisely in them, in the primary organizations, that formation of all of the party's executive organs begins, from the bottom up.

Today the role of party organizations in the life of our country has grown even more. This is associated with the complexity and diversity of the tasks facing the Soviet people in all areas of communist development, to include in the army and navy.

It should be noted that V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party always attached great significance to strengthening the army and navy party organizations. "Swift numerical growth of communist cells is the most important guarantee that the army will always be permeated by the ideals and discipline of communism," stated a resolution of the 8th Party Congress on the military issue. But swift growth of the party ranks does not mean that this growth should occur at the expense of quality. In that same year of the 8th Party Congress (1919), the Central Committee appealed to all party members in a circulating letter to strengthen the Red Army; in particular, it stated: "Only the steadfast warriors, only those people who are ready to die at any moment for the Soviet republic should be accepted into the collectives." And this is precisely what army and navy party organizations did, accepting the most conscious, active warriors who were most devoted to the revolution.

Many facts attest to the power of the influence communists have had upon their comrades. One such example is a telegram from the political section of the Southern Front sent to V. I. Lenin in February 1918: "It is the

unanimous conclusion of the commanders and commissars that the valorous actions of the Serdobakiy Regiment are for the most part the consequence of the steadfastness, bravery, and endurance of communists. In the last 3 days of the enemy's new offensive, the Serdobakiy Regiment withstood the onslaught of the enemy's forces, which enjoyed a five-fold superiority, and communists were the first to die at their posts."

Here is another document that was written more recently: "I report that the first assault group suffered one man killed and seven men wounded. They include VKP(b) (All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)) candidates killed--one man, VKP(b) candidates wounded--four men, Komsomol members wounded--2 men, party nonmembers wounded--one person. The first mission posed by the command has been completed. The political state and morale of the group are high." This was a report from Senior Lieutenant V. Botylev, who landed at the beach-head on the same night that Ts. Kunikov did. This document is one of those cited in the book "The Little Land" by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

Three million communists fell the death of the brave on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. But new warriors rose to take their places. Five million persons replenished the ranks of the party in the time of difficulty for our motherland. And beyond the haze of distant years we can make out the primary party organizations, which unified the communists, cemented the ranks of the fighting units and subunits by their will for victory, and mobilized army and navy soldiers in the fight for a just cause.

Much has changed in the nature of military labor today. The requirements imposed upon people, their knowledge, their skills, and their moral-combat qualities have risen even higher. The range of tasks now facing the primary party organizations of the army and navy has broadened as well. These tasks are spelled out in the CPSU Program and Charter, in decisions of the 23rd CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums, in its decrees, in the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, in the orders and directives published by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and in the requirements of life itself.

Being the bottom link of the party and the political core of the military collective, the primary party organization is responsible for everything done in the unit and subunit. There is no question associated with the life and service of the soldiers in relation to which communists could say: "It's none of our business, it has nothing to do with us." The quality with which the tasks of combat and political training are completed, the state of military discipline, the organization of the socialist competition, maintenance of armament and combat equipment, the moral climate of the military collective, and all of its life, its successes, and its shortcomings are reflected and refracted in the practical activity of army and navy party organizations, particularly of the party organizations of units and subunits of the National Air Defense Forces.

In fact, if you ask the commander of any of our best units what it was that insured the collective's substantial and long-lasting successes in combat and political training and in socialist competition, he would refer you to the high activity and aggressiveness of the party organization, and to its daily, purposeful influence upon all aspects of the life and service of the personnel. This is what we might hear, for example, about the party organization headed by Major S. Vavrinyuk. He himself is a master of combat qualification, and all communists are outstanding specialists of a high class, and leaders in the socialist competition. The soldiers follow their example in service, training, and discipline. The party organization provides effective assistance to the commander in insuring high quality and effectiveness in the training process, and in the fight against laxity and simplifications in combat training, and to bring the training conditions as close as possible to those of real combat. These issues are regularly discussed at party assemblies and bureau meetings in an atmosphere of healthy dissatisfaction with present achievements, and the resolutions they adopt are persistently implemented. Significant is the contribution of the party collective to further improvement of ideological and political indoctrination among the personnel. Lenin readings, evening discussions, and reader conferences are held regularly in the unit on the initiative of the party organization. These and other functions are promoting development of a communist philosophy and a conscious, conscientious attitude toward military duty in the soldiers, and an increase in their responsibility for combat duty. Communists are constantly concerned about creating a healthy moral climate in the subunit, they make sure that an exacting approach is taken to assessing the results of military labor and to compliance with the requirements of the oath, the regulations, and the norms of communist morality. The efforts of the party organization are now directed at mobilizing all of the personnel for an honorable welcome to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

The struggle for further reinforcement of military discipline is a most important direction in the activity of every primary party organization. Working on this task, many party collectives have managed to achieve a significant reduction in the cases of gross disciplinary violations, and they have been eliminated entirely in a number of units and subunits. These successes are based upon the personal example and the friendly, coordinated work of the communists, who have in fact become dependable assistants to commanders in their effort at establishing strict military order, and in ideological, political, military, and moral indoctrination of the personnel.

Typical in this regard is the example of the primary party organization in which Captain N. Lebedev is the secretary. He displays high exactingness toward communists, toward their behavior, and toward their moral countenance, and he makes sure that every party member and candidate would be a model of compliance with the requirements of the CPSU Charter, Soviet laws, and military regulations, and be intolerant of cases of looseness and carelessness. The status of military discipline in the collective is regularly



analyzed at meetings of the communists and at assemblies of the active party members. The reasons behind individual violations, even insignificant ones, are deeply analyzed here, and steps are taken to effectively uproot and prevent various sorts of negative phenomena.

We know that the battleworthiness of a primary party organization and the success of its activities depends primarily on the idealism, organization, and discipline of its members. The party constantly checks the purity of its ranks, and it demands that CPSU members hold the title of communist high. One of the important measures for insuring the required qualitative composition in the party is individual selection. The party organization accepts not all persons who desire admission, but only those, as is emphasized in the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, who have in fact demonstrated that they are joining the party not for the sake of some sort of privileges but in the name of selfless work for the benefit of communism.

It has become a rule in party organizations of units and subunits of the National Air Defense Forces that at the eve of a meeting at which a particular comrade is to be accepted into the party, members of the party committee (party bureau) must study the political, moral, and working qualities of the applicant, and that during the meeting they inform those present about the results of their work. These are open meetings as a rule. The ranks of the party organizations of units and subunits of the National Air Defense Forces are constantly growing, and what is especially important, this is happening due to entry of soldiers in the leading specialties, of those who serve right at the control consoles of the missile launchers, in the cockpits of the fighters, at the radar screens, and at the radio transmitters and plotting boards--that is, soldiers upon whom the combat readiness of the units and subunits depends primarily.

As we know, the November (1979) CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted, with special emphasis, the need for creating a situation of high exactingness, organization, and a creative attitude toward the work in all collectives. How a communist serves, how he behaves himself, and the sort of contribution he makes to strengthening a healthy moral-political climate in the subunit and unit--the primary party organization involves itself with all of this, being a unique school in which every person is simultaneously a student and a teacher. Take as an example the party organization having Major G. Filippenkov in its membership. All CPSU members of this organization are models of improvement in combat skills, they actively participate in public work, and they display high exactingness toward themselves and fellow servicemen. And it is no surprise that soldiers accepted into the party begin observing all of the best in service and behavior from their senior comrades, and comparing their works and deeds with the requirements of the manuals more strictly. It would be pertinent to recall here a folk saying that states: "If the spring is good, the streams it feeds are also good." In other words young party members develop more quickly when they are side by side with experienced communists.

According to the CPSU Central Committee decree on ideological work, the primary party organization must be the center of daily ideological indoctrination. The organizational forms, resources, and methods available to it for this task are legion. It is important to put all of them to use. One such resource is the party assignment. Constant work by communists on assignments of the party organization promotes development of their spirit of high responsibility for the work of their collective, and their ideological growth. Taking an active part in party life, communists mature as organizers, propagandists, and agitators, and they develop steadfastness and stubbornness in attainment of an assigned goal. This multiplies the power of the party organizations, their authority, and their battleworthiness even more. Experience shows that the greatest successes are enjoyed by those primary party organizations which give assignments to communists with a consideration for the tasks facing the collective, the capabilities, interests, and potentials of each communist, and his interest in a particular type of work. As we know, zeal is born mainly when the work has an attraction to the person, when he has a creative attitude toward it. Of special significance are assignments involving mobilization of the soldiers for successful completion of combat training tasks, with further reinforcement of the combat readiness of the units and subunits, with increasing the organization and unity of military collectives, and with implementation of measures spelled out in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination."

Many primary party organizations working in the units and subunits of our troops can rightfully be called effective. Take as an example the primary party organization of the air squadron headed by Captain S. Levoshin. This is a friendly, united collective. The high effectiveness of its influence upon the affairs of the soldiers can be explained in many ways by competent placement of the communists. Each of them, working on assignments of the party organization, labors with a spark, propagandizes and implements party ideas as required by the CPSU Central Committee decree of ideological work, and devotes all of his knowledge and all of the strength of his spirit to this extremely important work. Communists constantly augment their combat proficiency, and they actively help their fellow servicemen to do the same. They persistently publicize the advanced skills, and help the commander wage a decisive struggle against laxity and simplifications in combat training. A good rule has established itself in the party organization: regularly listen at assemblies and bureau meetings to reports from communists on their progress in their duties and assignments. Individual discussions with party members and candidates have become an effective form of control, and of providing help. During such discussions the party organization secretary asks the particular comrade what he feels his place to be in the overall scheme of things, how he is progressing with his party assignments, and what he is doing to increase his knowledge and elevate his ideological level. Each interview of this sort gives an indication as to what in the communist's practice deserves approval and support, and what he needs to work on some more and consider more deeply. The results of the interviews are brought to the awareness of the entire party organization,

which creates public opinion, and a situation of high exactingness in relation to the official duties, behavior, and work of party members and candidates. And we all know that the more actively mutual enrichment with experience and knowledge proceeds, the stronger the party organization becomes.

The communist assembly is the highest organ of the primary party organization. In these assemblies, members resolve all issues associated with the life and activity of the party collective, and they have a possibility for feeling more deeply their communion with that which is important to our people and which guides the life of the armed forces and the military collective, and for receiving a new energy charge for work on the tasks at hand.

The political directorate constantly analyzes the results of assemblies held in the party organizations of the units and subunits, and the state of criticism, self-criticism, and intraparty democracy. What does such analysis reveal? Most party collectives conduct their assemblies as required by the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Practice of Conducting Party Assemblies in the Yaroslavl' City Party Organization." The issues brought up for discussion are timely and vitally important to the military collectives-- problems associated with the quality and effectiveness of combat and political training, with raising vigilance during combat duty, with the effectiveness of socialist competition, with assimilation of equipment and weapons, and with reinforcement of military discipline. Issues such as fulfillment of official responsibilities by communists, the state of ideological work in the collective, the advance guard role of communists, elevation of their ideological-political level, and improvement of indoctrination of the young have also become more frequent topics of discussion. Talk about the life position of the communist and discussion of the contribution made by each party member to improving the training process elicit lively interest among those in attendance. Assemblies that have agendas of this sort and ones like them, and that are well prepared for, awaken the thinking process and help to raise the feeling of responsibility communists hold for the common success.

At the same time we sometimes encounter cases in which assemblies are prepared for and conducted formally; timely issues associated with the life of the organization and general political issues are rarely discussed at them. The same comrades always give the reports, they sometimes limit themselves to hackneyed truths, and they do not know how to get the attention of the communists and mobilize them for solution of the current problems. Moreover after decisions are made, practical work does not always follow. Many of these shortcomings are inherent, for example, to the party organization headed by Major Yu. Kochetkov. Here, quite often neither the reports nor the statements of the communists represent a deep and principled analysis of the collective's activities, or a strict assessment of the contribution made by each member of the organization to concrete tasks. Naturally the assemblies that are conducted in this fashion teach little to those in attendance, and they fail to create, within the party organization, a situation of criticism and self-criticism, healthy dissatisfaction with achievements, and an atmosphere of friendly, coordinated work. This reduces



not only the effectiveness of what is said at the assemblies, but also the power of the party's influence upon successful completion of the tasks of combat and political training.

Here is another shortcoming that has still not been eradicated in a number of party organizations. Some communists go on record at the assemblies as being for improvements in the affairs of the collective, but they do not even lift a finger to transform their wishes, and even the decisions adopted, into reality. The elected party organ, meanwhile, sometimes forgets about control, about checking up on how all of the work is going. It forgets that the main thing in our work is to change the state of affairs for the better, to create a situation in which our people would grow and their party character would crystallize, and to achieve stably high indicators in combat and political training. Being the supreme organ of the primary organization, the party assembly is at the same time a means for expressing the unity of opinions and actions of the communists, a tribunal of criticism and self-criticism, and a school of indoctrination. We see in the case cited above, however, that the primary party organization has been unable to teach its members to exercise their official rights competently. Mainly their right of criticism, of free, business-like discussion of all problems in their work and life. Nor is much being done in the collective under discussion here to confirm the unity of word and deed, of decision and execution.

The power of the primary party organization's influence upon all aspects of the life and activity of the combat collective lies in its close ties with the soldier masses, in the ability to rely, for help in the most important tasks, upon the Komsomol organizations, which have the absolute majority of young defenders of the motherland in their membership. Fulfilling the requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress and the party Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination," the primary party organizations of units and subunits of the National Air Defense Forces constantly keep management of Komsomol organizations within their field of view.

Take as an example just one of the party organizations. It is headed by Captain V. Yegorov. He devotes unweakening attention to strengthening the party core in the Komsomol, to the selection and training of active Komsomol members, and to insuring that Komsomol members serve as a personal example in training and service. CPSU members penetrate deeply into the needs and demands of the young, they give full support to the initiatives of the Komsomol committee, they help it organize and conduct various political indoctrination functions at a proper ideological level, and they do what they can to achieve high effectiveness in the all-union Lenin examination "Implement the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress!", an important form of ideological work. All of this is producing good results. Measuring themselves up to the communists, and constantly sensing their help and concern, all Komsomol members have become classed specialists, with every other one of them ranked in the top class, and they actively participate in public life. Moreover the Komsomol organization has been awarded the perpetual pennant of the Komsomol Central Committee.



Experience has shown that concrete, effective leadership of party organizations on the part of political organs in many ways promotes growth in the effectiveness of party organizations and constant growth of their influence and authority in the military collectives. If the political organs maintain close ties with party committee and party bureau secretaries and active party members, and if they have a detailed knowledge of what is going on in the party organizations of the units and subunits, then things go more smoothly in the party collectives, and their influence upon the personnel constantly grows. But unfortunately we sometimes see the opposite in our work with the troops as well as with the political directorate, hearing reports from political organ chiefs on the quality of leadership in primary party organizations. Rather than providing concrete assistance, certain political organs do no more than issue general directives and hold a few spirit rallies. Workers of the political section visit the party organizations, but the traces of their presence do not remain, and the state of affairs does not change for the better. Why? Because the more-experienced comrades do not penetrate deeply into the content of the party work, doing little to help the active party members to eliminate shortcomings and raise the effectiveness of the organization.

Understandably the political directorate of the National Air Defense Forces makes the proper conclusions for itself from all of this, and it constantly works to see that the political organs would provide objective leadership to the primary party organizations, so that their daily efforts would be guided promptly and concretely to fulfillment of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet government, and the requirements of orders and directives published by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and so that the political organs would be well aware of what is going on in the primary party organizations, of the tasks they are working on, and of the difficulties they are encountering, so that they would account for the unique features of the party collectives, and so that they would work thoughtfully with the active members.

The National Air Defense Forces, which are perpetually on combat duty, have complex and important missions. Their successful completion depends in many ways on how actively our primary party organizations function. And this is why we try to do everything to raise their effectiveness higher, to increase their influence upon the affairs of the military collectives, and to make the party organizations real helpers to commanders in the struggle for high combat readiness of the units and subunits, for further reinforcement of discipline, and for achievement of new successes in the socialist competition of the soldiers.

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## POLITICAL TRAINING: QUALITY OF LECTURES REVIEWED

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[Article by Maj Gen A. Kuzovnikov, Lecture Group Chief, Propaganda and Agitation Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and Col N. Ustyakin, Senior Lecturer: "Lecture Propaganda and Life"]

[Text] In the struggle to implement communist ideals, the CPSU attaches tremendous significance to ideological work and to further improvement of all efforts at indoctrinating the Soviet people and soldiers of the army and navy. The principal ways for completing the tasks of indoctrination in the conditions afforded by developed socialist society were clearly spelled out and scientifically grounded by the 25th CPSU Congress. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" is an elaborate and concrete program of action aimed at developing communist awareness in the Soviet people and soldiers of the army and navy. This general party document has great political and theoretical significance, and it bears a long-range nature. The All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers held in October 1971 was devoted to the pressing problems of its implementation.

Lecture propaganda has an important place in the implementation of the directives contained within the CPSU Central Committee decree and within the recommendations of the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers. In today's conditions, its role is growing significantly. The quality and effectiveness of all ideological indoctrination depends in many ways upon the level of lecture propaganda.

The bureau of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate gave audience to a report from Lieutenant General A. Lizichev--chief of the political directorate of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District--on the work of the political directorate and the political organs aimed at improving lecture propaganda in light of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee. A preliminary investigation of the affairs of units and formations in this district and discussion of this report revealed that commanders, political organs, and party organizations have improved their management of lecture propaganda, and that they have started penetrating more deeply

into its content, to resolve, in a more competent way, the issues upon which its quality and effectiveness depend, and to utilize its possibilities more broadly with the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee associated with raising the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. The same can be said about the activities of many political organs and party organizations of the Leningrad, Belorussian, and Odessa military districts, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and the Northern and Black Sea fleets. Much is being done in this respect by the military lecture group of the Central Club of the Soviet Army.

The scope of lecture propaganda in the formations and units and aboard the ships has grown, a broad range of official and unofficial lecturers and propagandists are participating in it, and its content and thematic orientation have improved. Central to lecture work is deep explanation, to the soldiers, of Marxist-Leninist theory, the pressing problems of the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy, and the successes in implementing decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums, decrees of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Constitution, and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's directives and recommendations contained within his speeches and his books "Pressing Problems in the Ideological Work of the CPSU," "Standing Guard Over Peace and Socialism," "The Little Land," "Resurrection," and "The Virgin Soil."

Lecture propaganda is used extensively to inform the personnel about the most important events in domestic and international life, and about changes occurring in the world's military-political situation. Army and navy lecturers and propagandists have begun showing more concern for tying their presentations in more closely with the life and concrete affairs of the soldiers. Executives are participating more in lecture propaganda. Regular presentations by executives that are well prepared in the ideological-theoretical respect, and by highly qualified specialists in different areas of military affairs are always received with great interest and produce an especially deep impression.

It may be said without exaggeration that lecture propaganda is becoming an increasingly more effective resource for developing a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, an active life position, and deeply conscious responsibility for fulfillment of one's patriotic and international duty in the soldiers, and it is having a growing influence, raising vigilance, strengthening military discipline, and maintaining constant combat readiness in the sub-units and units, and aboard ships.

However, lecture propaganda does need further improvement. This is dictated by growth in the requirements on this important area of ideological indoctrination, as well as by the fact that despite the noted positive changes, lecture propaganda still contains many serious shortcomings and unutilized possibilities. Some political organs and party organizations are implementing measures to fulfill the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee decrees "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" and "On the Status and Measures for Improvement of Lecture Propaganda" too slowly, without due persistence. It is entirely obvious

that only consistent and creative fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee's requirements will insure a further rise in the quality and effectiveness of lecture work. What we mean by this is that we must consolidate what we have achieved, and using this as a base from which to move further forward, raise the scientific level of lecture propaganda, improve its effectiveness and concreteness, and its relevancy to life and to current tasks, and develop its offensive nature.

When we say that lecture propaganda must be based on scientific grounds and high ideals, we imply deep, documented examination of pressing problems in the theory and policy of the party. What stirs the thoughts of people and encourages them to independent thinking, to independent analysis of the events and phenomena of public life, is not toying with scientific terms, and not declarations of common truths, but clear, comprehensible, and substantiated explanation of the most complex issues. All lectures, including those on technical and military topics, must correspond to the level of today's achievements in the given sector of scientific knowledge. A lecture is well received by the audience and elicits its interest if it does not repeat what everyone knows already, and if it instead bears new knowledge and broadens the outlook of the soldiers.

Political organs and party organizations are doing the right thing when they display constant concern for raising the quality of oral presentations. The discussion and review of lectures is a tested way to achieve this goal. Practice has shown that such discussions can be conducted in meetings of lecture and agitation-propaganda groups and collectives, and in discussion sections created within them. Lecture methods councils have been created in a number of propaganda collectives and have recommended themselves well as a platform of lecture discussion. These councils are staffed by five to seven of the best trained lecturers. Political organs of the Far East Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and the Northern Fleet have accumulated good experience in keeping lecture propaganda quality high.

Nevertheless, as an analysis of the state of affairs would show, the scientific and ideological-theoretical level of many lectures and reports is still below modern requirements. Some presentations lack a deep and substantial analysis of the problems under examination. In a number of cases the contribution made by decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the USSR Constitution to Marxist-Leninist doctrine is not fully revealed. In particular, little is explained about the premises on developed socialism, the socialist way of life, the unique features of the present stage in the general crisis of capitalism, and so on. Presentations on the successes enjoyed by the Soviet people in the 10th Five-Year Plan require significant improvement. They often contain a wealth of figures, but very few memorable comparisons and generalizations that persuasively demonstrate the advantages of socialism. The military aspect of economic successes and their favorable influence upon the country's defense capabilities and the personal living conditions of the soldiers are not always revealed.



Nor have the shortcomings in lectures on foreign policy topics been surmounted. Consider this in the light of the fact that almost a third of all presentations are in this area. Interest in them is invariably high, since they discuss pressing problems of war and peace, and of the role of the Soviet Armed Forces and the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact countries in insuring the security of the socialist fraternity. However, many presentations on these topics bear the nature of reviews. They lack a comprehensive and substantial examination of specific problems, and they are typified by a low theoretical level. In a number of cases the lectures are dominated by simple presentations of fact, with little room left over for class analysis and for class assessments of the most important events.

Many units and ships are working full speed today in connection with the impending 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. This work is proceeding in close unity with explanation of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech to voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy election district and his statements concerning defense problems. References to Lenin's works enrich lecture propaganda, and serve as a powerful means for forming scientific philosophy, ideological conviction, and class self-consciousness in our soldiers. Life persistently demands that lecture and agitation-propaganda groups and collectives regularly offer presentations on individual works of V. I. Lenin, and give lectures reviewing Lenin's works, singling out certain key problems, especially those associated with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, development of the Soviet Armed Forces, and party guidance of the army and navy.

As V. I. Lenin saw it, theory serves practice when it captures the awareness of the masses and incites them to practical action. In correspondence with this Leninist premise, lecture propaganda is being directed in the army and navy toward nurturing, in the personnel, an understanding of the objective need for maintaining constant combat readiness, which is an indispensable condition for successful development of communism. Lecture propaganda helps the serviceman understand that his military labor is as necessary to the motherland as is the creative labor of the worker and the peasant, and that successes enjoyed in combat training and in maintaining combat readiness are his personal contribution to the development of communist society.

Many units and ships have now begun devoting more attention to strengthening the relationship between lecture propaganda and the tasks of improving the quality of combat training, strengthening military discipline, raising political vigilance, and improving military and moral indoctrination. But this is not the way things are everywhere.

Today, in a time in which the army and navy are outfitted with complex and menacing combat equipment and arms, the significance of personnel military-technical training is growing immeasurably. Irreproachable knowledge of military equipment and weapons and their competent use in various situations is the most important indicator of field, aerial, and naval proficiency.

And yet in a number of cases lecture propaganda does little to promote attainment of these goals. As an example some units of the Moscow Anti-aircraft District have not devoted due attention to raising the level of propaganda on military-technical knowledge. Out of 20 lectures on this topic that were rated by inspectors, many exhibited serious shortcomings in their content. Many lectures and reports given in a number of units of some other districts are poorly tied in with the practical tasks of the soldiers associated with assimilation of equipment and weapons. We also encounter the other extreme, where lectures on military-technical topics take on the nature of instructions and directives, having no social and party orientation at all. Both extremes are harmful.

Lecture propaganda does not always have an effective influence upon military discipline, the most important foundation of combat readiness. Thus members of the agitprop collective of the political section headed by Officer N. Cherkasov do little to explain the essence of one-man command in our army, or the role of commanders of all ranks in strengthening military discipline. The agitation-propaganda group of the party committee of which Officer A. Popov is a member does not display aggressiveness in publicizing the military regulations, the military oath, and Soviet laws, even though certain servicemen do deviate from the official norms and rules of behavior.

When we say that lecture propaganda must be timely and concrete, and tied in with life, we also imply that the names of the outstanding soldiers of combat and political training must be publicized to the fullest, and most importantly, their experience should be revealed, and the ways, means, and methods by which they attained their success in improving their military proficiency should be demonstrated. But it is important to publicize not only the experience of the best soldiers, but also the best experience in organizing the basic forms of combat training and socialist competition.

To fight for greater effectiveness of lecture propaganda means to develop its aggressive, offensive nature, and to strictly follow the Leninist principle of adherence to party principles. Two aspects can be clearly seen in the question of the offensive nature of lecture propaganda, as well as of all ideological indoctrination--a domestic and an international one, though they are also closely associated and they generally pursue the same goal, that of reinforcing the historic advantages of socialism in the consciousness of the soldiers, promoting further success in socialism's development and defense, nurturing intolerance of alien ideology and its manifestations, and promoting elimination of all that keeps the soldier collectives from moving ahead on the road toward perfect combat readiness.

If we are to raise the effectiveness of personnel indoctrination, lecturers and propagandists will have to devote more attention to publicizing all that is new, progressive, and promising. They must reveal to the soldiers the farthest horizons in improvement of their combat skills, they must indicate the ways of reaching them, they must mobilize the soldiers in the fight against shortcomings more aggressively, and they must seek out and

implement unutilized reserves by which to raise combat readiness further. In this connection the need arises for fighting more decisively against laxity and simplifications in combat training. It is also important to prevent the still-encountered attempts by some servicemen to deviate from the norms of communist morality and the requirements of the manuals.

The practical work of many lecture and agitation-propaganda groups and collectives shows that far from all of the great possibilities for developing the offensive nature of lecture propaganda in the international aspect are being utilized. As an example the agitprop collective headed by Captain 1st Rank A. Teikalo once weakened its efforts to reveal the true nature of bourgeois ideology and of ideological sabotage undertaken by imperialism in military affairs. Lectures aimed at revealing bourgeois fabrications on the guiding role of the CPSU in military development, falsifications of the history of World War II, and malicious distortions of the methodological and philosophical foundations of Soviet military policy, the purpose and combat history of our armed forces, and their international missions were practically absent from among the presentations of this collective's propagandists.

The offensive nature of lecture propaganda is doubtlessly raised when the revelation of the true nature of imperialism, hegemonism, militarism, and reaction, and of various sorts of slanderous campaigns is accompanied by publicity on the successes and advantages of real socialism in all spheres, and by thorough demonstration of the untiring struggle being waged by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity to avert imperialist aggression and consolidate peace and international security.

One of the manifestations of the offensive nature of lecture propaganda can be seen in effective briefing of the personnel on the most important events in the international arena. "It is time," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "to make our information on international affairs more effective and comprehensible, to fill it with more concrete facts, and to lecture on international events and generalize them immediately after they occur. What we need is not repetition of hackneyed truths, but deep, substantiated analysis of the facts of international life!"

CPSU Central Committee requirements associated with raising the scientific level of lecture propaganda and intensifying its concreteness, effectiveness, and defensive nature may be satisfied only by improving work with ideological personnel. It is all the more important to emphasize this because many lecturers and propagandists have held their posts for relatively short periods of time. In their overwhelming majority, these are energetic and unconventional people, but they do not all have sufficient work experience. Considering this, political organs and party organizations have recently intensified their attention to lecturers and propagandists. In general, propagandist rallies have been well organized and their content has been rich. But at the same time, as an analysis of the state of affairs in the Transbaykal Military District showed, some political organs are not

concerning themselves enough with arming the propagandists, especially the young ones, with the techniques of party propaganda and with the pedagogical foundations of lecture work. These problems are rarely raised at rallies and seminars. At the present time, these shortcomings are being corrected. But life persistently requires that we constantly improve the ideological-theoretical and methodological training of propagandists, concretely teach them the art of oral presentations, and inform them better of the country's domestic and international life, the tasks of combat and political training, and the state of military discipline.

If we are to improve lecture propaganda, political organs and party organizations must be more demanding in their approach to staffing the agitprop collectives and agitation-propaganda groups, and they must delve more concretely into their activities. It is important for party organizations to view communists working as lecturers and propagandists as persons on an important party assignment, to display high exactingness toward them in regard to the quality of their presentations, and to help them in their work every day. It would be suitable to periodically discuss the status of lecture propaganda and the ways for improving it at communist assemblies and bureau meetings.

There is a need for improving the planning of lecture propaganda. As we know, it involves numerous official and unofficial lecturers and propagandists. But in some formations and units, for example in the Moscow Military District, until recently the propaganda groups and collectives did not always work in coordinated fashion. Sometimes it happened that certain topics were repeated, while no one gave presentations on other important topics. Sometimes plans foresaw several presentations at the same time and in the same subunits. The district's political directorate corrected this situation. Now the activities of the lecture and agitation-propaganda groups and collectives are coordinated as a rule in terms of their content, place, and time. The plans reflect the requirements of an integrated approach to ideological indoctrination, they insure unity in ideological-political, moral, and military indoctrination, they are based on the requirements of life and the tasks of the servicemen, and they now consider their interests and demands more fully. This experience deserves approval and dissemination.

The Communist Party teaches us that concrete works are the yardstick of communist indoctrination of the masses. This pertains to lecture propaganda as well. Its purpose is to promote effective development, in the servicemen, of deep communist conviction, faithfulness to patriotic and international duty, and high responsibility for protection of the achievements of socialism.

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## MILITARY DISCIPLINE: IMPROVEMENT METHODS DISCUSSED

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[Article by Cand Legal Sci, Col Justice V. Gushchin: "Crime Prevention in the Subunits"]

[Text] "Every commander (chief) must devote special attention to strengthening conscious military discipline and preventing participation of subordinates in crimes, disciplinary incidents, and misdemeanors, to promptly revealing and eliminating their causes, and to capitalizing fully upon the power of the public in the struggle against violators of military discipline and social order."

(From Article 51 of the USSR Armed Forces Internal Service Regulations)

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Improving the Law Enforcement and Intensifying the Fight Against Crime" emphasizes with new force the need for strengthening socialist legality and intensifying the fight against crime. The main direction of this work is prevention of crimes and other violations of the law. The urgency of this task is dictated by the growing intolerability displayed by Soviet people toward antisocial manifestations, and by the desire to see each person as an honorable citizen of a society building communism. And it is no accident that the principle of mandatory observance of the law is documented within the USSR Constitution (Article 4).

Another reason that prevention of all violations of the law and of the requirements of military discipline is a growing necessity in the Soviet Armed Forces is, as was noted at a scientific-practical conference of army and navy political organ executives by CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, that "today, at a time in which the army and navy are outfitted with complex armament systems, the slightest manifestation of carelessness and lack of discipline by even a single serviceman could lead to grave consequences."

In the army, the problem of preventing crime is within the competency of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, and workers of military justice organs. The principal role in this belongs to one-man commanders, who organize and direct preventive work, set tasks for all subordinates and party and Komsomol organizations associated with training, indoctrination, and attainment and maintenance of established order, determine the ways of completing these tasks, and organize control over their fulfillment.

Scientific research on and analysis of the practice of legal education graphically shows that a definite system of party-political, psychological-pedagogical, administrative, legal, and other measures promote better solution of the problems of maintaining the combat readiness and battle-worthiness of the subunits and units, and timely crime prevention. Of priority significance in this regard is political, military, legal, and moral indoctrination of servicemen, and organizational steps taken to organize the activities of the personnel in strict correspondence with military regulations, manuals, and statutes, and orders of commanders and chiefs.

The greatest success in crime prevention is enjoyed when this work is conducted purposefully, consistently, and actively, and, what is especially important to emphasize, in a carefully thought-out, planned order. Such planning is preceded by a study of the causes and conditions promoting crime. In this case we invariably consider the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee, orders and directives published by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, the tasks the soldiers must complete in the planning period, the status of military law and order, and so on.

Plans for joint measures to strengthen legality in particular units and subunits, written up by the command, by political sections, by the military procurator's office, and the military tribunal, have gained a firm foothold in recent times. Planned preventive work is performed both with all the personnel and with individual groups of soldiers. The effectiveness of these measures depends in many ways on how well individual and group features of the servicemen are accounted for and utilized.

Soldiers are never absolutely alike. Beyond outward similarity, we find different levels of education, capabilities, and conscientiousness. That part of an individual that is not a soldier is his individuality, his life's signature. Understanding this handwriting, and discerning behind each line the thoughts and ideas of the soldier, his desires and yearnings, and correcting them where necessary is one of the prerequisites for prevention of possible crimes.

The most experienced commanders and political workers try to promptly and fully study group interests and moods, and the individual features of the soldiers. Constant communication with subordinates and confidential

discussions with them in a relaxed atmosphere not only reveal the demands and wishes of the soldiers but also provide objective information on the state of affairs in the subunits, making it possible to more thoughtfully and effectively influence the mutual relationships of the servicemen and maintain a healthy atmosphere in the military environment. There is much that all officer-indoctrinators can learn from this work, and many things that deserve their attention. Thus in order to study more fully the individual qualities of soldiers in the subunit in which Captain V. Gerasimov serves, letters are sent to the parents of the young soldiers requesting the most detailed possible information about their children--their character traits, interests, the conditions under which they were raised, and so on. Meetings with the parents when they visit their sons in the unit also serve these purposes. In another subunit Captain I. Gutsalenko took the initiative to develop a special journal as a means for assisting commanders in their study of the individual features of the soldiers. It indicates questions and sample answers of special importance to organizing subsequent indoctrination of young soldiers. The journal contains the following sections: family status, attitude of parents toward their children, school, and work, the way free time was used before the army, impressions of military service, and others.

Young soldiers called up for service are met by a new life road 2 years long--1 in the navy. The way they travel this road depends in many ways on the orientation the new soldiers are given in their army and navy collectives. It is especially important here to orient them promptly on an upward path taking them to the summits of combat proficiency and discipline. Life shows that there is a great emotional charge to be had from meetings with outstanding soldiers of combat and political training, with classed specialists having expert facility with weapons and combat equipment, with the best sportsmen of the subunits, with participants of the Great Patriotic War, and with persons who had received government awards for exemplary fulfillment of military duty in peacetime. As an example Private 1st Class V. Vasil'yev, Private 1st Class N. Simkin, and Sergeant A. Sergeyev, soldiers doing outstanding training, had a successful encounter with young soldiers in one such meeting conducted in the outstanding company led by Officer Yu. Pal'chikovskiy. They clearly shared their experience in maintaining complex combat equipment, and they described the sort of difficulties they experienced when they began service, how they learned to surmount them, and how they became reknowned specialists in the end. The novice soldiers asked questions during the meeting, to which substantial answers were given. Such meetings are very effective in terms of psychologically orienting young soldiers toward conscientious fulfillment of their responsibilities. Moreover they help personnel of different persuasions to come closer together, improve the moral atmosphere in the collective, and reinforce military discipline.

Another form that is very effective in the same subunit is discussions on the traditions of the company, and the combat road of the unit. In addition to officers and warrant officers, an active part is taken in these discussions by privates and sergeants, outstanding soldiers of combat and

political training who proudly describe the achievements of the personnel in training, service, athletic competition, and the glorious combat traditions of the units, and appeal to the soldiers to multiply them.

Devoting much attention to the training and indoctrination of young soldiers, the best commanders at the same time do not forget about servicemen called up in earlier conscription periods; they are not left without daily educational influence. An analysis of disciplinary practices would show that the greatest number of violations are committed by privates and sergeants in their second year of service. This can be explained in many ways by the fact that on assimilating their functional responsibilities and acquainting themselves rather well with military service, such servicemen gradually lose interest in the lessons and other measures, if they are organized without a consideration for their training level, and for their higher interests and demands. Repetition of that which they had done, seen, and heard in the first year of service, without enriching these forms with new content, cannot elicit creativity in the soldiers. These shortcomings in work with them, and sometimes even their neglect without adequate control, often leads to a situation where instead of directing their energy toward improving military proficiency and rendering aid to those who fall behind, they assume a road of crime. To prevent such phenomena, in addition to other measures the company discussed above conducts group discussions for soldiers in their second year of service, and it studies the guidelines on strengthening military discipline and uprooting cases of improper mutual relationships. Personal interviews and conferences are now part of the work with them. A knowledge of the state of affairs in the subunit is an aid to maintaining a purposeful influence upon particular servicemen trying to create a privileged position for themselves within the military collective.

The work of strengthening discipline, nurturing high moral-combat qualities in the servicemen and personal responsibility for compliance with Soviet laws, manuals, and orders, and preventing crime is based on the high communist awareness of the personnel, which is achieved in turn through combat and political training, and all of the service and life of the troops.

Legal education is an inseparable part of political and military indoctrination of the personnel. Activities aimed at crime prevention are associated directly with such indoctrination. Legal indoctrination mainly entails propaganda on Marxist-Leninist ideas of state and law, the statutes of the USSR Constitution, and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress on raising the defense capabilities of our country, strengthening socialist legality, law, and order, and surmounting the vestiges of the past in the consciousness and behavior of the people. In order to achieve strict and unswerving compliance with the law and with the demands of the military regulations and the military oath, we must first of all have a good knowledge of their essence, and deeply understand them. But a knowledge of the law is not the sole prerequisite of compliance with it. It is important to nurture a correct attitude toward the law, to achieve transformation of this knowledge of the law and of the requirements of the military regulations



into personal convictions held by each soldier, into his practical deeds. Respect for the law must be the personal conviction of each individual--this is the way Comrade L. I. Brezhnev worded the main task of legal indoctrination. The forms of this work are most diverse: political lessons, lectures, reports, group and individual discussions (the latter are reserved primarily for undisciplined servicemen), discussion evenings, question-and-answer evenings, Lenin readings and lessons on protection of the socialist fatherland, socialist legality, and military discipline, readings from the constitution on the rights and responsibilities of Soviet citizens, and legal consultation.

Film lectures on legal topics are an interesting and effective form of legal propaganda. Presentations by legal propagandists on the requirements of Soviet law have a favorable influence upon the legal consciousness of the soldiers when art and documentary films are shown concurrently.

Unified political day and legal knowledge day are successfully employed in some subunits to publicize legal knowledge. Workers of the procurator's office and the court, representatives of the higher command and political organs, and the workers of local party and soviet institutions give lectures and reports to the soldiers.

Taking steps to improve propaganda of Soviet law, we cannot fail to consider both the organizational and the psychological difficulties. Because of the small number of workers in military justice, and because they are busy with other work, it is not always possible to invite a military lawyer to a subunit to give a lecture. But even though a significant quantity of legal literature and all sorts of preplanned lectures are available, certain commanders and party and Komsomol active members sometimes fail to hold lectures on legal topics themselves, and thus we find the measures aimed at publicizing knowledge of Soviet law are conducted sporadically in such subunits.

A differentiated approach to legal indoctrination, and extension of its influence to all categories of servicemen is an important prerequisite for effective legal indoctrination, as well as all indoctrination. Raising the legal competency of the indoctrinators themselves has special significance. In order to insure that their knowledge is at the required level, the forms of indoctrination listed above are supplemented by lessons in schools and lecture courses, scientific-practical conferences, rallies, seminars, and independent study of Soviet legislation.

The work experience of the best subunits also shows that success in strengthening military discipline and preventing crime depends in many ways on the personal example commanders show in complying with the laws and military regulations. It is precisely through their own faultless relationship to execution of their duties that officers teach their subordinates to comply unwaveringly with the rules of the law. Diligence and obedience to the will of the commander are also promoted by the demand for clear and precise reports on fulfillment of orders and on work done.

Party organizations are the political core of the military collectives. Communists are the cementing force of all the personnel. As the work experience of crime prevention shows, success invariably follows those commanders who deeply understand the meaning of purposeful efforts by party organizations to strengthen military discipline, and who do everything possible to stimulate their activity. This is precisely the case, for example, with Officer N. Leuhchenko, commander of an outstanding subunit. Constantly relying upon the party organization, the officer guides its efforts at insuring that CPSU members would serve as an example. He seeks advice from political workers and from the secretary and members of the party bureau, and he heeds their opinions and proposals on ways to strengthen socialist law and order in the subunit. The most important issues of troop indoctrination are brought up for discussion by CPSU members and candidates. Thus in the previous period of accounting party assemblies were held with agendas entitled "Lenin's Requirements on Party Membership and Their Satisfaction by Subunit Communists" and "On the Personal Contribution of Each Communist to Strengthening Military Discipline." The following issues were discussed at meetings of the party bureau: "The Party Bureau's Practical Work to Strengthen One-Man Command" and "On the Work of the Party Bureau to Prevent Violations of Military Discipline." Reports on performance of official duties were given by communists A. Moskalin, V. Bolotnov, S. Sakovskiy, and O. Svetlanov.

The Komsomol organization is also working actively to strengthen military discipline in the subunit. Issues such as "The State of Military Discipline Among Komsomol Members and Young People of the Subunit, and Ways to Strengthen It Further" and "Komsomol Member! What Are You Doing to Satisfy the Oath You Gave to the Motherland?" were discussed by Komsomol members in their meetings. The Komsomol bureau meetings had agendas entitled "Komsomol Concern and Attention to Junior Commanders," "Report of Komsomol Bureau Secretary Warrant Officer T. Radchenko on Satisfaction of the Requirements of the Oath and the Manuals by Komsomol Members," and so on. All violations of military discipline are mandatorily discussed here correspondingly at party and Komsomol assemblies, Komsomol committee and bureau meetings, and general assemblies of the personnel. The forms of discussion include hearings, reports, and personal interviews.

In this case the subunits base themselves on the immutable truth that the power of measures implemented against violators lies mainly in collective condemnation of the violator, in comradely criticism. V. I. Lenin pointed out that some cases must be "brought to public trial not so much for the sake of strict punishment (a reprimand might be enough), but rather for the sake of publicity and to disprove the universal conviction that the guilty go unpunished."

These and other forms and methods of troop indoctrination are reinforced daily in the subunit by organizational measures aimed at keeping the life and service of the personnel in strict correspondence with the manuals and orders. Much attention is devoted here to having commanders of all

ranks and officers of the day monitor the activities of the personnel. This helps not only to maintain an awareness of the true state of affairs in the subunit, but also, what is most important, it makes it possible to prevent violations in time. Such surveillance makes it possible to keep the soldiers convinced that any violation they might make would be known to the commander, and it nurtures the organization, self-control, and diligence of the personnel.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the role of such surveillance in eliminating the psychological motives of certain deviations from the requirements of the regulations, committed by individual members of military collectives. To confirm this idea, let me cite the results of a survey I made of law violators. Most of them declared that they were aware of the punishments foreseen by the regulations and laws, but they assumed that their violations would remain undiscovered.

Disciplinary practices hold one of the important places among the resources for maintaining proper legality, law, and order. The regulations state reward to be the first among the measures of disciplinary influence. By rewarding the successes of a subordinate, the commander mobilizes the consciousness of the soldier for even more zealous performance of duty, and he encourages fellow servicemen to imitate him.

Practice confirms that as a rule the number of cases of reward exceed by several times the number of cases of punishment in the best subunits, while in subunits having training indicators at a lower level, the number of cases of reward is significantly lower. These facts reflect, first of all, differences in the approach taken by the indoctrinators themselves to utilization of disciplinary measures. Some of them, in particular, underestimate the significance of reward, and they do not adhere to the rule that positive factors can always be found in the service and behavior of each soldier, and developed. At the same time we can note that in their disciplinary practice, the competent, most thoughtful commanders, while stimulating the activity of their subordinates with rewards, do not ignore violations of discipline and deal strictly with violators. Concurrently these officers indicate to such violators the ways they could correct their errors, and they try to see that the punished individual would understand his guilt and recognize the justice of his punishment.

When a crime is left unpunished, the fight against crime suffers. Disciplinary and, when necessary, criminal proceedings keep not only violators but also those surrounding them from committing new violations, and they encourage them to behave in accordance with the requirements of Soviet law and military regulations.

Competent indoctrinators have at their disposal not only the procedures and means of fighting for unswerving fulfillment of regulations and Soviet law named above, but also many others. The interests of higher combat

readiness obligate commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, and military lawyers to not become self-satisfied with their achievements. It is important to seek and find effective forms of influence, and concurrently to make more-sensible use, in every subunit, of the ways and means of eradicating crime that have already proven themselves in practice.

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## POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: AGGRESSIVE NATURE OF IMPERIALISM

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[Article by Cand Hist Sci, Asst Prof, Col Ye. Bondarenko: "The 25th CPSU Congress on the Aggressive Nature of Imperialism"; material for political lessons on the topic "The 25th CPSU Congress on the Aggressive Nature of Imperialism. The Armies and Blocs of the Imperialist States, a Threat to the Peace and Security of Nations"]

[Text] Study of this topic has the purpose of helping students gain a deeper understanding of the aggressive nature of imperialism, and recognize the serious danger it harbors for mankind. This lesson will help students get a fuller understanding of the reactionary essence of the military-industrial complex of the USA and other imperialist countries, of the goals and purpose of bourgeois armies, and of the growth of their reactionary role in the present stage of social development, and deeper their knowledge of the aggressive military blocs of imperialism and their anti-Soviet, antisocialist orientation. The entire content of the lecture must have the purpose of raising the desire of the soldiers to untiringly improve their vigilance and combat readiness, and to dependably defend their socialist fatherland and the great achievements of socialism.

Six hours are devoted to the topic. It would be desirable to distribute this time as follows: Two hours for lecture, two for independent study of the literature, and two hours for a seminar.

The following basic problems must be examined in lecture: 1. Intensification of imperialism's aggressiveness at the present stage. 2. The purpose of the armies of imperialist states and ideological processing of their personnel. 3. Aggressive imperialist military blocs--a threat to the peace and security of nations.

It would be suitable to note in the introductory remarks that the international situation has grown noticeably more acute in recent times. Reactionary circles of the USA and NATO and their Chinese minions are intensifying their attacks upon relaxation of international tension, and they are trying to erase all that has been achieved by peaceful forces in

relaxation and in consolidation of peace. The goals pursued by the Soviet Union in the international arena are clear and noble. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said the following in his meeting with voters of Moscow's Baumanskii election district: "The Soviet Union cannot be scared by anyone. Our forces and possibilities are tremendous. We and our allies will always manage to stand up for ourselves, and repel all hostile advances. And no one will be able to provoke us. In response to the 'doctrine' of military hysteria and a feverish arms race, we offer the doctrine of a consistent struggle for peace and security on earth."

## 1. Intensification of Imperialism's Aggressiveness at the Present Stage

In previous articles--"Imperialism--the Source of Military Danger" and "The Largest Capitalist Countries"--we thoroughly examined Lenin's description of imperialism, explained the causes of the deepening of capitalism's general crisis at the present stage, and showed imperialism to be the source of military danger and of world wars (see *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*, No 3,4, 1980). It would be important to note that Lenin's teaching on imperialism enjoyed further development in documents of the CPSU, in decisions of its congresses and plenums, and in the works of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other executives of the Communist Party and the Soviet governments.

Our era is typified by growth in the general crisis of the capitalist system. Basing itself on Lenin's assessment of imperialism as monopolistic, parasitic or decaying, dying capitalism (see "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 30, p 163), the 25th CPSU Congress made a deep, scientific analysis of the content, features, and paths of development of today's international situation, and of the disposition of class forces and their relationship in the world. The congress emphasized that the general crisis of capitalism continues to deepen, and the events of recent years are a persuasive confirmation of this.

Next, it would be desirable to recall the premise concerning the general crisis of capitalism. The general crisis of capitalism, which was initiated by World War I and the Great October Socialist Revolution, is a profound historic process of the revolutionary fall of capitalism, and its replacement by socialism, a process of the decomposition and death of the world capitalist system. In recent times the general crisis of capitalism continues to deepen.

The symptoms of this crisis manifest themselves today: in economics--in the chronic underloading of production capacities and tremendous unemployment, inflation, and currency upheavals; in politics--in growing corruption, deception of public opinion, and the readiness to resort to authoritarian (based on unquestioning subordination to despotic rule) and adventurist methods in response to the slightest threat to the supremacy of monopolies; in the society's spiritual life--in the spread of amoral phenomena, spiritual bankruptcy of the people, and their fear of tomorrow.

Among the signs indicating aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, special significance is acquired by the obvious decline of that neocolonial system through which imperialism mercilessly plundered, and is significantly plundering today, the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The struggle of these people to gain control of their own natural resources and restructure their international economic relations on a just foundation is becoming increasingly more decisive and organized.

The capitalist world is feverishly seeking a way out of the crisis. The monopolist bourgeoisie believes the way out to be further militarization of all aspects of the life of capitalist society. From its point of view, militarism is a means capable of arresting the forward progress of the forces of peace, democracy, and socialism on one hand, and insuring maintenance of high profits for itself on the other.

Imperialism has but one response to any advance in the movement of liberation--direct force, or the threat of force. Clearly frightened by the prospects of losing the possibility for exploiting the peoples of the developing states, imperialism's reactionary and aggressive circles are pumping up military hysteria and preparing special military formations for punitive expeditions. And in order to have the possibility for increasing their military potential without restraints, these circles are waging another of several anticommunist campaigns, and they are "justifying" the billions invested into the arms race by the mythical threat on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries. The events of recent times, which have significantly complicated the international situation, are the product of world imperialism's desire to use all means to hinder growth in the struggle of nations for independence, progress, and a peaceful life.

In what way does the aggressive nature of modern imperialism manifest itself?

Answering this question for the students, the instructor might recall that imperialism bears responsibility for two world wars that it started in the 20th century, and for hundreds of local wars and military conflicts. In World War I, 10 million persons were killed and 20 million were maimed. World War II cost more than 50 million human lives. Great was the destruction and annihilation of material valuables accompanying these wars. In the period from 1945 to 1977, the USA and other NATO countries unleashed more than 30 wars and military conflicts, and committed 115 acts of armed provocation. In 33 cases the USA threatened the use of a nuclear weapon.

To achieve its aggressive desires, imperialism has spent and continues to spend incredible sums, and it is engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The USA is setting the tone in this effort. The Pentagon was allocated \$116.7 billion in fiscal year 1978 and \$130 billion in 1979, in 1980 the USA's military budget will attain \$141.2 billion, and \$161.8 billion are planned for 1981. According to reports in the American press, by 1984 the USA's military budget will reach \$220 billion!

Nor are other imperialist countries lagging behind the United States of America, especially those that have been drawn into the aggressive military blocs. Thus in the time of the NATO bloc's existence, countries within it have spent two trillion two hundred billion dollars for military purposes. Just in 1978 13 NATO countries (not including Greece and Turkey) spent \$178.2 billion for militarization. According to predictions of experts, the total military budget of the NATO countries will be \$189 billion in 1980.

Next it would be suitable to explain to the soldiers that the monstrous expenditures on military needs are necessary for imperialism to create and produce constantly new, increasingly more destructive types of weapons and combat equipment. The largest military concerns of the USA now possess guaranteed orders for the production of more than a hundred weapon systems costing a total of about \$160 billion. Presently the USA possesses about 2,200 nuclear weapon carriers in its strategic offensive forces, to include over a thousand intercontinental ballistic missiles. Forty-one atomic submarines carry 656 ballistic missiles, each of which can possess up to 14 individually guided nuclear warheads.

The export of weapons and combat equipment is a powerful lever that is intensifying growth in military production in developed capitalist countries. This is not only an advantageous item of business for military monopolies, but it is also an established form of political subordination of other countries, one of the ways for planting and supporting reactionary political regimes.

Discussing growth in the arms race in the capitalist world, the instructor should emphasize that it is proceeding under the cover of the false myth of the so-called "Soviet military threat," on the excuse of maintaining a defense against the "subversive activities" and "intrigues" of the Soviet Union, which is supposedly threatening the vital interests of the USA. These fabricated conclusions cannot withstand any sort of criticism. Back in 1919 V. I. Lenin noted in a statement against politicians shouting about "Red militarism" that they "are giving the appearance that they believe these absurdities, and they toss such accusations right and left, utilizing their legal abilities to compose false conclusions and throw sand in the eyes of the masses" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, p 50).

Fabrications of a "Soviet military threat" have the purpose of prolonging the unprecedented arms race started by imperialism, and placing the blame for it upon the USSR. But the realities persuasively demonstrate that the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at creating the conditions for peaceful, creative construction, at protecting the great achievements of socialism. It was not we who initiated the arms race and created the military-political blocs. The USA and its NATO allies are precisely the ones who promoted the arms race in the past and continue to do so today, railroading increasingly larger military budgets through their legislative organs and inflaming militarist passions. Imperialist circles of the NATO countries, and mainly the representatives of the powerful



military-industrial complexes of these countries, as well as Chinese leaders associating with them, are stubbornly opposing every step taken to relaxation and disarmament.

The aggressiveness of imperialism manifests itself especially clearly in the foreign policy of capitalist states, primarily the USA. In his traditional annual message to Congress, American President J. Carter described a course for the United States hostile to relaxation, aimed at unrestricted growth of arms, at interference in the internal affairs of other states, and world hegemonism. This course foresees everything that would promote outbreak of the "cold war," and it leaves room for the use of all means to increase military tension and anti-Soviet hysteria. J. Carter declared so-called "retaliatory measures" in connection with events in Afghanistan: the freezing of SALT-2, rejection of the shipments of a large number of goods to the Soviet Union, including grain, the breaking of cultural, scientific, and other contacts, and, finally, an appeal to boycott the Olympic games in Moscow. He thus confirmed the openly militarist and hegemonic position of the USA in the modern world.

Thus at the turn of the decade the international situation has become noticeably more complex. The fault for this lies with imperialist forces, and mainly certain circles in the USA. It lies with those who view relaxation of tension as an interference in their aggressive designs, in their attempts at inciting militarist psychosis and intervening in the domestic affairs of other nations. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev revealed the true nature of the attempts by the ruling circles of the USA to engage in speculative actions in connection with events in Afghanistan, and to use them to cover up their own militarist actions.

Regarding relaxation of international tension and all peaceful actions of the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries, the aggressive imperialist forces are clearly defined. We are represented by the reactionary circles of imperialism, primarily the military-industrial complexes.

A military-industrial complex is a union of the largest military-industrial monopolies and militarist circles in the state machinery of the imperialist powers. It is the most reactionary and aggressive factor of state-monopolistic capitalism, and it exercises power in all key positions of the capitalist state, which is especially evident from the example of the United States of America. The USA's military-industrial concerns are responsible for a great deal of that country's policies. These are policies aimed against world communism, against the workers' and national-liberation movement, and against all peaceful, progressive forces on the planet. Military-industrial complexes exist and are active in imperialist countries other than the USA, such as the FRG, England, Japan, and a number of others.

The activities of military-industrial complexes are hostile to relaxation, and they are intensifying the danger of war in Europe and in the whole world. In any case requests the goals of military-industrial circles are to acquire

equipment and collect as much money from the people as they can for production of new types of arms.

All of this indicates reinforcement of the reactionary essence of military-industrial complexes, and their aggressive orientation, which is causing natural alarm among the nations of the world.

As a counterweight to the misanthropic policy of the military-industrial complexes, the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist fraternity are firmly adhering to a constructive course in international relations, doing everything they can to consolidate relaxation and preserve peace.

Completing his presentation of the materials on the first problem, the instructor should recall to the students that the 25th CPSU Congress, analyzing the international situation and marking the paths for the continued struggle for peace, came to the following conclusion: "The enemies of relaxation and disarmament still have many resources. They are operating actively, in different forms and from different directions. Although the possibilities of aggressive actions by imperialism have now been significantly reduced, imperialism's nature continues to be as before. This is why peace-loving forces must display high vigilance. We need energetic actions and unity of all forces of peace and good will" ("Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p. 24).

## 2. The Purpose of the Armies of Imperialist States and Ideological Processing of Their Personnel

In order to preserve their supremacy, the classes of exploitation are employing forceful measures to suppress the laboring masses. They have the police, courts, and jails for this purpose. But the armed forces continue to be the main and largest weapon in their hands.

By their nature, the armies of imperialist states are deeply hostile to the regular, laboring masses. A deep chasm lies between the army and the people in capitalist society, one resulting from the fundamental opposition existing between the interests of laborers and monopolies.

Recruits are selected for imperialist armies from representatives of the bourgeoisie. This makes it possible to constantly monitor the political mood and behavior of the soldiers, and to suppress all manifestations of democratic and progressive viewpoints. A cruel system of compulsion, discipline by the rod, and drill, which are supplemented by measures of spiritual compulsion and ideological stupefaction of servicemen, exists in imperialist armies. As the result yesterday's laborer or peasant, donning his soldier's overcoat, transforms into an obedient executor of the criminal will of his class enemies. It is precisely in armies that imperialism sees its main resource for implementing its delirious plans of liquidating socialism, suppressing socialist and national-liberation revolutions, and restoring its colonial supremacy.

In the postwar years many armies of imperialist states have been manned on a professional basis--by mercenary soldiers. Such an army, in the opinion of the ruling circles, corresponds most fully with the goals of imperialist foreign and domestic policy, since it is an unquestioning executor of their aggressive designs.

The armies of imperialist states perform two basic functions: internal and external. In a society of exploitation, the internal function of the army is to suppress resistance by oppressed classes and their struggle for their rights and freedom and for improvements in living conditions. Such an army has the external function of suppressing revolutionary movements by other nations fighting for their social and national liberation, and of serving as a weapon of aggressive imperialist policy, pointed mainly at the fraternal countries of socialism.

It would be suitable for the lecturer to dwell on a description of the armies of the principal capitalist states.

First, the armed forces of the USA: According to the classical scheme, the U.S. Armed Forces consist of the ground troops (the army), the air force, and the navy. Each of these armed forces possesses appropriate branches of troops and services. The U.S. Armed Forces are subdivided on an operational-strategic basis into strategic forces, general-purpose forces, forces responsible for transporting troops by air and sea, and reserves. The regular armed forces of the USA have a strength of 2.1 million persons.

The so-called "triad" of strategic offensive forces--intercontinental ballistic missiles, atomic missile submarines, and strategic bombers--plays the main role in the aggressive plans of the American military machine.

More than a thousand intercontinental missiles are positioned at launching pads in different regions of American territory. Warheads of greater power capable of greater target striking accuracy are being installed on Minuteman-3 missiles. Work on the new mobile MX missile is continuing. B-52 strategic bombers, which will be armed with cruise missiles, are being improved. Atomic submarines are being outfitted with new Trident-1 and Trident-2 missiles.

The USA is presently creating so-called "quick response forces" with a strength of 110,000 enlisted men and officers, possessing about a thousand fighters and bombers, 700 transport aircraft, aircraft carriers, destroyers, tankers, and assault landing vessels. According to the design of the American leadership they are to possess considerable maneuverability, permitting their transfer to "hot-spots" on the planet. These points of armed intervention may be in the Far East, Northeast Asia, the Near East and, as U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown declared, "other regions."

The officer corps, which is the principal promoter of the policy and ideology of monopolist bourgeoisie in the armed forces of the USA, is manned on the basis of a strictly class principle. As an example only 5 percent of the

officers in the ground troops are laborers and white collar workers by birth, the rest being representatives of the upper and middle bourgeoisie, military families, prosperous farmers, and the intelligentsia. Enlisted men and sergeants are mercenaries, and they serve on contract.

Through intensified ideological processing, bribery, and cruel drill, the American military machine manages to influence the personnel and transform them into obedient automatons, into mindless manikins in uniform. A special ideological processing apparatus, which is called the "information service," has been created for this purpose. This service is headed by the U.S. defense secretary's information administration. Information officers who organize the ideological processing of the personnel are present in the units and aboard ships. Ideological processing of servicemen consists mainly of double-dyed anticommunism and its extreme reactionary manifestation--anti-Sovietism.

Capitalizing on the myth of a "Soviet military threat," American military propaganda attempts to justify the unrestrained arms race. The imperialist bloc of NATO is declared to be a "counterweight to Soviet expansion." It is drummed into the heads of the soldiers that defeat in a future war could be avoided only through the power of NATO, through the military might of the USA. "Atlantic solidarity," instilling a faith in NATO is one of the most important directions of ideological processing of personnel in American armed forces.

The USA's propaganda machine applies tremendous effort to whitewash capitalism, to deprive soldiers of their class self-consciousness, and to instill a sense of savage hatred of socialism and communism. This is also typical of other imperialist armies.

The regular armed forces of Great Britain include: strategic nuclear forces, ground troops, air forces, and naval forces. The total strength of the English armed forces is 311,000 persons (not counting the reserves). They play a noticeable role in the combined armed forces of NATO, to which they contribute the British Rhinish Army (55,000 persons), which is deployed in the FRG. Together with the USA's ships, English warships make up NATO's strike fleet in the Atlantic. Forty-eight strategic bombers and 4 atomic submarines are outfitted with nuclear weapons. Carrier-based attack aircraft also carry nuclear weapons. England maintains troops at its own military bases on Gibraltar, in Cyprus, in Singapore, on the Maldives Islands (Indian Ocean), and in Hong Kong.

The armed forces of Great Britain are manned by professional mercenary soldiers. Ideological processing of the personnel has become significantly more active in recent years. This activity is closely coordinated with that of the propaganda organs of the USA and the FRG. Anticommunism and malicious anti-Sovietism are at its basis. Cruelty and the cult of force are an inseparable aspect of military indoctrination.



The main factor defining the content and orientation of the development of the FRG's armed forces is their participation in NATO, the desire of the country's leadership to occupy a leading position in West European politics. As the military-political leadership of the FRG sees it, this goal can be achieved only by possessing armed forces that would be superior in quantitative and qualitative respects to the armies of European allies in NATO.

Today, the Bundeswehr is the strongest army in NATO after the U.S. Armed Forces. The total strength of the FRG's armed forces is about 500,000 persons.

The West German command plans to reform the Bundeswehr in the next few years on the excuse of "military preparations" by Warsaw Pact countries. The main goal of the reform is to raise the combat readiness and striking power of the Bundeswehr. There are plans to spend 46 billion marks in 5 years on modernization of the Bundeswehr.

The ground troops (12 divisions) are armed with more than 3,000 tanks, missile launchers, and other modern combat equipment. The air forces are supplied with Starfighter and Phantom airplanes. The navy possesses modern multipurpose warships--destroyers, frigates, submarines, torpedo boats, and naval aviation.

The revanchist influence is not weakening in the Bundeswehr. A significant percentage of the Bundeswehr's generals and admirals are former Nazi officers. In the army, as in the entire country, fascist literature is openly disseminated, and there is a brisk trade in textbooks and geographic atlases containing maps of Germany with its 1937 borders.

In 1947 the Japanese Parliament adopted the constitution which is in effect today, in accordance with which Japan has forever rejected war as a means for resolving international disputes, and has agreed to never again create ground, naval, and air forces and, equally so, other resources of warfare.

However, in response to pressure from the United States of America armed forces were formed in Japan as early as in 1954; in order to camouflage their political essence and aggressive orientation, they are still being called "self-defense forces." Presently the strength of Japanese armed forces is more than 260,000 persons, and their fighting power already exceeds the pre-war level by a great deal. Because of a high proportion of officers and noncommissioned officers, the army's strength could be increased to a million persons at any time.

More than 200 American military bases and facilities have been created in Japan, to include 20 large air bases and more than 100 airfields. There are over 45,000 American enlisted men and officers in the country. Atomic submarines and other warships of the USA enter the naval bases of Japan and make themselves at home.

The new five-year program (1977-1981) foresees further development of military production and rearmament of the Japanese army, and stronger Japanese-American military cooperation. Imperialist circles are inciting revanchism and anti-Sovietism in the country and army, and they are raising the so-called "territorial question," involving claims upon some Soviet islands in the Kuril chain. A Japanese-Chinese treaty signed in 1978 is, according to an assessment by progressive Japanese press, anti-Soviet in nature and has the clear earmarks of a military alliance.

The modern armies of imperialist states are an implement of oppression of the laboring masses, of implementation of the aggressive policy of the ruling classes, and of seizure and enslavement of other countries and nations. Pertinent in this connection is V. I. Lenin's statement that in capitalist society, "the army is the most obdurate instrument of support of the old structure,...of support of the supremacy of capital, the preservation and installation of slavish subservience, and of subordination of the laborers to it" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 295).

### 3. Aggressive Imperialist Military Blocs--A Threat to Peace and Security of Nations

The aggressiveness of modern imperialism manifests itself distinctly in its so-called basic strategy, the essence of which entails creation, around countries of the socialist fraternity and mainly the Soviet Union, a well developed net of military bases on the territories of other states united into imperialist military-political blocs. It would be pertinent to recall to the students V. I. Lenin's statement that there was a possibility that capitalist powers would sign an agreement to "crush socialism in Europe together, and to defend their plundered colonies together..." ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 354).

Thus the class interests of monopolistic bourgeoisie are the primary reason for creation of imperialist military-political blocs. Imperialism is slipping more and more from its positions as a result of the growing power of countries in the socialist fraternity, their greater influence, and the successes in the struggle of nations for national liberation. The balance of power in the world arena is constantly shifting in favor of socialism. The inability of imperialist states to pursue neocolonial expansion on their own is manifesting itself with increasingly greater frequency. Reluctant to understand that this process is irreversible, they seek a solution by uniting their efforts.

Another reason for arisal of aggressive military blocs is associated with the fact that in many developing countries, the struggle for national liberation has now begun transforming into a struggle against imperialism. In an attempt to prevent this, imperialist powers are uniting their actions with the goal of planting their own political puppets in liberated countries.

A third reason can be found in the economic interests of the imperialists. Slipping from their political positions in liberated countries, they are trying to create a situation which would permit them to continue to extract profit from them. This is done by signing bilateral economic and military contracts and agreements, aimed in the end at economic enslavement of states that are less strong.

The military blocs of imperialism make up a system embracing 54 countries with a population of more than 1.3 billion persons. The strength of armies contained within these blocs exceeds 8 million persons, and military outlays were more than \$200 billion in 1977. The system of imperialist military blocs includes the aggressive NATO bloc as well as regional military-political alliances. The partners to these blocs are united by hatred of world socialism and the communist, workers' and national-liberation movement.

Aggressive circles of imperialism are arguing more and more actively for joint use of armed compulsion as a means to impose and support pro-imperialist regimes, to exert pressure upon progressive governments and patriotic forces in liberated countries, and to support counterrevolutionary interference in the affairs of young national states with the purposes of suppressing the movement for greater sovereignty, economic independence, and a noncapitalist path of development. The military-political blocs are also given the tasks of coordinating activities in economics, diplomacy, and ideology, exerting an influence upon the internal life of the member countries of the bloc, and creating within them a material and military-political base to support the activities of reactionary, pro-imperialist forces.

Representatives of the USA's military-industrial complex intend, by means of bloc strategy, to strengthen their dominant position in the capitalist world, to do away with former city-states in developing countries and take their places, and to encourage allied countries to join in the arms race, which would open additional channels for entry of American weapons into these countries. And this means more enormous profits for military concerns.

The United States has deployed atomic submarines, aircraft carriers, strategic aviation, contingents of ground troops and marine infantry, tactical ships of various classes, and antiaircraft resources beyond its own borders. Based in the Mediterranean Sea and on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans, American naval forces represent a constant factor of political pressure upon other states, as well as a potential implement of invasion, to go into action when Washington feels it necessary. The USA has begun creating strongpoints for itself on islands of the Pacific and Indian oceans (in particular, the main base on the island of Diego Garcia is being expanded and reinforced there). In the Indian Ocean, and mainly in the Persian Gulf, Washington plans to permanently deploy a new fleet, the Fifth, with a strength of 40-50 ships. Its purpose is described unambiguously in a message from the U.S. President to Congress: "Any attempt by any power whatsoever to gain control over the Persian Gulf region will be

viewed as an infringement upon the vital interests of the United States, and it will be repelled with all necessary resources, including military power."

The North Atlantic pact--the main implement of imperialist aggression and adventurism, aimed mainly against the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity--is at the center of the global system of aggressive military-political allies created after World War II. Bourgeois propaganda expends a great deal of energy and money to make NATO out to be an "implement of peace," the "defender of liberty and democracy" against the "Soviet threat." However, the entire history of this bloc says something different: From the very first days of its existence it was oriented at functions of a "global policeman" defending colonial empires; since the time that the latter fell, it has served as a tool of neocolonialism. "As far as NATO is concerned," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "this bloc was created as a tool of aggression and suppression of the struggle of liberation of nations, and no matter how it glosses over its activities, it remains the same today" ("Leninskii kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], Vol 6, p 54).

NATO is the main military-political bloc of the capitalist countries. This organization was created in 1949 on the basis of a treaty signed by the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, and the FRG joined in 1955. France has not participated in the NATO military organization since 1966. Greece declared its departure from the NATO military organization in 1974.

In the last 10 years the NATO military machine increased its power significantly. The quantity of nuclear warheads on European territory doubled. American aviation, which is capable of making nuclear strikes against various targets, including all the territory of the USSR, has been modernized. Enormous reserves of weapons and equipment intended to supply divisions that may be transferred across the ocean in the event of "crisis situations" are being created in West Europe. And recently, in opposition to the interests of the people and under pressure from Washington, NATO's leaders decided to deploy about 600 American medium-range missiles in a number of countries of West Europe. Consider that this was done when the USSR declared its readiness to reduce the strength of its troops in Central Europe by 20,000 persons on a unilateral basis, and to remove a thousand tanks and a certain quantity of other military equipment. Moreover the first Soviet military formations with a strength of 1,500 men, together with their weapons and combat equipment, had already started withdrawing from the GDR to Soviet territory on 5 December 1979. The next group of Soviet military tank units began leaving the German Democratic Republic for the motherland on 25 February 1980. The withdrawn units will be redeployed in European regions of the Soviet Union.

It should be emphasized next that other aggressive military-political alliances in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are operating in the international arena in the same harness with the NATO bloc.



Reserving an important place for peripheral aggressive blocs in its strategy, international imperialism imposes diverse specific tasks upon them. It plans, first of all, to use their help in strengthening local militarism, stabilizing pro-Western regimes, raising new barriers across the path of revolutionary renovation of the given area, and blocking development of the movement for a socialist orientation. Second, the intention is to acquire the "right" to build military bases, weapon dumps, and training grounds on the territory of countries in the peripheral blocs, and to deploy its troops there. Third, the United States and other Western powers are to be rendered political and military support by countries in these blocs for the purposes of interference in "conflict situations"--that is, in the fight against aggressive forces. Fourth, liberated countries are to be fractionated into hostile groupings and tension in the given region is to be increased, so as to realize the tried-and-true motto of imperialism, "Divide and Conquer." Fifth, American monopolies carry the hope that alliances created with liberated countries within the framework of military-political blocs would facilitate solution of the raw material and energy resource problems, and create better conditions for displacing other imperialist countries out of their former colonies. Sixth, imperialism hopes to use the regional alliances to create "buffer zones" having the purpose of barricading the most important regions of the "Third World" from the USSR and fraternal socialist countries, thus worsening the conditions under which help could be given to nations of these regions in their struggle to consolidate their independence.

In Latin America, the main hopes for achieving these goals are rested upon the OAS, which unites 25 Latin American states and the USA.

Following their defeat in Indochina, American ruling circles have been exerting intensive effort to bring some life into the activities of ANZUS. They are demanding, from their allies in the bloc--Australia and New Zealand, more-active participation in suppression of the liberation movement in Southeast Asia. Concurrently the USA is making an effort to transform the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which includes Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, into a military alliance with an anticommunist leaning. Open appeals have been heard for transferring the functions of the defunct SEATO bloc to ASEAN, and to intensify military aid to countries in this organization.

Other schemes for military-political groupings that could assume the function of supporting bases for American military-political strategy in the world's crisis areas are also being proposed in the ruling circles of the USA. Talk has started across the ocean about forming a "triangular regional security system" in the Far East with the participation of the USA, Japan, and South Korea. Meetings between the political and military leaders of these countries, having the goal of gaining practical support for such an alliance, have grown in frequency.

The signs of probable inclusion of China in the unified anti-Soviet front have appeared in bourgeois press; things may go as far as creating a triple alliance (USA-Japan-China) on an anti-Soviet basis. This was promoted by a recent visit to China by U.S. Defense Secretary H. Brown. Moreover a message to Congress from U.S. President J. Carter lays special emphasis upon the role of Maoist China, which has been declared to be "a new friend" of American imperialism in all of its military preparations.

Discussing the military preparations of the imperialists, the lecturer should concurrently note that all of their attempts at creating a decisive superiority in forces over those of socialist countries are suffering failure. Imperialist military blocs are being torn apart more and more by acute conflicts, ones which are aggravating the crisis of imperialism's bloc strategy today. This crisis is predetermined by the action of the objective factors of world development, by the inconsistency between the aggressive desires of imperialism and its real possibilities, considering the constant shifting of the balance of power in the international arena in favor of socialism. The actions of the imperialists are now being restrained by powerful antiwar and anti-imperialist forces.

Of course these phenomena do not yet mean that imperialist military blocs will fall apart on their own. Militarist circles of imperialism are exerting all of their effort to strengthen their aggressive alliances. As an example they are stubbornly opposing proposals by socialist countries to achieve simultaneous annulment of the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact, or at least as a first step, liquidation of their military organizations. The fraternal socialist countries, which invariably side with normalization of relations and development of cooperation among states having different social structures, and with insuring the collective security of nations, are the driving force opposing the aggressive imperialist military blocs. In military respects the imperialist forces are being opposed by the Warsaw Pact--a defensive alliance of countries in the socialist fraternity, the activities of which are wholly subordinated to the interests of preserving and consolidating peace.

In the lecture's conclusion it would be suitable to briefly describe the tasks of the personnel brought on by the modern international situation and imperialism's aggressiveness.

Implementing a peace-loving policy, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government constantly combine it with growing vigilance; they are constantly concerned for strengthening the country's defense capability, improving the Soviet Armed Forces, supplying them with modern equipment and weapons, and raising their combat readiness. The combat brotherhood of the armies of socialist states in the Warsaw Pact is constantly growing stronger. The modern international situation demands that the Soviet soldiers be deeply aware of their responsibility for the security of the motherland, for serving vigilantly, and for being constantly ready to repel any aggressor.

The troops and fleets are undergoing intense winter training, and an active socialist competition is presently underway under the slogan "Hold Lenin's commandments sacred, improve combat and political training, raise vigilance, and always be prepared to defend the motherland and the great achievements of socialism." Successful fulfillment of the plans of combat and political training, satisfaction of socialist pledges, further growth in field, naval, and aerial skills, and augmentation of vigilance and combat readiness--this is what Soviet soldiers respond with to the appeal of our party to transform the final year of the 10th Five-Year Plan into a year of shock Leninist work.

During the hours of independent work the students should study: V. I. Lenin's works "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 27, p 387-388, 419-420) and "A Letter to American Laborers" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, pp 48-50); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Current Tasks of the Party in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS," pp 5-14, 75-76, 81); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech to the election meeting of voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy election district (PRAVDA, 23 February 1980); Chapter 3 of "Mir segodnya" [The World Today] (Voenizdat, 1979), a training aid for political lessons.

The following questions may be discussed in a seminar:

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on imperialism as a source of war.
2. The aggressive essence of imperialism in modern conditions.
3. The characteristics of the armies of the principal imperialist states--the USA, the FRG, Great Britain, and Japan.
4. For what purposes are the military-political blocs of imperialist states created?
5. Why is high vigilance and constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces necessary?

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#### BOOK REVIEW: LENIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAVY

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[Review by Capt 1st Rank Yu. Morozov of the book "V. I. Lenin i stanovleniye sovetskogo voyenno-morskogo flota" (V. I. Lenin and Development of the Soviet Navy) by A. K. Selyanichev, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1979, 230 pages, price 1 ruble]

[Text] The growing complexity of the international situation and intensification of imperialism's military preparations once again graphically persuade us that dependable protection of the socialist fatherland and the revolutionary achievements of the people continue to be a pressing problem. Study and utilization of the tremendous experience of the Communist Party in military affairs plays an important role in its successful solution. The need for studying the experience of the party and its leader, V. I. Lenin, associated with creation of the Red Army and Navy and their leadership is dictated by a number of factors. They include: objective growth of the significance of the CPSU's leadership of the armed forces today; intensification of the ideological struggle, attempts by the ideologists of imperialism to discredit Lenin's military experience; the importance of the experience of the Soviet military organization's development to nations assuming the road of liberation from colonial and social oppression. Noteworthy in this connection is the work "V. I. Lenin and Development of the Soviet Navy" by military historian A. K. Selyanichev.

A brilliant successor of the teachings of Marx and Engels, the founder of the Communist Party, the leader of the socialist revolution, and the builder of the world's first workers' and peasants' state, V. I. Lenin was the greatest expert in military affairs. His name is associated with the birth and development of the Soviet Armed Forces and their heroic history. As is noted in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist fatherland have unfading important significance.

The study of the tremendous contribution made by V. I. Lenin to creation of a new, revolutionary navy began back in the 1920's. However, deep investigation of Lenin's legacy on naval problems is typical only of the present

period of Soviet historiography. In recent years a number of substantial scientific works revealing the role of Vladimir Il'ich in the creation of the Red Navy have been published.

The book under review here examines three mutually associated problems on the basis of a study and generalization of Lenin's legacy, party documents, and a vast amount of facts: V. I. Lenin on the navy in wars of the imperialist era; Lenin's contribution to bringing the navy over to the side of the revolution; the role of the party's leader in development and combat application of the regular Soviet fleet.

Illuminating the first problem, the author thoroughly examines the significance of Lenin's works "The Fall of Port Arthur," "Defeat," and other works to a scientific understanding of the fundamental military problems, unique features, and objective laws of wars in the era of imperialism. Penetrating deeply into the essence of war, the great strategist of the revolution demonstrated the dependence of the methods and resources of armed conflict on the means of production and the level of development of science and technology. V. I. Lenin called the Russo-Japanese War a war of "mechanized cannons," associating this military-technical characteristic of wars with the onset of the era of imperialism, in which mechanical military technology dominates. His premises suggested in the articles "The Fall of Port Arthur" and "Defeat" represent a deep criticism of the reactionary theory of "conquest by sea," embodied within the foundation of new naval theory. Lenin's conception is still valid today as a means for revealing the true nature of militarism and the policy of gunboat diplomacy created by American imperialism, and it leads us to an understanding of the role of the socialist state's naval power in protection of the revolutionary achievements of the laborers.

V. I. Lenin's conclusions concerning the unique role of naval bases in the activity of the fleet, and on the significance of new weapons that appeared during World War II--submarines and aviation--are important even today. Of special value is Lenin's statement that the navy, which must be outfitted with the best equipment and manned by trained personnel, should be used as an inherent part of the armed forces in pursuit of the goals of war.

The problems associated with bringing the navy over to the side of the revolution are revealed in the book on the basis of an analysis of the events that occurred in all three of Russia's revolutions. In this case the author relies extensively on the works of V. I. Lenin, documents of the party congresses, and achievements of Soviet historical science. It was as early as in the proceedings of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party that the army and navy were defined as an inherent part of the country's social organism, and that organization of political work by Bolsheviks in military units and aboard ships was planned. It was at that time that V. I. Lenin pointed out that the navy possessed favorable possibilities for revolutionary movement.



The Baltic Fleet became the name from which naval formations received their military, political, and organizational personnel. These facts demonstrate that V. I. Lenin's leadership of the navy involved not only the writing of fundamental directives but also a tremendous amount of military organizational work.

An especially large number of documents written by Lenin are cited in the discussion of the actions of the ocean on the Baltic and the Caspian seas--an important strategic line in the armed conflict. However, it should be noted that the author was not sufficiently persuasive in his demonstration of the significance of the struggle in the Caspian region and of the work done by the Russian Communist Party (in Bolsheviks) and V. I. Lenin to create the Caspian Flotilla. The first Soviet experiment in creating a core of regular naval personnel also fell within this period. In fall 1919, when the Baltic Fleet, which was constituted by the knots of the Great Treaty and settled up in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, and after the country's other naval forces had been lost, a large flotilla was created at the mouth of the Volga and in the northern Caspian under the tremendous organizational and political work of the party; this flotilla was to become the most powerful after the Baltic Fleet throughout the entire civil war. It rendered significant assistance to troops on a number of fronts in the struggle against the armies of Kolchak and Denikin and interventionist forces. It created the nucleus out of the most important sea basins, and it successfully completed V. I. Lenin's personal instruction to deliver the fuel and supplies needed so much. In spring 1920 ocean made a powerful strike against British interventionists on the Caspian, thus helping out the Russian people in their struggle for national independence. Soon after the defeat of British colonies, negotiations were started between the Soviet republic and Iran to establish friendly diplomatic and trade relations. "You performed your mission brilliantly," telegraphed V. I. Lenin to the flotilla on 21 May 1920. "The activities of naval forces on the Caspian sea in the campaign of 1920," the republic's Revolutionary Military Council reported to the VII Congress of the Soviets of the RSFSR, "make up one of the most brilliant pages of the work of the Red Fleet."

As is demonstrated in the manuscript the foundation of party-political leadership also took shape in the course of formation of the Fleet's administrative machinery. There was special significance in this case to implementing V. I. Lenin's proposal for creating the institution of military commissars. Party-political work done by commissars, political organs, and party organizations was an essential new introduction to the army and navy, and the battle-mindedness of the ships and units, the fighting spirit of the crewmen, discipline, and order depended to a great degree upon it.

The significance of marine theaters of war neighboring our country in the goal of the young Soviet republic with world imperialism is illuminated in our manuscript more fully and deeply than ever before. Possessing a large military fleet, the interventionists dominated the whole Pacific, and they invaded Soviet territory in the north, east, and south, putting the republic



all from away of the sources of raw materials and supplies, and isolating it from the outside world. It was on this basis that Soviet military strategy defined the place and role of the Red Navy in the new war. Our navy blocked the enemy's advance on seas, lakes, and rivers, and hastened commitment of troops of the Red Army. It was with this purpose in mind that the operating detachment of the Baltic Fleet (1919), the naval forces of the Black and Azov seas (1920), and up to 20 naval flotillas and detachments of warships were formed by decision of the Soviet government. The author demonstrates that in the creation of the new formations, V. I. Lenin turned special attention to the Volga, the Caspian, and the Northern Dvina.

During the civil war and the fight against the interventionists, the book demonstrates that the Red Navy engaged in diverse, complex military actions. The latter were distinguished by a combination of combat and revolutionary experience with innovations prompted by the socialist structure in military affairs. Liberated by the revolution, the creative forces of the masses had a decisive influence upon the outcome of the armed duel with forces of the old world. The war produced numerous examples of original, innovative actions by our fleet on the seas, lakes, and rivers. Initiative, aggressiveness, a high offensive spirit, use of maneuver to make bold, decisive strikes, and use of disparate forces and resources, the monograph points out, were typical of Soviet seamen. The Soviet Navy embodied Lenin's promises as to the need for coordinating the actions of all arms and services of the Armed Forces to achieve victory.

Special sections of the book are devoted to the Baltic Fleet, which played an important role in the defense of Petrograd, to the actions of naval forces on the Volga and the Caspian, and to the combat use of naval forces on the Black and Azov seas.

Believing upon a diverse and broad historical base, the book "V. I. Lenin and the Development of the Soviet Navy" not only reflected the achievements achieved by historical science following many years of research on the problem, but it also represents a noticeable independent step forward. But at the same time it does contain unsolved or weakly illuminated issues. In particular, the way the leader's directives that directly concerned the naval forces were implemented, and the sort of significance they had to the enemy's defeat were not treated sufficiently. Almost nothing is said about the work done by central military, and especially central naval organs directly responsible for execution of the party central committee's, government's, and V. I. Lenin's directives to develop the material-technical base of the navy, to set up its organization and administration, and to find, train, and indoctrinate seamen.

On the whole, however, the work reviewed here is undoubtedly a useful aid in the study of V. I. Lenin's military legacy, and in gaining an understanding of his tremendous significance to solving today's problems of strengthening the country's defense capabilities and the combat power of our army and navy.

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## POLITICAL TRAINING: PARTY COMMITTEE AGENDA

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5 May 60 (p. 23-2)

[Article: "Preparation of Questions for the Party Committee (Party Bureau)"]

[Text] In all of their activities, the party organizations of the army and navy guide themselves by the CPSU Program and Charter, by the instructions to CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, by party decisions, orders from the USSR Minister of Defense, and directives published by the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. The issues to be discussed at party committee (party bureau) meetings are defined on the basis of this principle, and on the basis of the concrete tasks life poses to party organizations at the particular moment.

Indoctrination of communists and all personnel in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideas, proletarian internationalism, devotion to the socialist motherland, friendship among nations, vigilance, and constant combat readiness must always be in the center of attention of the elected organ. For previous shows that in its meetings, it should systematically discuss the status of the party organization's work aimed at ensuring the personal example of communists in combat and political training and service, and at raising the responsibility for the quality of combat training in the unit, ship, and squadron, for studying and preserving combat equipment and weapons, for strengthening organization and discipline, for improving management of the socialist competition, and so on.

An intensive, thorough analysis of the state of affairs in the collective helps active members to tangibly and objectively influence the content of combat training and the quality of training and indoctrination, and to raise the primary organizations the content of ideological indoctrination, as is required by the CPSU central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination." The agenda for a party committee (party bureau) meeting is determined as a rule when writing up the monthly plan of party work. But sometimes it becomes necessary to examine some current problem that arises after the plan is approved. In such a case the party committee (party bureau) is entitled to include this

problem in the course of its meeting. Speakers are designated beforehand with a consideration for the nature of the problems as well.

Every meeting of the party committee (party bureau) is preceded by meticulous preparations. Much depends here on the ability of the secretary to distribute responsibilities among members of the elected organ, account for their practical experience and knowledge, and define what each of them must do in each concrete case. It would not be bad for the party committee secretary or his deputy to preview the questions to be discussed for his comrades as a means of preparation; he could tell them why the problem has arisen, what sort of difficulties may be encountered in its solution, and what aspect of it requires special attention. When the active members are informed in this way, favorable conditions are created for thorough preparation for the party committee (party bureau) meeting. They are able to study the problem deeply, they can determine the attitude communists have toward it, and they are prepared for their proposals and critical remarks. Prominent specialists and experts should be called in to study the particular problem, with a consideration for the nature of the issue under discussion. The ability of party committee (party bureau) members to unite the collective efforts of communists, to envision innovations, and to heed the demands of the day serves as a guarantee of successful work, and a productive search for the best solutions.

Such a creative approach is typical, for example, of the party committee of the 5th National Rifle Unit headed by Major I. Lashchuk. When it comes time to prepare an agenda for the party committee, communists representing the staff and services--authoritative people knowing the status of combat training and discipline--are called in. Thus soon after graduation from military schools joined the unit, the party committee decided to examine how the young officers were developing, and what role the party organization was playing in this matter. Consulting with the communists and political workers of the unit, the party committee secretary ordered communist officers A. Borupak and B. Isakha to study this issue. These active members talked with every lieutenant, discerned the strong and weak sides of their training, and acquainted themselves with the work being done by communist party organizations with the young officers. They came to the party committee meeting with concrete conclusions and proposals. And, as a natural result, the discussion of the issue was impassioned. The party committee came up with ways to improve the ideological-political indoctrination and instructive training of the young officers. An exchange of experience between those officers who were competently training and indoctrinating their subordinates and the young officers was organized in the regiment. Lectures on pedagogical topics were a good support to the development of new recruits in the unit. The experience showed that whenever the active members were well aware of an issue to be discussed at the party committee, there was never any need for creating special commissions or conducting additional investigations.

The writing of the resolution is validly believed to be a critical stage in preparation for a meeting of an elected party organ. The resolution must embody within itself the collective experience, it must define the concrete ways to improve things, and it should mobilize the people for successful completion of their tasks. Clear recommendations, thoughtful assessments, and determination of the deadlines for completing the measures and of those responsible for them all make the adopted decision a real guide for action.

It is important to emphasize that success is enjoyed by those elected organs that do not get carried away with the number of meetings held, and which instead lay their emphasis on lively organizational and political work in the masses, and on encouraging all communists to contribute to the work actively. In order to insure implementation of plans, the party committee (party bureau) instructs individual members to monitor the course of the resolution's satisfaction. This practice disciplines the executors, raises their responsibility for their assigned work, and promotes reinforcement of the party organization's authority.

Good preparation for discussion of problems at a meeting of the party committee (party bureau), concrete discussion, and meaningful decisions make up an important prerequisite for successful activity of the elected organ, and an indispensable condition for its effective influence upon mental and political training, upon improvement of political indoctrination, and upon reinforcement of organization and military discipline.

Assume that the party bureau has held its meeting. Assume also that an important problem has encouraged the members of the elected organ to convene in order to make an effective decision together. But this is only the beginning of the work. The fate of even the best resolution depends on the executors, on their knowledge, experience, and diligence, and on how the work of implementing the decisions is organized, and how this work is monitored.

APPENDIX. "Communist Youth Organization 811", 1960

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# POLITICAL TRAINING: FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SHORTCOMINGS

ARMY COMMUNIST VOSKRESHENNYKH BIL in Russian No 6, Mar 68 signed to press  
5 Mar 68, p 26

[Article: "In the Footsteps of the Journal's Articles"]

Event: The article "The Kind of Help We Need" by Gerasimov Senior Lieutenant M. Gerasimov, a political lesson group leader, was published in COMMUNIST VOSKRESHENNYKH BIL, No 24, 1979. It discussed the difficulties being encountered by young political lesson group leaders of the Nth Unit, and the shortcomings in organization of theoretical and methodological training for this category of propagandists.

The editorial board received a letter from the chief of the formation's political section. It admitted that the shortcomings noted in that article did in fact exist. The article was discussed at a meeting of the unit's party committee, at conferences of the unit's and formation's political workers, and at seminars attended by the propagandists. Steps are being taken to improve work with group leaders, to provide more assistance to them in their preparations for political lessons, and to teach them propaganda skills. The political section intensified its surveillance over the quality of seminars attended by unofficial propagandists. More attention is now being devoted at the seminars to discussing the content and methods of political lessons, and to exchanging the work experience of the propagandists; political literature, military memoirs, and artistic literature is now being reviewed. A number of additional lectures and reports on pressing problems in the theory and policy of the CPSU and on questions associated with the methods of political lessons were organized for group leaders. A methodological conference was held. Two open lessons were conducted. Regular self-preparation of propagandists for upcoming political lessons during their working hours has been organized. Individual and group consultation is being organized for young group leaders in addition to the seminars. Systematic work is being done with their assistants. Every person of the political lesson groups have been furnished with newspapers and film strips.

In conclusion the political section chief notes that steps taken in response to the article "The Kind of Help We Need" have promoted improvement in work with political lesson group leaders in other of the formation's units as well.

OVERSIGHT: "Kommunist Voskreshennoy Bil", 1980

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ARMY 1104

## SOVIET ARMED FORCES: LENIN'S PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT

Review KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 80 signed to press  
1 Apr 80 pp 19-25

[Article by Col A. Babakov, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "Lenin's Principles of Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces,"  
Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]

[Text] V. I. Lenin was a theorist of genius and the supreme strategist and tactician of the world proletariat. The CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin" emphasizes that he mastered to perfection the art of directing revolutionary struggle and communist creation, and he possessed an unsurpassed gift of scientific foresight, of the deepest penetration into the very essence of events and phenomena that were occurring, and of an imaginative application of the dialectical-materialistic method to an analysis of new historic conditions.

These remarkable qualities of the party's leader were clearly manifested when he elaborated the teaching on defense of the socialist homeland. Lenin not only grounded the need for forming a new type of army, but also defined the principles of its organizational development. They contain the fundamental ideas on the management work of the Communist Party and socialist state in conformity with which the USSR Armed Forces develop and grow strong. Lenin's principles of organizational development of a socialist army brilliantly withstood the test of time, demonstrated their vitality in fierce battles of past wars and acquired international importance.

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Lenin formulated the military program of the proletarian revolution back before the Victory of the Great October, pointing out that its leading element was organizational development of a revolutionary army. He linked the implementation of such a program with the struggle against an exploiting order and imperialist wars, a struggle for the freedom and national independence of peoples, and he linked this implementation with the toilers' solidarity in defense of the socialist homeland.

The winning of political power by Russia's workers and peasants placed the practical task of organizing a new army next on the agenda. By its nature the socialist Soviet state did not require a standing army. The need for such an army was born of the hostile acts of internal and foreign counter-revolutionary forces. Lenin wrote that "imperialists around the world threw themselves on the Russian Republic in order to stifle it, and we began to create an army which knows for the first time in history what it is fighting and sacrificing for, and which successfully resists a numerically larger enemy..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVIII, 51).

The noble and lofty ideas of defense of the socialist homeland advanced by Lenin laid a firm foundation for theoretical and practical solution of the very complex issues of organizational development of a regular, people's, multinational army and of its development and strengthening in close unity with the political, economic and social transformations in the country. Lenin taught that this organizational development is determined by the interests, goals and politics of the working class. It is reflected in military doctrine and is a most important component of the overall system of measures conducted by the Communist Party of socialist states to create and strengthen the national defensive might.

The economic, social-political and spiritual foundations of Soviet society have a deciding influence on organizational development of the Armed Forces--socialist ownership of means of production, a planned organization of the national economy, our social and state system, the indestructible alliance of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia, the people's high spiritual culture, and the Marxist-Leninist ideology dominant in the country. The army's development is indivisible from realities of the international situation, the correlation of political forces in the world, the USSR's international obligations, and the character and degree of military threat on the part of imperialism.

The Communist Party's management of the Armed Forces and reinforcement of the role and influence of party organizations in the Army and Navy represents the primary basis and supreme principle of Soviet military organizational development. The CPSU's undivided and unremitting political management of the Armed Forces is determined by the leading role the party plays in the life of Soviet society as the nucleus of its political system; by the character and specific features of the Armed Forces, which act as a central centralized tool of the Soviet state; and by the need and possibility of using the advantages of socialism for its effective military defense. Following instructions by Lenin, the 8th VKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress drew a conclusion of extreme importance to the effect that the army's revolutionary character and fulfillment of its historic functions is achieved "through overall party and soviet management of the life and work of the army" ("KPSU resolyutsiyakh..." [The CPSU in Resolutions...], 11, 87).

Lenin formulated the principles of military policy of the Communist Party and Soviet state, defined its goals, content and connection with general party politics, and emphasized that it organically combines within itself measures for strengthening national defenses and the combat might of the Armed Forces with the struggle for disarmament, for preservation of peace, and for eradicating war from the life of society. This policy takes account of the entire complexity and diversity of interaction of internal and external factors affecting the development of military affairs as a whole. Its leading element is the development of recommendations on matters of organizational development and training of the Armed Forces.

The CPSU's work in organizational development of the USSR Armed Forces, as well as of the state apparatus as a whole, is characterized by deep scientific substantiation. Lenin taught that the party "must act on /scientific/ bases" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XI, 65). Marxism-Leninism permits it to become oriented in domestic and international events and find correct answers to current issues advanced by life and by the practice of building socialism and communism and struggling to preserve the peace. The party decides issues concerning defense of the socialist homeland and improving the Army and Navy in conformity with fundamental interests of the people. These issues are formulated in the most important party documents--the CPSU Program and decrees of congresses, conferences and Central Committee plenums, and are legislatively fixed in the USSR Constitution.

Lenin taught that the Party Central Committee and its Politburo play a leading role in organizational development of the army. They define the primary missions and direction of development of the Soviet Armed Forces, their training and logistical support, and improvements in their organization. Revisions in military matters are implemented through supreme entities of state power, and through extraordinary management entities formed for the period in which armed warfare is waged.

The immediate implementation of missions for organizational development of the Army and Navy is a job for management cadres of the state and military control apparatus. At Lenin's suggestion a list of military officials was established who were subject to approval by the Party Central Committee, and principles of selection and placement of command and political cadres were developed. Lenin believed that only the party should make the most important state assignments, since "it is impossible to conduct any policy without reflecting it in assignments and transfers" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XI, 237). These matters were in Lenin's field of view daily. His approach to resolving personnel policy is followed strictly and absolutely in all stages of organizational development of the army.

The Central Committee constantly directs the work of political entities and the party and Komsomol organizations, and it constantly improves forms and methods of party-political work among the troops, striving to ensure



that by its nature it is lively, aggressive, and closely linked with general party life, with the interests of the people and with missions facing units, ships and combined units. Effective and purposeful party-political work is an important means and a condition for successful accomplishment of the widest range of Army and Navy organizational development problems.

Lenin's ideas on organizational development of the armed forces and the methods of the Communist Party's organizational and ideological work in implementing them are reflected in a concentrated manner in the party's Program, in decisions of the 23d, 24th and 25th congresses, in decrees of CPSU Central Committee plenums, and in documents devoted to jubilee dates in the country's history. Following party guidelines, the Soviet government carries out important decisions touching both on issues of national defense as a whole and on specific directions of organizational development of the Army and Navy. They were reflected in provisions of our military doctrine, in recommendations of Soviet military science and in the requirements of regulations and manuals.

Lenin and the Communist Party theoretically grounded the class principle and implemented it in the practice of organizational development of the army of a socialist state. The new army was formed as a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the spokesman for the will of workers and peasants freed from capitalism, and as a tool of struggle for their interests. Lenin stated that "our army is a class army, against the bourgeoisie" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XLIII, 210). All political, organizational and indoctrinational activities were conducted and are being conducted in troop units to ensure that the Soviet Army and Navy reflect the nature of socialism and its fundamental advantages over capitalism through their historic purpose, social-class composition, and the ideological maturity of service personnel.

With the building of developed socialism in our country, the USSR Armed Forces acquired new traits on the basis of a further consolidation of the Soviet political system, the solidarity and unity of society, an upswing in the national economy, especially in heavy industry, and achievements of scientific-technical progress. Without losing their class essence, they became a tool of the socialist state of the whole people. They rest on a powerful economy, the social-political relationship and the spiritual culture of mature socialism, and on the Soviet people as a historically one social and international community of people building communism. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in a speech to workers of the Nauman Electoral District of Moscow: "The solidarity and unity of society is a unique property of socialism and it is our invaluable, irresistible strength."

Lenin and the Communist Party grounded and implemented the principle of indivisible unity of the army and people. This principle reflects the high degree of social-political solidarity of Soviet society and the inseparable nature of interests and strength of the alliance of workers,

peasants and the intelligentsia both in carrying out tasks of building socialism and organizing its defense. Lenin emphasized that the October Revolution called to life an army which "is not separated from the people, as was the strength of the old standing army, but is linked with them in the closest manner..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXIV, 304). This is manifested especially vividly in our days. Close contact constantly exists between the combined units, units and ships and the soviet, party and social organizations as well as labor collectives. The Army takes an active part in national affairs. It is the school of life and school of indoctrination for the youth.

The Soviet Armed Forces are built on the principle of friendship of nations and of proletarian, socialist internationalism. Our Army is a single multinational military organization. The USSR Constitution grants all nations and nationalities in our country the equal right of defending their homeland. Lenin called for rallying "all military forces and the powerful international Red Army," and then, he said, "no force of imperialists will stand up against us!" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVII, 26). The supreme expression of internationalism is the joint struggle by toilers of countries of the socialist community against imperialist reaction.

Under present-day conditions there is enormous importance in the fact that tasks of ensuring the USSR's security are being accomplished in an inseparable tie with the strengthening of defenses of all fraternal countries of socialism. They are jointly elaborating and implementing steps to strengthen the combat community of socialist armies and are improving the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact Organization, which is celebrating the 25th Anniversary of its founding in May of this year.

The rapidly changing, complex and strained international situation requires the elaboration and implementation of measures which organically combine a consistent struggle for peace with reliable defense of the world-historic achievements of socialism and communism. Together with socialist countries, the Soviet Union is fighting to curb the arms race and attempting to rid mankind of its heavy burden by firmly following Lenin's statement that disarmament is the ideal of socialism. The Peace Program adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress and its organic continuation--the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and for the Freedom and Independence of Nations advanced by the 25th party congress, is playing an enormous mobilizing role in accomplishing these tasks.

But the military threat on the part of imperialism continues to be preserved, and it has been reinforced of late. The new spiral of the arms race in western countries aimed at creating new and more sophisticated kinds of mass destruction weapons conceals a serious danger. Centers of military conflict such as in the Near and Middle East are breaking out in various parts of the globe through the fault of imperialism. The shock

force of armies of countries belonging to the aggressive NATO military bloc is building up under cover of the myth of the "Soviet military threat." The aggressive pretensions of the Chinese hegemonists are growing.

The CPSU takes account of all this in its foreign policy. It thoroughly and comprehensively analyzes the changes occurring in the correlation of class forces under conditions of the struggle for two opposite social systems. It is promptly evaluating trends and prospects of military preparations in countries of imperialism and it is showing effective concern for national defense. Comrade Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union is not seeking and will not seek to attain military superiority over another country. We do not wish to disturb the approximate equilibrium of military forces now present. But countries of the socialist community cannot look with indifference at the efforts of NATO militarists and are forced to carry out necessary supplementary steps to strengthen their security. A wide range of foreign political issues as well as problems in the field of organizational development of the Armed Forces is being resolved with consideration of these new factors.

Thus the social-political principles of organizational development of the Army and Navy reflect the unity of the CPSU's general party and military policy and the peace-loving character and international content of the Soviet state's endeavors. These principles have a determining influence on the organizational-technical aspect of development of the Armed Forces.

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The basic measures in the system of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces--the most important component of military organizational development as a whole--are being accomplished on the basis of organizational principles. They reflect the patterns of development and functioning of the Army itself as a special entity for implementing state policy and patterns for maintaining the necessary level of technical outfitting of the troops and the conformity of their organization to demands of modern warfare. Lenin stated that in armed struggle "the one who wins is the one who has the greatest technology, efficiency, and discipline and the best vehicles..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVI, 116).

Thorough consideration in organizational development of the USSR Armed Forces is given to the capabilities of industry and transport, the progress of science and technology, size and composition of the population, the country's geographic position, the level achieved in logistical outfitting of armies of probable enemies and the direction of their development, the status of military science, the content of military doctrine and other factors. It is also important to reckon with the experience of past wars and the nature and features of future wars which might be unleashed by the imperialists.

The implementation of organizational principles ensures a scientifically grounded supply of the Army with weapons, an improvement in its organizational structure and control system, and the proper ratio of branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms, special troops and services. These principles serve as a reference point for manning and billeting troops, for their logistical support, for forming reserves and mobilization stocks, for training personnel, and for organizing their training and indoctrination.

A key problem in organizational development of the Armed Forces is consistent implementation of the uniform military-technical policy developed by the CPSU. Thanks to this, conditions are formed for the development and improvement of those weapons systems in which the USSR's security depends to the greatest extent, with strict observance of international treaty obligations.

Soviet military science is developing in conformity with the growing demands on the status of USSR defenses. Our military cadres are oriented on firm mastery of foremost military art, most effective use of high combat capabilities of modern arms, a continuous improvement in the organization of all branches of the Armed Forces and an increase in their readiness to deal crushing retaliatory blows against any aggressor.

Following Lenin's statement about taking account of historic conditions, the party and government created armed forces according to the principle of a standing, regular Red Army. At the same time the possibility was not precluded of a gradual transition to a territorial-militia system of military organizational development under favorable internal and external conditions. The course of historic development demonstrated the enormous advantages of regular armed forces over any other form of military organization.

Under present-day conditions, when the danger that imperialist forces will unleash new wars both of a general and a local character is preserved and at times even grows, and when arms and military equipment become more and more complex, the presence of regular armed forces manned on the basis of universal military obligation acquires a deciding role. The USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" passed in 1967 proceeds from the need for preserving and strengthening such a system. The new USSR Constitution states that military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is the honorable duty of Soviet citizens.

Optimum forms of organizational development corresponding to the demands of modern warfare, the level of military-technical progress, the numbers and quality of arms and the country's economic capabilities have been established and are being maintained in the Soviet Army and Navy. Consideration is given to the appearance of new branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms and naval forces and to the differentiation and specialization going on within them. The harmonious nature and proportionality achieved



In development of the Army and Navy on this basis permit the development of the most effective methods of their strategic and operational-tactical employment, organization of a system of coordination, and the personnel's study of modern weapons and combat equipment.

Management entities of the Soviet Army and Navy are organized and formed for the purpose of carrying out uniform command and control on the principle of centralism and one-man command. These entities are given full responsibility for the status and effectiveness of measures in personnel, combat and political training. Centralism is combined with the work of collegiate control entities in the supreme operational-strategic elements in the organization of the USSR Armed Forces. According to Lenin's definition, this system comprises the strongest aspect of the army's organizational development in which all its formations are subordinated to central military entities and a supreme command.

Lenin saw the enormous importance of one-man command formed on a party basis in the fact that it ensures the strictest unity of will, the goal-oriented actions of large masses of people, and their discipline and efficiency.

A strengthening of centralism and one-man command is linked with maintaining high military discipline. As a social norm of behavior, it is characterized by precise regulation of relations among service personnel and serves as an indicator of their efficiency and solidarity. Soviet military discipline is based on the personnel's political awareness and communist morality and is maintained through a skillful combination of measures of persuasion and coercion.

The appearance of new means of warfare made the principle of maintaining constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces of paramount importance. They now must be in that condition ensuring the accomplishment of their assigned missions of defeating an aggressor should he encroach on the USSR or other countries of socialism in the shortest period of time. The very important behest of Lenin to the effect that preservation of combat readiness is an obligation for us has not lost its importance. This requires the precise organization of the entire system of personnel training, imaginative development of military art, an improvement in field, air and naval schooling, and development of high moral-political and psychological qualities and the necessary intellectual and physical abilities in service personnel.

Inasmuch as man has been and remains the chief force in war, the accomplishment of tasks of building the Soviet Armed Forces is linked inseparably with the combat and political training of their personnel. It is accomplished on the basis of the following principles: training troops in what is needed to win in modern warfare; developing the soldiers' communist ideology and awareness; observing a unity of training and indoctrination; and combining individual training of service personnel with the training of subunits, units and ships.

The implementation of Lenin's principles of organizational development of the Army and Navy ensures the conditions and prerequisites for the advisable improvement in the Soviet Armed Forces, standing vigilantly on guard over the peaceful labor of our people and over universal peace, an improvement responding to the laws of social development and armed warfare.

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The Communist Party and Soviet government strictly and absolutely follow Lenin's principles of management of the USSR Armed Forces and implement Lenin's course in their organizational development firmly and consistently. They see the primary task to be, using the necessary sum of economic, social-political, military-technical and indoctrinational measures to ensure that level of military might of the socialist state and the combat might and combat readiness of the Army and Navy which would preclude any opportunity for an aggressor to begin war against the USSR and other countries of socialism with surprise and impunity. In fulfilling party instructions, military councils, commanders, staffs, political entities, and the party and Komsomol organizations direct the personnel's efforts at increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops and see to it that the Armed Forces reliably safeguard the sacred borders of the Motherland, which is building communism.

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## POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: NEED FOR VIGILANCE STRESSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 80 signed to press  
3 Apr 80 pp 68-76

[Article by Col I. Semenov for political study group instructors: "Be A Vigilant Soldier!"<sup>1</sup> Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]

[Excerpts] This article begins publication of material for political classes in the summer training period. The objective of this class is to help soldiers comprehend even more thoroughly the behests of V. I. Lenin and demands of the Communist Party for unremitting vigilance of Soviet citizens and Army and Navy personnel, and to emphasize the importance of vigilance under present-day conditions of the international situation, aggravated through the fault of the United States and other NATO countries.

Eight hours are allocated for studying the topic. It is advisable to distribute this time as follows: 2 hours for lecture, 2 hours for independent student preparation and 4 hours for seminar.

It is recommended that three basic questions be covered /in the lecture/:  
1. V. I. Lenin's behests and CPSU demands concerning vigilance of Soviet citizens and of Army and Navy personnel. 2. The increase in importance of vigilance under present-day conditions. 3. To be a vigilant soldier and to keep military and state secrets strictly.

/In a brief introduction/ it can be noted that the final year of the 10th Five-Year Plan is in full swing in our country. The selfless labor of Soviet citizens is implementing party plans aimed at increasing production effectiveness and work quality and at a further strengthening of the Motherland's economic might and defensive power. The preparation and conduct of elections to supreme soviets of Union and autonomous republics and to local soviets of people's deputies became vivid proof of our people's political and labor enthusiasm and their inseparable unity with the Leninist Party.

1. Material for political classes on the topic "Strictly Keep Military and State Secrets and Be a Vigilant Soldier."

Our party subordinates its many-sided work to concern for the welfare and happiness of Soviet citizens. All CPSU policy is imbued with this concern. It embodies Lenin's strategic line for a steady strengthening of the country's economic and defense might, for an increase in the people's welfare and for comprehensive prosperity of the socialist homeland. Soviet citizens responded fervently to the party's appeal to turn the year of 1980, the year of the 110th Anniversary of the great Lenin's birth, into a year of shock work, of work in a Lenin manner.

The steady strengthening of international positions and of the influence and authority of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community led to profound changes in the correlation of forces in the world in favor of socialism. But normalization of the international situation does not enter the plans of reactionary imperialist circles. Even under conditions of detente, they did not cease and are not ceasing for a single day the physical preparation for war. The United States sets the tone for all the West's military preparations. It is attempting to mobilize all forces of international reaction, militarism and aggression for the fight against detente and unite them on an anti-Soviet, antisocialist basis. Under these conditions the conclusion of the 25th CPSU Congress sounds especially current: "Although the possibilities for aggressive actions of imperialism now have been eroded considerably, its nature remains the same. Therefore peace-loving forces have to display high vigilance" ("Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p. 24).

#### 1. V. I. Lenin's Behests and the CPSU's Demands Concerning Vigilance of Soviet Citizens and of Army and Navy Personnel

Military vigilance is directly linked with missions of national defense and the country's armed protection against aggressive intrigues of the enemy. Loss of vigilance in this area inevitably leads to a reduction in troop combat readiness and has a negative effect on the course of combat actions.

Lenin's statements on vigilance are a constant guide to action for our party and all the Soviet people. Lenin's behests on vigilance are the immutable law of Soviet soldiers. Tillers of the Land of Soviets and defenders of the socialist homeland recalled it both in the Civil War years and in the period of peaceful construction. Fighting men and commanders were steadfastly guided by it in the stern time of the Great Patriotic War.

#### 2. The Increased Importance of Vigilance under Present-Day Conditions

In beginning the presentation of material on the second question, it is advisable to note that a detailed analysis of the contemporary domestic and international situation of our country is contained in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's vivid speech to electors of the Bauman Electoral District of Moscow. In describing the past decade, Leonid Il'ich noted that it was



a period of stable growth of our Motherland's economic and scientific-technical potential, which permitted a rise in the people's standard of living. During the 1970's real incomes per capita rose 1½ times for us. Over 108 million people improved their housing conditions. This is more than 40 percent of the country's population.

It was with a feeling of pride for our people that Leonid Il'ich said: "Our country is enormous and beautiful, comrades. We are accomplishing gigantic projects. And today, on the threshold of the 1980's, when preparations are unfolding for the 26th party congress, we have every basis to look calmly and confidently into the future. Our course, as before, is a course of peaceful creation, of further transformation of the country's boundless expanses, and of multiplication of the Soviet people's material and nonmaterial riches. And no one will turn us from this course!"

The Soviet people need a firm peace for creative labor. Concern for this has dictated the numerous peace initiatives of the Soviet Union aimed at preventing a new upward flight of the arms race and at safeguarding and multiplying the fruits of detente and peaceful cooperation. It was with great attention and approval that the entire peace-loving public and all progressive mankind greeted Comrade Brezhnev's proposals which he advanced during a visit to the GDR in the fall of last year. In Comrade Brezhnev's speech at a pre-election meeting of electors of the Bauman Electoral District of Moscow there is convincing proof of the unchangeability of our state's foreign policy course, which combines consistent love of peace with firm rebuff of aggression.

It should be emphasized that our Leninist Party's steadfast implementation of the Peace Program advanced by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses permitted achieving a noticeable normalization of the international situation and breaking the tragic cycle where peace was only a short breather between wars.

But this historic result does not suit the aggressive circles of imperialism and their Chinese accomplices. They are attempting to undermine detente, return the world to the dismal "cold war" times, and step up even more the arms race and intervention in internal affairs of other nations. In the traditional "State of the Nation" message of U.S. President J. Carter, seasoned in the "cold war" spirit, there is a frank statement of the U.S. claim to a "leading role in the world." This is taken to mean Washington's intent to dictate its customs in any region to any state and, in those instances where the U.S. administration should deem it necessary, to employ any means including weapons to counter the national liberation movements, revolutionary movements and all progressive movements. This message is a new claim to American world dominance.

The U.S. government unceremoniously declares various parts of the globe as spheres of "vital" American interests. For some time the trend to

bring these spheres right up to the borders of the Soviet Union has been seen more and more clearly;

And it is not simply words. They are backed up by the dispatch of aircraft carriers thousands of kilometers from the United States to the shores of countries located in the immediate vicinity of Soviet borders, by the fanning of anti-Soviet hysteria, by the declaration of all kinds of "sanctions" against us and even by threats to boycott the summer Olympic Games in Moscow. Matters have come to a point where chest emblems have appeared for sale in New York with the inscription "Kill a Soviet!" American soldiers have long been taught to fire against targets which depict servicemen in Soviet military uniform.

For the sake of what is all this being done? It turns out, for the sake of saving the western world against the "Soviet military threat." The malicious fabrication about this mythical "threat from the East" was taken up by double-dyed reaction from the first day of the Soviet state's existence. The Pentagon propaganda machine attempts to motivate every new step in military preparations of American imperialism--the movement of additional troop contingents from the United States to Western Europe, the building of new military bases and installations at "hot spots" on the planet, the creation of an interventionist "rapid deployment corps" and so on--by the need to counter the "Soviet military threat." The build-up in American military might in the Indian Ocean and in the Near and Middle East is accompanied by new revelry of fabrications about the "Soviet military threat," particularly in connection with events in Afghanistan, and attempts to slander Soviet-Afghan relations.

The tone is set by representatives of the supreme military leadership both in printed propaganda and in verbal propaganda. For example, in 1978 there were some 500 of their appearances before the personnel of U.S. Armed Forces' units and ships. In the face of elementary logic, Pentagon propagandists on the one hand repeat over and over again to the masses of soldiers and sailors about the "growing threat of the Soviets" and, on the other hand, they begin expanding on the "invincibility" of the American Army and boast about the capability and readiness of American interventionist forces to rush to any part of the globe to "defend" the notorious U.S. "national interests," but in fact for their accomplishment of gendarme functions. In short, the propagandist apparatus of the military-industrial complex uses the myth of the "Soviet military threat" as the primary "argument" in favor of the country's militarization and the preparation of new military adventures by U.S. imperialism.

International imperialism's fear of a strengthening of socialism, successes of the national liberation movement and a reinforcement of forces acting for relaxation of tensions and disarmament is the true reason why reactionary circles of the United States and certain other countries are intentionally aggravating the situation in the world. The enemies of socialism do not wish to reconcile themselves with progressive changes on the globe

and they are attempting to halt the inexorable course of history with the help of military force. At the Washington session of the NATO Council back in May 1978 a decision was made at U.S. insistence concerning the yearly automatic increase in military expenditures of participants of this aggressive bloc. In December 1979 NATO made the decision to station some 600 cruise missiles and Pershing-2 ballistic missiles in Western Europe, capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union and thus changing the strategic situation in Europe in NATO's favor. U.S. military circles do not plan to hide the fact that "medium-range missiles for Europe" will be used not for defense, but to deliver the first strike against targets on the territory of Warsaw Pact countries.

The Pentagon budget for FY 1981 will exceed \$160 billion, which is over 25 percent of the U.S. national budget. And by the mid-1980's Washington's military expenditures will go beyond \$200 billion! Behind these astronomical figures lies the program for building the "MX" mobile missile systems, the Minuteman intercontinental missiles with a more powerful nuclear warhead, strategic submarines with the new Trident missile, a new generation of tanks, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, tactical aircraft, and naval warships. In the following five-year period the Pentagon is allocating over nine billion dollars just for equipping a "rapid deployment corps," intended to become a firefighting team for putting down national liberation movements in various parts of the world.

The military preparations of American imperialism often turn into provocations dangerous to the cause of peace and which more than once have placed mankind on the brink of catastrophe. In an attempt to frighten our country in the postwar years, the United States resorted to nuclear threat 19 times, and in 10 instances it placed its strategic bombers in a state of combat readiness and sent them toward the borders of the USSR and other fraternal socialist states.

The dangerous actions of American imperialism are fully supported by Peking's rulers, who unreservedly sacrifice the national interests of the Chinese people for their great-power schemes. The PRC minister of defense openly calls for preparation for war, which he considers inevitable. The visit to China by U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown confirmed the fears of the peace-loving public about the threat to security carried to the peoples by the Sino-American military alliance. American military leaders are making plans for the broadest involvement of the PRC in Washington's aggressive policy aimed against countries adjacent to China, and above all against the Soviet Union, and they are attempting to turn China into an Asiatic appendage of NATO.

While building up military preparations and fostering aggressive plans against the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist states, world imperialism at the same time is conducting a frantic ideological struggle and, using the most refined methods and contemporary equipment, is attempting to poison the awareness of Soviet citizens with slander against

our reality, blacken socialism, and color imperialism and its predatory, inhumane policy and practice. Ideological struggle is a continuously operating front where the forward edge passes through the hearts and minds of people.

Numerous radio stations conduct refined and many-sided propaganda against the fraternal socialist countries: Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, BBC, Liberty, Free Europe, Voice of Israel, Vatican Radio and others. There is a sum total of over 40 foreign radio stations conducting hostile propaganda against the USSR in 27 languages of peoples of our country. The contents of bourgeois broadcasts show that all of them are aimed at disarming Soviet citizens ideologically, instilling social inertness in them, and generating doubt as to the truth of our spiritual values and ideals.

The western poisoners of the airwaves do everything to slander the Soviet Union, to drive a wedge in the united ranks of countries of the socialist community, split its unity, and weaken the attractive force of the ideas of socialism. For example, in the United States the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Z. Brzezinski drew up special directives according to which the Voice of America is to wage a more persistent offensive against socialist countries in the field of ideology under new conditions. Lately the airwaves literally have shuddered from the abundance of the most refined and crude forgeries fabricated by the "voice" from America and by other echoing voices.

The Soviet Armed Forces have been and remain one of the chief targets of imperialism's subversive activities. Under present-day conditions these subversive actions are intensifying and are being conducted in a differentiated manner--with consideration of different categories of service personnel. Our class enemies in the world arena would like to weaken the resolve of Soviet soldiers to defend our revolutionary achievements, introduce nationalistic prejudices into their awareness, shake their dedication to the cause of the Leninist Party and thus undermine the basis of our Army and Navy's might. But these calculations are doomed to failure.

It is not difficult to conclude, from all that has been said, that the importance of political and military vigilance for Army and Navy personnel grows considerably under present-day conditions. A person deeply persuaded as to the historic truth of the Marxist-Leninist teaching and our party's policy will not be confused by any vain attempts or any ideological diversions of our ideological enemies. A defender of the Motherland who knows his duties firmly and fulfills them faultlessly will not be caught unawares by the aggressive acts of imperialism or their accomplices. At any moment he is capable of fulfilling demands of the oath and regulations courageously and capably and of identifying and neutralizing the enemy, no matter what crafty techniques and methods he uses.

It should be emphasized that the revolutionary vigilance of Soviet citizens and of Army and Navy personnel is a tested method in the struggle against



bourgeois ideology and our enemies' malicious intrigues. It is based on their deep communist conviction, political awareness, and irreconcilability toward alien views and phenomena. Like all workers of our Motherland, Army and Navy personnel are closely rallied about the party of the great Lenin and they fervently and unanimously approve the CPSU's Leninist political course and the productive practical work of its Central Committee headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. As noted by CPSU CC Politburo Member and USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, the Party Central Committee and Soviet government keep a vigilant eye on the development of international events and are constantly concerned to see that the Soviet Armed Forces absolutely meet the high requirements for ensuring the security of our Motherland and of all countries of the socialist community.

### **3. Be a Vigilant Soldier, Keep Military and State Secrets Strictly**

The Soviet soldier takes an oath on entering the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces. He swears to be disciplined and vigilant, to keep military and state secrets strictly, and to be dedicated to the last breath to his people, to his Soviet Motherland and to the Soviet government. The requirement to be vigilant and to keep military and state secrets strictly also is contained in the USSR Armed Forces Internal Service Regulation.

Just what is a military secret? A military secret is everything concerning the Soviet Armed Forces: their organization, strength and location of units, their armaments, equipment, level of combat training, logistical and financial support, operations and mobilization plans and so on. In addition, a military secret consists of all data on military industry, on discoveries, inventions and improvements in the field of technical and other means of our country's defense, and so on.

Sometimes one can hear from young soldiers: "But what secret does a private have? Secrets are kept in headquarters' safes under lock and key." This is, of course, an erroneous opinion. Military secrets are entrusted to every Soviet soldier to one extent or another, and he is obligated to keep them strictly. Privates and seamen know, for example, the strength of their subunits, their locations, models of armaments, their specifications, the contents of combat and political training classes, the names of commanders and chiefs, allowance standards and so on. All these data are not to be divulged.

In an attempt to boast about what they know in front of those near and dear and friends and acquaintances, some service personnel, apparently even without evil intent, blab information about the location of military installations, the location and re-forming of units, and about their company, battery, squadron and combat unit. But in so doing they do harm to the state's defenses as a whole, since the enemy can collect data of interest to him even from small bits and use them in his subversive activities against our country.

Today questions of maintaining unremitting vigilance are especially acute. The fact is that the enemy not only is expanding the front of secret warfare against the Soviet Union and its Army and Navy, but is receiving more and more sophisticated means to use for collecting secret data. Not long ago, for example, he could photograph small military installations from a distance of 3-5 km maximum. But now, according to foreign press data, long focal length cameras allow distinguishing objects on the terrain 3-6 m in size from an altitude up to 500 km.

There has been an immeasurable increase in the capabilities for performing reconnaissance with radiotechnical facilities. Tens of thousands of specialists in radio, telephone and telegraph communications, electrical engineering and electronics, radio operators, cipher clerks and other experts are assembled in the Pentagon's intelligence service. They have at their disposal thousands of radio posts operating around the clock and situated around the Soviet Union. According to foreign press data, the equipment in them is capable of registering not only the broadcasts of fixed radio stations, but even receiving short-wave radio traffic among Soviet Army units. Powerful radar installations of our enemies perform continuous surveillance over the territory of our country.

It cannot be ignored that at the present time there are greatly expanded possibilities for contacts by foreigners, among whom may be agents of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, with the personnel of our units and ships. The press has given many examples where people with special assignments of hostile intelligence centers have gotten into our country under the guise of "tourists." They were assigned to collect information on the location of military airfields, missile launching pads, radar installations, high-voltage transmission lines and so on. The spies were told to observe Soviet troop movements, to write down vehicle numbers and photograph military and industrial installations.

There have been instances, during periods of friendly visits to foreign ports by our warships, where representatives of foreign powers attempted to worm information of specific interest to their intelligence people from Soviet seamen. But the seamen and petty officers always were equal to the occasion and kept military and state secrets strictly.

It must be remembered that the traditional impression about an enemy agent as a person in dark glasses with pulled-up collar and hat pulled down over his eyes is obsolete today. He may be a person who has a very charming appearance and disposes people to himself. He is an excellent conversationalist and always ready to listen attentively, show sympathy and stand a treat. Intelligence agents display heightened interest in people who are not able to keep their tongues from wagging. It was not by chance that the people accurately dubbed blabbermouths as boons to spies. It is generally known that people who use alcoholic beverages are distinguished by special talkativeness. A well-known saying goes: "In the mind of a sober person, on the tongue of a drunk."

It should be noted that imperialist intelligence agents excellently master the art of eliciting from people information of interest to them. A person who is talkative, let alone one who has used alcohol, most often will not notice how the conversation shifts to a topic of interest to his companion. Instructions to the agents contain very detailed directions on how to use blabbermouths and braggarts for espionage purposes. For example, American intelligence agencies instruct their cadres: "Bragging is a weakness inherent in every person to a greater or lesser extent. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and look for braggarts. Exercise your ability to listen for hours to the profuse talk of some blabbermouth. They always will fall into your carefully prepared trap and will divulge strictly-kept secrets without realizing it."

The admissions of former foreign intelligence agent Kudryavtsev, who gave himself up to agencies of Soviet authority, are indicative. He related that spies being sent into the USSR are recommended to strike up acquaintanceship with officers and men, to listen to conversations at train stations and on trains, trolleys and buses, to fish for information on the location of units and on weapons, to learn the names of commanders and so on. Kudryavtsev said that "I was to visit clubs, restaurants, stores, taverns and other public places located near important points and military installations, take note of the frequent visitors there, establish friendly relations with some of them, get them drunk and thus study the people and find those suitable for recruitment and for collecting espionage information."

Loss of secret documents may become the source of divulgence of military and state secrets. Such instances occur where rules for their storage, use and shipment are violated and where lack of discipline and indifference are permitted.

Constant vigilance also has to be displayed both in personal correspondence and in conversations outside the unit area. It can happen as follows. A private has arrived in the regiment or a seaman has arrived aboard ship and in letters or conversations with outsiders begins to boast what kind of unit it is and what sophisticated equipment or weapons he has been entrusted with. Of course, our weapons generate fully understandable pride in those to whom they are entrusted. But there is a golden rule: What the enemy shouldn't know, don't tell even to a friend.

In completing presentation of material on the topic, it is important to stress that to be on guard means never to forget about the military danger threatening us on the part of aggressive forces of imperialism and its accomplices, to constantly increase political and military vigilance, to maintain combat readiness at the proper high level, and to prepare seriously and strenuously for the struggle against a strong and crafty enemy.

Speaking to electors of the Bauman Electoral District of Moscow, Comrade Brezhnev remarked that the more imperialism's capabilities to dominate

other countries and peoples are curtailed, the more furiously its most aggressive and short-sighted representatives react to this. This aggressiveness can be contained only by the might and intelligent policy of peace-loving states and by the resolve of people to disrupt dangerous plans of pretenders to world domination. Leonid Il'ich further emphasized that the Soviet Union can be frightened by no one. Our strength and capabilities are enormous. We and our allies always will manage to stand up for ourselves and offer a rebuff to any hostile attacks.

Soviet soldiers are guarding the sacred borders of our Motherland and the achievements of socialism vigilantly and reliably. They always are ready to fulfill their patriotic and international duty with honor.

/In the period of independent preparation/ it should be recommended that the soldiers study Lenin's work "Beware of Spies!" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVIII, 399); "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [CPSU Program] (Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report entitled "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and Upcoming Tasks of the Party in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS," pp 22-24, 75-76, 83) and Comrade Brezhnev's speech at his meeting with electors of the Bauman Electoral District of Moscow (PRAVDA, 23 February 1980); and Chapter 10 of the training aid for political studies entitled "Na strazhe rodiny" [Guarding the Motherland] (Voenizdat, 1978).

The following questions can be discussed /in the seminar/: 1. What is vigilance and why is it necessary to Soviet soldiers? 2. What did V. I. Lenin bequeath to defenders of the socialist homeland about vigilance and combat readiness? 3. What tasks did the 25th CPSU Congress assign to the Soviet Armed Forces? 4. Why is the importance of vigilance and unrelenting combat readiness growing under present-day conditions? 5. What demands do the military oath and military regulations place on vigilance of Soviet military personnel? 6. The subunit's tasks for further strengthening vigilance and increasing combat readiness.

During the class it should be recommended that more examples be given of vigilance displayed by soldiers of a given unit (ship) and that critical remarks be made of those who permit negligence and who deviate from demands of the regulations.

/In the evening hours/ it is possible to arrange a viewing of the documentary newsreels entitled "Our First Commandment," "True Sons of the People" and "I Serve the Soviet Union"; and filmstrips entitled "V. I. Lenin's Behests to Soviet Soldiers on Vigilance and Constant Combat Readiness" and "Vigilance is Our Weapon." In preparing for the classes it is advisable to make use of albums of visual aids entitled "The 25th CPSU Congress on Strengthening USSR Defenses" (Voenizdat, 1976) and "Vigilance is Our Weapon" (Voenizdat, 1977).



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#### BOOK REVIEW: LENIN AND THE ARMED FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 80 signed to press 3 Apr 80 pp 88-91

[Review by Lt Gen M. Kir'yan, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, on publication of the book "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" (V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces): "Bibliography: Founder of a New Type of Army"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense Voennoye izdatel'stvo is publishing the book entitled "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" for the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's birth. It opens a new publishing series entitled "Officer's Library," undertaken by Voenizdat with consideration of the readers' needs and desires.

As this work also notes, the most outstanding events of the 20th century are linked with Lenin's name--the Great October Socialist Revolution, and the creation, establishment and development of the first socialist state in the world. The birth, heroic history and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces and the development of Soviet military science also are linked inseparably with the name of the workers' great leader. Vladimir Il'ich's military activities are inseparable from his fight to establish the power of workers and peasants and for building a socialist society. The military program of the proletarian revolution and the teaching on defense of the socialist homeland elaborated by Lenin comprised the scientific-theoretical basis for creating an armed forces capable of defending the young Soviet state against internal counterrevolution and foreign intervention. Lenin's behests on defense of the socialist homeland and principles of military organization of the Soviet state continue to serve throughout the entire period of its existence as the basis for accomplishing tasks of building and developing the Soviet Armed Forces. This is why Soviet citizens take great interest in studying Lenin's military-theoretical heritage, which allows obtaining answers to many questions of modern times as well.

The content and importance of Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland is revealed in this work with great depth. It consists of the scientifically grounded propositions: on the essence of the socialist state

as a new type of state; on the essence and characteristic features of wars in defense of socialism; on military organization of the socialist state and principles of organizational development of its Armed Forces; and on the Communist Party's managing and directing role in military organizational development, in strengthening the country's defenses and in organizing its protection.

An analysis of Lenin's military-theoretical heritage on these matters clearly shows the objective need for military defense of the socialist homeland and permits setting forth in a systematized form the principles of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and reflecting the CPSU's work to implement Lenin's ideas.

The work shows that with the Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the proletariat was to prove in deed "that it is not only capable of overthrowing the exploiters, but also of organizing for self-protection" (V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniye" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVIII, 139). To defend the revolution the workers needed their own military organization, since the old army was not able to serve this purpose.

Creation of such an organization represented one of the most difficult tasks which the young Soviet state had to accomplish. The issue of building a new army was a burning one for the country under conditions of civil war. The Communist Party and toiling masses managed to fulfill it. The book notes that Lenin's decree entitled "On Organization of a Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" marked the beginning of formation of the Soviet Armed Forces. The 7th Party Congress played an important role here, having outlined ways to form an orderly system of military control from top to bottom, as did the conference on military organizational development held in March 1918 under Lenin's chairmanship.

It is generally known that the Red Army was formed at first on a voluntary basis, which was necessary to attract broad masses of workers to the armed defense of achievements of October and to create a proletarian, politically aware nucleus of the Red Army. But under conditions where Entente imperialists broke the peaceful respite in the summer of 1918 and began open armed intervention, the need arose for a regular army formed on the basis of universal military obligation of the toiling classes. The need for a new phase in Soviet military organizational development was thoroughly substantiated in Lenin's works and in party decisions. The necessary measures were conducted under the Central Committee's direction for converting to universal military obligation of the workers. It was necessary to overcome the frenzied resistance of the socialist revolutionaries and Mensheviks in so doing. The 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets legislated the organizational principles of a regular army.

The 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress holds an exceptionally important place in the history of Soviet military organizational

development. With its decisions, founded on Lenin's ideas, the congress secured the time-tested principles of organization and training of a regular Army and Navy and mobilized the party masses for a further strengthening and development of the Armed Forces and for reinforcing the rebuff to interventionists and the White Guards. In conformity with congress guidelines, an orderly system of political entities was formed in the Army and Navy and the work of party organizations was activated and improved. In their social nature, the Soviet Armed Forces, formed by the Communist Party headed by V. I. Lenin, are truly of the people. Herein lies the inexhaustible source of their might and their advantage over armies of imperialist states.

The work also shows that V. I. Lenin was an outstanding manager of the Red Army's combat actions. At a difficult time for the Soviet land he took the helm of the Workers' and Peasants' Defense Council, which was granted full powers. The military leadership qualities of the leader of the party and state were thoroughly revealed in this difficult period. Understanding the situation thoroughly and estimating it correctly, Lenin capably determined the axes of the main attack and saw that the necessary personnel and weapons were concentrated on them. The Soviet state stood up under the onslaught of enemies armed to the teeth in the difficult military ordeals, and its Armed Forces demonstrated high moral-combat qualities, firm discipline, efficiency and steadfastness in battle. It is generally known that the party also used the experience of concentrating absolute power in one entity during the Great Patriotic War, when the State Defense Committee exercised direction over all aspects of Soviet state activities, including military activities.

This book thoroughly examines the course and features of military organizational development and the improvements in the Armed Forces in the period between the Civil and Great Patriotic wars. In March 1921 the 10th party congress secured Lenin's propositions on ways to strengthen national defense under conditions of socialist creation and it outlined specific measures for developing the Soviet Armed Forces in peacetime. Lenin acted resolutely against the leftist viewpoint about an immediate transition to a militia system, and essentially the elimination of a regular Red Army. Military organizational development continued on the basis of Lenin's scientific principles.

The book notes that, among the decisive principles of military organizational development, one of the most important places is held by the thesis on the managing and guiding role of the Communist Party in strengthening national defense and in increasing the combat might of the Army and Navy. Lenin and the Party Central Committee always kept within their field of view and determined the main directions for organization and improvement of the Armed Forces and questions of their technical outfitting, personnel training and indoctrination, the maintaining of high combat readiness, the training and allocation of cadres and so on. Under the direction of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet Army and Navy were



transformed into a powerful, technically well equipped, spiritually tempered armed force formidable to enemies. Soviet soldiers honorably performed their duty in the Great Patriotic War under the leadership of the CPSU. The Party Central Committee was the true organizer and inspirer of our historic victory over fascist Germany and militarist Japan. It was the headquarters from which supreme political and strategic leadership of military operations was exercised.

The experience gained by the party in those years was further developed after the Great Patriotic War. This book reflects the military-theoretical, political and military-organizational activities of the CPSU in the organizational development, technical outfitting and training of the Soviet Armed Forces in the contemporary phase of the Soviet state's development. The work emphasizes that the primary goal of the CPSU's defense policy in the contemporary stage is to ensure peaceful conditions for building a communist society and to ensure the security of the Soviet state. The Communist Party's work in the military area was reflected in a concentrated form in the CPSU Program, in decisions of the 23d, 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and in other party documents. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev notes that "the growth in the party's managing role is a process coming from within our socialist society, closely linked with its entire development and reflecting its objective needs" ("Leninskiy kurs" [With a Leninist Course], II, 181).

The CPSU was faced with tasks of scientific elaboration of fundamentally new problems of military theory and practice determined by the altered nature and methods of conducting modern wars and of organizing defense of socialist achievements together with fraternal parties of socialist countries. This all increases the CPSU's responsibility for the historic destinies of socialism and communism and consequently demands a further reinforcement of the Communist Party's role in the military area. In presenting Leninist principles of party direction of the Armed Forces, the book's authors identify among them in particular the scientific spirit, unity of political and military management, and close ties with the masses.

The book devotes considerable space to revealing the principle of one-man command. Lenin described one-man command as a system of control which best ensured the use of human abilities, personal responsibility of the manager and performers, and the flexibility and efficiency of management. The issue of its introduction in the Army and Navy was studied by the party very thoroughly and it was discussed at division and district party conferences, at the All-Russian Conference of Chiefs of Political Entities, and at the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] Plenum. The party introduced one-man command in the Armed Forces in March 1925, the Party Central Committee repeatedly returned to this problem. Great Patriotic War experience once again confirmed in practice the correctness of this important Leninist principle of management. In the postwar period the CPSU took all steps to ensure that one-man command developed and strengthened in conformity with the developmental level of the Soviet Armed Forces

under contemporary conditions. The concentration of the functions of management and control over all the many-sided troop activities in the hands of the commander with unity of command permits the fullest implementation of party requirements on maintaining their constant combat readiness.

Lenin's heritage as the founder of Soviet military science is thoroughly described in the work. Lenin created the principles of Soviet military science as an orderly system of knowledge on principles of preparing and waging war after having imaginatively generalized the military-combat experience of the Communist Party and the experience of Armed Forces of the young Republic of Soviets and having critically used all the best from past military thinking. He developed the teaching of Marx and Engels on war and the army as applied to the new historic conditions and he demonstrated the dependence of the course and outcome of war on a society's economic system, the developmental level of production, science and technology, on politics, on the moral-political status of the people and the army, the technical outfitting and combat training of troops, and quality of the command personnel.

As stated in the book, Lenin formulated the fundamental theoretical provisions on the mutual link of politics and military strategy and on the determining influence of politics on strategy. Many key issues are elaborated in his works connected with the conduct of strategic actions, direction of the armed forces, training and employment of reserves, and selection of the moment for the decisive attack on the enemy, and connected with the relentless pursuit of the enemy until complete defeat.

Having correctly assessed the possible character of a future war under present-day conditions, should it be unleashed by the imperialists, the CPSU and its Central Committee precisely determined the basic directions of development for means of armed warfare. The great results achieved in technical outfitting of the Army and Navy are a result of the party's constant concern for ensuring reliable defense of the Soviet state and all countries of the socialist community.

Formation of a massive regular workers' and peasants' army advanced the problem of training command cadres. As this work states, Lenin set aside the chief role in deciding this problem for the working class and its organizations. He emphasized that it was the workers who must take up command of the army and advance people from their midst who were capable of becoming Red Army commanders. The leader of the party and state constantly monitored the training and use of military cadres and taught how to select them with consideration of their conscientiousness, political awareness, knowledge of military affairs and administrative abilities. Guided by these Leninist propositions, the CPSU successfully resolved the complex task of preparing cadres who directed troops expertly in the Great Patriotic War. Placing high demands on the selection, placement and indoctrination of military cadres under present-day conditions, the

party sees to it that workers are advanced to posts of leadership who are dedicated to the ideals of communism, who have a good knowledge of their job, who are constantly linked with the masses, and who are able to organize and inspire them for performing tasks at hand.

As the book notes, an important place in Lenin's military-theoretical heritage is held by the conclusion that participation of broad toiling masses in war and the degree of their awareness and initiative in the final account have a decisive effect on the outcome of a war. Many of Lenin's statements formulate tasks of ideological-political indoctrination of Soviet soldiers as a component part of a single process of communist indoctrination of the whole people.

Party-political work, which Lenin viewed as a powerful means of implementing party ideology and policy in the work of the Armed Forces, has primary importance in developing high moral-political and combat qualities of service personnel. In organizing this work, the party proceeds from Leninist principles, with the primary ones being: the profoundly party character of party-political work and conformity of its goals to the social nature, features and historic purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces; a close link with the practice of building communism and with the life of the entire Soviet people; a continuous nature, concreteness, purposefulness, efficiency and flexibility; truthfulness, clarity, intelligibility and persuasiveness. The book emphasizes that commanders, political workers and all party members engage in ideological-political and indoctrinational activities. Their primary goal in the present-day stage is to ensure the ideological conditioning of Soviet soldiers and to mobilize them for a comprehensive increase in combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The altered content of combat readiness, especially under conditions of an aggressor's possible employment of nuclear missiles, introduces substantial changes to the content and methods of party-political work in the Army and Navy.

Among the most important conditions for successful conduct of armed warfare, Lenin set aside a special place for conscious discipline of Soviet soldiers which, according to his definition, multiplies tenfold the combat might of units and subunits and ensures their superiority over the enemy. The book notes that Vladimir Il'ich Lenin thoroughly revealed the class content of Soviet military discipline and its fundamental differences from the discipline of bourgeois armies. He considered the immutable basis of Soviet military discipline to be the high political awareness of soldiers, which serves as the basis and foundation of high troop morale and the massive heroism of personnel. The leader's behests on military discipline have not lost their importance even today and have been further developed in decisions and documents of the Communist Party and Soviet state.

Constant readiness to rebuff aggression is inconceivable without high vigilance, the importance of which is revealed in Lenin's theoretical heritage. As shown in the book, Lenin demanded a decisive struggle against gullibility and unconcern, and against instances where military

secrets were divulged. The high vigilance of the Soviet people and Army and Navy personnel served as an important condition for victory over internal counterrevolution and foreign intervention in the Civil War and of victory over fascist Germany and militarist Japan in the Great Patriotic War. High vigilance has acquired special importance now, in connection with the Armed Forces being outfitted with nuclear weapons, the imperialists' preparation of a nuclear missile war and their stepped-up ideological diversions against countries of socialism. In this situation, the CPSU, guided by Lenin's behests, devotes much attention to instilling vigilance in Soviet personnel who stand on guard over the creative labor of our people and over peace throughout the world.

Authors of this work write that with the formation of the world socialist system the question of armed protection of socialism and communism became a component of the problem of strengthening the unity and cooperation of socialist countries. True to Lenin's behests and to its international obligation, the USSR honorably fulfilled its liberation mission during World War II and it has given and is giving political, economic, moral and, when necessary, even military assistance to peoples and countries struggling for their national liberation from imperialism. It considers it to be its international obligation, together with other socialist countries, to ensure reliable protection and security of the entire socialist community.

Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland was imaginatively elaborated in the CPSU Program, in the documents and decisions of party congresses, and in decrees of Party Central Committee plenums. It also was reflected in the Soviet Union Constitution, which included a special chapter entitled "Defense of the Socialist Homeland." These documents comprehensively present a program of building communism in our country, which contributes to a further strengthening of the USSR's defenses. The works, reports and addresses by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Mar SU L. I. Brezhnev make an outstanding contribution to elaboration of Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland. They specify provisions of Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland as applied to the present correlation of class forces in the world arena and substantiate the need for collective defense of countries of the entire socialist community.

Along with armies of Warsaw Pact member nations, our Armed Forces reliably safeguard the security of the socialist community. Comrade Brezhnev noted in the Report to the 25th CPSU Congress that "the Soviet people can be sure that the fruits of their creative labor will be under reliable protection" ("Leninskim kursom," V, 343).

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It stands to reason that it is impossible to encompass all the problems of a fundamental printed work in one review. But it would appear that even what has been said above allows the conclusion that the book entitled "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" is of unquestioned interest for readers and will be of great assistance to officer cadres in increasing their knowledge and in resolving tasks of training and indoctrinating Army and Navy personnel.

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## WARSAW PACT: TASKS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 80 signed to press 17 Apr 80 pp 43-52

[Article on occasion of 25th Anniversary of Warsaw Pact Organization by Lt Gen A. Merezko, Deputy Chief of Staff of Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Member Nations: "Reliable Shield of Socialism and Peace." Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]

[Text] In May of this year peoples of the USSR and other fraternal countries of socialism and all honest people of our planet are celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization--the first military-political alliance in history of truly equal, free, sovereign socialist states. And today, in tracing mentally the quarter-century path of the powerful defensive coalition of countries of the socialist community, we recall again and again the world-historic event, the defeat of shock forces of world imperialism--German fascism and Japanese militarism, in which the Soviet Union made the deciding contribution. Our heroic people and their valorous Armed Forces, led by the Party of Lenin, won a great victory in an unprecedented battle against a strong and crafty enemy, defended the freedom and independence of the socialist homeland, brought liberation to many peoples of the world from Hitler's invaders, and saved mankind from the fascist plague.

The victory over fascism was a world-historic event which had a very profound influence on the entire further course of world development. As a result of this victory socialism moved beyond the bounds of a single country and a world socialist system formed. The correlation of class forces in the international arena changed and continues to change irrepressibly in favor of socialism, democracy and peace and to the detriment of imperialism.

A community of socialist states was transformed into a powerful factor of social progress in a historically brief period of time. Real socialism acts as the chief revolutionary force of modern times. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 25th CPSU Congress that "not one objective person can deny that the influence of countries of socialism on the course of world events is becoming more and more strong and profound. And this . . .

is a great boon to mankind as a whole and to all who wish freedom, equality, independence, peace and progress."

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Formation of the defensive Warsaw Pact Organization was a forced retaliatory measure of the Soviet Union and other European countries of socialism against the direct military threat on the part of international imperialist reaction. Several years had passed since the end of World War II, but black clouds of military storm again thickened over Europe. The ring-leaders of imperialist powers, and the United States and England above all, formed the aggressive NATO bloc as early as April 1949, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and their obligations in the anti-Hitler coalition, and in 1954 and 1955 they formed the CENTO and SEATO blocs and were feverishly developing plans of aggression against the Soviet Union and the European socialist states. Imperialism unfolded intensive preparations for unleashing a new war with the use of mass destruction weapons. The threat to peace and socialism rose even more with the inclusion of the FRG in NATO in 1955. Ruling circles of the FRG were conducting a policy of undisguised revanchism and militarism.

The USSR and other socialist countries of Europe were faced with the insistent need to take effective steps for collective defense of their security and preservation of peace on the European continent and throughout the world. The socialist states of Europe signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on 14 May 1955 in the capital of the Polish People's Republic, Warsaw, and this marked the beginning of their military-political alliance. It should be emphasized once more that this happened six years after formation of the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance.

Lenin's ideas on cooperation and mutual assistance of socialist countries and on consolidating their economic and military efforts for defending revolutionary achievements were embodied and further developed in the Warsaw Pact. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that the peoples who chose the socialist path of development "definitely need a close military and economic alliance, since otherwise the capitalists . . . will stifle and crush us singly" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XL, 46). Speaking at a session of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] in February 1920, Vladimir Il'ich said: "In standing against the enormous front of imperialist powers, we who are fighting against imperialism represent an alliance requiring close military solidarity, and we view any attempts to disrupt this solidarity as a completely inadmissible phenomenon, as betrayal of the interests of struggle against international imperialism. . . . We say: There is a need for unity of military forces and deviation from this unity is inadmissible" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XL, 98-99).

Life vividly confirmed that the defense of socialism cannot be only a national task of a particular socialist state. It is a general national and international obligation and the vital job of all countries of the socialist community. International unity and solidarity of socialist states is a vitally important need for ensuring reliable joint defense and for maintaining peace and the security of nations.

Lenin's ideas on the international character of defense of socialist achievements, elaborated under new historic conditions, now determined the essence and primary directions of the military policy of the CPSU and of the communist and working parties of fraternal socialist states.

The Warsaw Pact is a new type of military-political alliance, not formed for preparing for predatory wars, but to counter the forces of aggression and prevent the appearance of military conflicts and territorial annexation in Europe. The history of mankind knows no other such military-political alliance with such a considerable influence on the destinies of nations and with such noble goals as the community of socialist states joined in the Warsaw Pact Organization. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasizes that "we formed this cooperative effort above all to withstand the threat of imperialism and the aggressive military bloc it formed and in order to defend the cause of socialism and peace through common efforts" ("Leninskiy kurs" [With a Leninist Course], IV, 68). As shown by the entire 25-year history of its existence, the defensive coalition of socialist countries represents a most important factor of stability in Europe, an insurmountable barrier to reactionary plans and attacks by aggressive militaristic forces both on the European continent and throughout the world.

The indestructible unity, solidarity and comprehensive cooperation of fraternal countries of socialism are based on common economic, political, ideological and military-strategic foundations.

The economic foundation comprises a single type of socialist method of production, public ownership of means of production and the socialist character of production relations, which permits accomplishing a close economic and scientific-technical cooperation among the Warsaw Pact member nations.

The social-political basis of the unity of allied countries is the uniformity of the social and state system, commonality of social-class structure and power of the toilers headed by the working class.

Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and an unshakable faith in revolutionary principles of international solidarity of the working class in a struggle for the triumph of socialism and communism represent the ideological foundation of the close solidarity of fraternal socialist states.



The military-strategic foundation of the combat alliance of brother nations consists of a commonality of goals of collective defense of the achievements of socialism and communism, as well as a commonality of military-theoretical views based on Lenin's teaching on war and the army and on defense of the socialist homeland.

All the work of the Warsaw Pact Organization is directed by the collective efforts of communist and working parties, which jointly elaborate the fundamental directions for a further strengthening of the security of fraternal countries and a development of their diversified cooperation within the framework of the Political Consultative Committee (PKK). The management by Marxist-Leninist parties is a fundamental condition ensuring firm unity of states of the socialist community. The report of the CPSU CC to the 25th Party Congress emphasizes that "the primary foundation of our close cooperation, its living soul and its guiding, organizing force is, of course, the indestructible combat alliance /of Communist Parties of the countries of socialism/, the unity of their ideologies, the unity of goals and the unity of will" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 7).

The cooperation of fraternal countries of socialism becomes many-sided while constantly improving, and it acquires ever greater depth. A particularly important role in development of ties in all directions belongs to the Political Consultative Committee--the supreme political entity of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Formed to carry out consultations among Warsaw Pact member nations, the PKK has served for a quarter-century as one of the most important forms of cooperation for the leaders of our parties and countries. Beginning in 1960, the general (first) secretaries of central committees of communist and workers' parties and the heads of states and governments regularly have taken part in PKK conferences, which elevates even more the international authority of this entity and attaches enormous weight to its decisions.

Warsaw Pact member nations jointly work out decisions at conferences of the Political Consultative Committee on general political and international problems touching on the interests of all allied countries, and they examine the most important issues involving a strengthening of effective armed defense of the socialist community, the assurance of peace and security, development of cooperation in Europe, prevention of a world nuclear missile war, elimination of centers of military danger and curtailment of the aggressive actions of international imperialism.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the enormous work done by the Warsaw Pact Organization to relax international tension and strengthen peace in Europe and throughout the world. Very important initiatives aimed at resolving cardinal foreign policy problems in the interests of all peace-loving nations proceed from this organization.

A PKK conference held in Bucharest in July 1966 adopted the familiar Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe, which proposed large-scale measures for activating efforts aimed at strengthening security on the European continent, which repeatedly has served as the center of the most bloody wars. A key point of the declaration was the proposal to convene a pan-European conference on security and cooperation. Proposals contained in the declaration were of great importance for the cause of peace and cooperation of nations and became the basis for the convocation and successful conduct of the Helsinki Conference of 33 European States, as well as of the United States and Canada, which adopted the well-known Final Document.

The consistent line of the socialist community for strengthening European security was reflected in other PKK documents as well, particularly the Address to All European Countries by Warsaw Pact Member Nations, adopted in Budapest on 17 March 1969, and in the Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted by the PKK conference in Prague in January 1972.

The Warsaw conference of the Political Consultative Committee held in April 1974 confirmed the inflexible resolve of countries of the socialist community to continue a coordinated peace offensive and the struggle to implement Lenin's ideas of peaceful coexistence.

Participants of the PKK conference in November 1976 examined current issues of a further struggle for peace, for deepening the relaxation of international tensions, and for strengthening security and developing cooperation in Europe. The declaration adopted at this conference as well as the proposal that all states participating in the pan-European conference conclude a treaty on not being the first to use nuclear weapons against each other attests to the very profound humanism of those gigantic efforts being spent by the socialist countries to establish peace on earth and to assure the security of all nations.

In addition to other international problems, PKK conferences repeatedly have examined the issue of the German peace settlement. Realizing the danger of West Germany's nuclear pretensions to the cause of peace in Europe, Warsaw Pact nations called on all states to direct their efforts at precluding the possibility of allowing the FRG access to nuclear weapons in any form, directly or indirectly--through groupings of states.

The consistent strengthening of the GDR's international position, recognition of the inviolability of existing borders between European states, and establishment of principles of peaceful coexistence in relations among states with different social systems are convincing examples of the effectiveness of a coordinated foreign policy course of Warsaw Pact member nations.

A prominent role was played by the coordination performed by countries of socialist communities of their actions aimed at supporting the heroic Vietnamese people in their struggle against imperialist aggression. This issue was discussed repeatedly at PKK conferences.

Warsaw Pact nations also conduct a consistent, fundamental policy with respect to settlement of the situation in the Near East.

The PKK conference held in Moscow on 22-23 November 1978 was a major event in international life and vivid evidence of the steadfast concern of fraternal countries of socialism for strengthening peace. A central place in that conference was held by the discussion on further steps in the struggle to deepen the process of detente and disarmament. The unanimous declaration, which contained a detailed analysis of trends in contemporary international development, presented a broad and realistic program of further steps to normalize the world political climate.

The sum total of documents adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Member Nations comprises a concrete program of action aimed at eliminating the causes of possible armed conflicts in Europe and other parts of the world, at strengthening mutual trust among countries belonging to opposing social systems, at achieving genuine detente and on this basis arranging mutually advantageous trade, economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

Formation of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Joint Secretariat in November 1976 was an important step in increasing the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact Organization's work in the international arena. The Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is called upon to resolve problems of security and cooperation on the European continent and coordinate the joint actions of pact member nations in foreign policy.

Military management entities were formed even earlier, in March 1969. These are the Committee of Ministers of Defense, the Military Council and the Technical Committee of the Joint Armed Forces. Functions and missions of the Joint Command and the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, which have operated since the Warsaw Pact was signed, also were updated.

Sessions of the Ministers of Defense Committee and the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces discuss current issues involving a strengthening of the defenses of fraternal countries of socialism, the status of combat readiness, development and improvement of the Joint Armed Forces, and their current activities and combat training.

The Joint Command and the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces consistently implement decisions of communist and working parties, of the Political Consultative Committee and Ministers of Defense Committee as well as recommendations of the Military Council aimed at increasing the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the Joint Armed Forces and at strengthening the friendship and cooperation of allied armies.

In fulfilling the obligations they assumed for collective defense against imperialist aggression, the Warsaw Pact member nations assigned specific contingents of branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, control entities, and support and rear services units to the Joint Armed Forces.

An orderly system of cooperation in the military field has formed over the 25 years of existence of the Warsaw Pact Organization through the common efforts of communist and workers' parties, governments and military entities of the fraternal socialist states.

One of the primary directions for such cooperation is coordination of plans for building and developing fraternal armies and navies and carrying out joint activities to improve the combat training of Armed Forces. Much attention is given to military-technical cooperation and to implementing a uniform, coordinated military-technical policy permitting a concentration of efforts on resolving basic tasks and the outfitting of allied troops and naval forces with contemporary models of standardized weapons and combat equipment.

A prominent place is held by joint activities in operational and combat training and by the development and implementation of foremost methods of troop training and personnel indoctrination. A special role is played by joint exercises of allied troops and navies to practice coordination of branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, combined units and units; to improve the training of commanders and staffs and the field, air and naval schooling; to develop the most effective forms and methods of conducting joint combat actions and for the coordination and comprehensive support of troop groupings and naval forces; to exchange training experience; and to strengthen friendship among the personnel of allied armies. Joint exercises have a great political importance. They are a true school of combat cooperation and of the patriotic and international indoctrination of soldiers and the population of fraternal countries.

Deep and many-sided ties have formed among the groups of Soviet forces temporarily on the territory of allied states and the armies and populations of these countries. Party and state managers, representatives of industrial enterprises and agricultural cooperatives, and figures of culture and art of the fraternal countries regularly speak in units and combined units of the groups of Soviet forces. Soviet soldiers generously share foremost experience in personnel training and indoctrination with their brothers in arms, and at the same time make use in their own practice of all the best achieved by our combat friends.

The military cooperation of Warsaw Pact nations includes mutual assistance in training skilled cadres in Soviet and national military educational institutions. This contributes to the fact that the armies of our defensive alliance are manned with well-trained officer cadres utterly devoted to the ideals of socialism.



The joint development of socialist military science and elaboration of uniform views on the character and methods of waging war are of no small importance. Fraternal armies rely on Soviet military science and the military science base of the USSR Armed Forces to a significant extent in this matter. At the same time, the contribution of each allied army to military science is becoming more and more tangible.

The cooperation of political entities of armies of the Warsaw Pact nations, carried out on the basis of decisions of communist and working parties, is expanding and deepening from year to year. There are conferences and meetings of representatives of political entities at various levels, other conferences, interviews and consultations. It is a broad practice to exchange experience of party-political work among the troops, as well as to exchange military-political literature, films, photo exhibits and so on. Ties are growing stronger among editorial offices of military journals and newspapers.

Reactionary politicians and ideologists of imperialist states see in the Warsaw Pact the primary obstacle on the path to implementing their aggressive plans and they undertake desperate efforts to distort the genuine goals and character of the defensive coalition of countries of the socialist community and discredit it in the eyes of the world public. But over the quarter-century of its existence, the practical endeavors of the Warsaw Pact Organization have razed to the ground all possible falsehoods and fabrications of imperialist propaganda.

At the same time, history has proven irrefutably the aggressive essence and the reactionary, antipopular, counterrevolutionary character of NATO, the primary imperialist bloc. Suffice it to say that in the period 1949-1978 the cumulative military expenditures of NATO countries comprised an astronomical sum--\$2.6 trillion.

The entire world also knows that it was not the Soviet Union and not Warsaw Pact nations, but the United States and its NATO partners who began a new round in the arms race of late that was unprecedented in the history of militaristic preparations. Importunately spreading the myth of the "Soviet military threat," the ringleaders of the North Atlantic Alliance are attempting to justify the feverish material and ideological preparations they have begun for a new war. The decisions of last year's December session of the NATO Council are especially dangerous to the cause of peace in Europe and throughout the world. They were adopted under crude U.S. pressure and concern the stationing of new systems of American medium-range nuclear missiles aimed against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community on the territory of certain West European states.

These decisions attest to the attempt by militaristic circles of the United States and NATO to block the detente process and change in their own favor the approximate equilibrium of military forces in Europe now existing.

In contrast to the United States and other imperialist powers, the Soviet Union along with the fraternal countries of socialism is persistently and consistently implementing a policy of peace and acting to deepen detente. The new proposals advanced by Comrade Brezhnev at ceremonies in Berlin in October 1979 and in his responses to questions by a PRAVDA newspaper correspondent and in a speech to electors of Bauman Electoral District in Moscow serve as vivid proof of the unchangeability of the Soviet states' peace-loving course.

But any of our peace initiatives encounter stubborn resistance and opposition by the ruling circles of the United States and other NATO member countries. Isn't this really shown by such facts as Washington's decision to put off Senate examination of the SALT-2 Treaty for an undetermined period of time, the unprecedented program of militaristic preparations by the United States for the next five years advanced by President J. Carter, and the fanning of anti-Soviet psychosis in the West? Using the "power" politics, militant circles of imperialism are attempting to retard the irreversible social advances in the world and to save the capitalist system, doomed by history.

China's present leaders are acting as one with the imperialistic "hawks" as provokers of a new war and as ardent enemies of detente, peace and socialism. Peking's hegemonic, chauvinistic, anti-Soviet course is converging more and more closely with the policy of the most aggressive forces of world imperialism. In recent years the U.S. and NATO militarists have acquired an ally on a "strategic plane" in the person of the Peking leadership. Playing the "Chinese card" became an important aspect of the foreign policy activities of the United States and other imperialist powers.

It is natural that the Soviet Union and its allies cannot remain inactive under these conditions. They are taking the necessary steps to strengthen defenses, to deepen military-political cooperation and to increase the fighting power of their armies and the Joint Armed Forces. In a speech to electors of the Bauman Electoral District of Moscow, Comrade Brezhnev declared with all certainty: "The Soviet Union can be frightened by no one. Our forces and capabilities are enormous. We and our allies always will be able to stand up for ourselves and give a rebuff to any hostile attacks."

Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Nations are in a high degree of combat readiness thanks to the collective efforts and constant concern of the communist and working parties and the governments of allied countries.

The existence of the Warsaw Pact Organization is determined by the interests of preserving peace and security of nations of countries of the socialist community and by the tasks of struggle against aggressive plans and aspirations of world imperialist reaction. Life is providing ever newer confirmation of the fact that the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist states are following Lenin's peaceful course strictly and are persistently acting to deepen detente, to settle the thorny and unresolved international problems through talks, and to cease the arms race.

The powerful force of socialist solidarity has made the community of countries joined in the Warsaw Pact and in the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance one of the most powerful bodies in international life. Its fundamental, consistent policy, which meets the interests of the overwhelming majority of mankind, faithfully serves the cause of peace and independence of nations.

The 25-year history of the Warsaw Pact Organization convincingly attests to the fact that the combat alliance of brother nations, formed on the principles of socialist internationalism, has won high authority in the world through its peace-loving policy. It was and remains an insurmountable barrier in the path of imperialism's aggressive aspirations, the faithful guardian and reliable shield of the achievements of socialism, and an important factor in ensuring European and international security.

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#### CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES: COOPERATIVE EFFORTS NOTED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 80 signed to press 17 Apr 80 pp 53-59

[Article by Maj Gen M. Goglev, Member of Military Council, Chief of Political Directorate of Central Group of Forces: "In a Spirit of Fraternal Friendship"]

[Text] The Communist Party of the Soviet Union attaches great significance to the international and patriotic indoctrination of workers and of Army and Navy personnel. The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th party congress noted: "Establishing in the awareness of workers, and the younger generation above all, ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, of pride for the Land of Soviets and for our Motherland, and a readiness to rise to the defense of socialism's achievements has been and remains one of the most important tasks of the party."

The CPSU's requirements for indoctrinating soldiers in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism have special meaning for personnel of the Central Group of Forces, who perform service beyond the Motherland's borders on the forward edge of the defense of socialism. Service under these conditions imposes a specific imprint on the character of the organizational and ideological work to develop high moral-political qualities in personnel. Indoctrination of an ideologically tempered soldier, a soldier-patriot, a soldier-internationalist constantly is the focus of attention of the CGF's military council, political directorate, commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations. In our work we maintain close contact with local party and state entities and public organizations of the CSSR, and with the command element of military units of the Czechoslovak People's Army [CPA]. Our joint work encompasses various aspects of the ideological-political life of Soviet soldiers in garrisons and includes an entire complex of mass political activities conducted together with CSSR workers and CPA soldiers.

The heart and primary content of all work among personnel of the Group of Forces comprises propaganda of Lenin's ideological-theoretical heritage and the CPSU Program and a thorough study and full implementation of



decisions by the 25th party congress and subsequent plenums of its Central Committee, and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's statements and recommendations on defense matters.

Commanders and political workers proceed from the requirements of the 25th party congress and the CPSU Central Committee decrees entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" and "On the 110th Anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's Birth," and aim their primary efforts at developing the soldiers' Marxist-Leninist ideology, dedication to the cause of the party and people, and readiness to defend the achievements of toilers of the countries of socialism. Much is being done to expose the aggressive nature of imperialism and NATO military preparations in Western Europe and to develop in service personnel a feeling of personal responsibility for the security of the western borders of states in the socialist community.

Indoctrinating personnel in the immortal behests of Lenin is of permanent importance to us. In connection with celebration of the 110th Anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's birth, work was stepped up among the troops for the international indoctrination of soldiers in the example of Lenin's life and work and in the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. Lenin readings and lessons, topical evenings and morning gatherings, practical science and methods conferences, evenings of questions and answers, and readers' conferences are very popular among the soldiers.

Officers' Marxist-Leninist training, warrant officers' political studies and political classes with privates and NCO's present broad opportunities for bringing up soldiers in a spirit of socialist internationalism. Topics devoted to achievements of Czechoslovakia's workers in fulfilling decisions of the 15th CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] Congress and the CSSR's national economic plans and to the success of soldiers of the CPA in combat training and in raising the combat readiness of units and subunits also are included in training plans and programs in addition to primary topics.

It is generally known that training effectiveness largely depends on the class instructor, his qualification, initiative and imagination, and his ability to link the topic with the life of a subunit and with international missions being performed by Soviet soldiers on Czechoslovak territory. There are many experienced, qualified class instructors among the troops. For example, here is how political classes were arranged with the privates by Sr Lt V. Shugay. In presenting the topic entitled "The World System of Socialism and the 25th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the Unity and Fraternal Cooperation of Socialist Countries," he reminded his audience of Lenin's statement that peoples who have taken a socialist path of development "require without fail a close military and economic alliance, since otherwise the capitalists . . . will crush and stifle us singly." Then the officer revealed the basic directions of cooperation of the socialist countries using specific facts and examples and dwelled on issues of

expanding and strengthening the fraternal ties between the USSR and CSSR. During the hours of self-training the soldiers were shown a film strip entitled "Our Strength is in Unity" and a discussion was held on the political, economic and military cooperation of socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, from material selected additionally by the instructor. The seminar in the group was lively and interesting. In covering a particular issue, the students capably tied it in with the missions being accomplished by personnel of the CGP and with the need for further strengthening Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship.

Lecture propaganda is one of the forms of international indoctrination. Its basis is the detailed revelation of Lenin's principles of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism and the contents of 25th CPSU Congress materials and other party documents. Much attention also is given to explaining our people's successes in fulfilling quotas of the 10th Five-Year Plan, Soviet foreign policy and the international missions of armies of the Warsaw Pact nations. In connection with preparations for the 35th Anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War, the 35th Anniversary of Czechoslovakia's liberation by the Soviet Army, and the 25th Anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, a significant place in lecture propaganda is given to topics of the USSR Armed Forces' liberation mission in World War II, Soviet-Czechoslovak combat brotherhood, and strengthening of the combat cooperation of the personnel of Warsaw Pact member nation armies.

Lecture propaganda helps further expand the friendly ties with Czechoslovakia's workers and the personnel of its Armed Forces. Our lecturers and propagandists are frequent guests at enterprises, in agricultural cooperatives, and in military units and military educational institutions of the CSSR. For their part, Czechoslovak lecturers regularly speak to Soviet personnel. The arsenal of forms and methods of our cooperation with Czechoslovak friends includes meetings between Soviet service personnel and workers and soldiers of the CSSR, an exchange of experience in organizational and ideological work, participation in celebrations and ceremonies in holding revolutionary and national holidays, and joint mass cultural and sports activities.

Party committees and party organizations of the Group's units play an important part in accomplishing tasks of international indoctrination of troop personnel and strengthening friendship with CSSR workers and CPA soldiers. For example, the party committee of the unit in which Officer I. Kuznetsov serves performs extensive work. Accounts are regularly heard here from party members about their work and about the assistance they are giving to the subunits' aktiv in resolving problems of international indoctrination. On assignment by the party committee, experienced propagandists and unit staff officers periodically give lectures and briefings to soldiers, explain Leninist principles of socialist internationalism and its vital need for joint defense of the cause of socialism, and they tell about the successes of the Soviet and Czechoslovak peoples in fulfilling

decisions of their parties' congresses and about combat cooperation by soldiers of Warsaw Pact nations.

There is also much of interest in the work of the party committee where Officer P. Drapiko is secretary. This unit's command element maintains good business ties with local party and state entities and the personnel maintain ties with workers of the rayon. The party committee sees to it that every serviceman, worker and employee of the Soviet Army has precise knowledge of and strictly follows the laws and legal norms in effect in the CSSR. This work is arranged on a differentiated basis, with consideration of different categories of service personnel. The young generation and officers and warrant officers who recently arrived in the Central Group of Forces are given a major place in this work. Discussions are held with them, lectures and briefings are given for them, and the principles of CSSR law are explained to them. They are told of the culture, mores and customs of peoples of Czechoslovakia and about the specific features of service in the CGF.

The party committee sets aside in particular the work with drivers, who have to be among the local populace more often than others. In addition to the activities already mentioned, technical conferences and quizzes are held for them to which representatives of the CSSR's automobile inspectorate entities are invited. They acquaint motor transport personnel with the features of traffic on the country's roads and give practical help in training young drivers. Before going out on exercises and field problems, party and Komsomol activists discuss with personnel the strict observance of rules and norms of behavior on the territory of a country friendly to us.

Komsomol organizations of units and subunits make a worthy contribution to bringing up the soldiers in a spirit of socialist internationalism. Their work is distinguished by a diversity of forms and methods and by the massive inclusion of service personnel. It is performed in an inseparable tie with a further strengthening of friendship with the CSSR's youth and CPA soldiers. For example, it is an extensive practice to hold Lenin readings and lessons, discussions devoted to our country's successes in building communism, talks by privates, NCO's and officers who have returned from leave, and correspondence with soldiers released to the reserve and working at key construction sites of the 10th Five-Year Plan. Evenings of friendship and combat cooperation leave a noticeable imprint in the soldiers' awareness. Sports events and tours through places of combat glory generate lively interest. For example, trips by service personnel to the museum of labor glory of the Adast Plant of the city of Policka have become more frequent in the unit where WO V. Gerasimchuk is a member of the Komsomol committee. Here the soldiers become acquainted with exhibits telling about Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's participation in the liberation of Czechoslovakia and about his meetings with residents of this city. Witnesses of those memorable days--plant veterans--speak to the youth.

The Komsomol committee organizes and directs the work of Komsomol-youth lecture groups entitled "We are Patriots-Internationalists," set up in every battalion. Also participating in the work of the lecture groups are members of local organizations of the CSSR's Socialist Youth League and party workers who familiarize Soviet soldiers with the life of the Czechoslovak youth and tell about successes of the Republic's toilers in building socialism.

The military council and political directorate do a great deal to assist political entities and the party and Komsomol organizations in generalizing and disseminating the foremost experience of indoctrinating personnel in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism and for arming commanders and political workers of units and combined units with this experience. In seeking to raise the effectiveness of activities conducted among the troops, the military council and political directorate also concentrate attention on unresolved problems, carefully study the reasons for deficiencies and take necessary steps to eliminate them. Questions of the soldiers' international indoctrination are discussed regularly at courses, seminars and conferences of commanders and political workers. Positive results are produced by the daily painstaking work of the military council, political directorate, political entities, and unit party and Komsomol organizations for qualitative resolution of tasks of international indoctrination, for eliminating deficiencies and for fuller use of all reserves. In recent years there has been a substantial increase in the influence of the measures we carry out to raise the level of combat readiness and the quality of combat and political training and to improve the discipline and solidarity of military collectives. The forms and methods of strengthening friendship with CSSR workers and combat cooperation with CPA soldiers have become more diverse.

While organizing and conducting the work of international indoctrination of personnel and strengthening the friendship with CSSR workers and combat cooperation with CPA soldiers, the CGF's military council, political directorate, commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations constantly take account of the complex nature of the present-day international situation and of the fact that our troops are performing their international missions of defending the interests of our Motherland and countries of the socialist community in the immediate vicinity of the borders of countries in the aggressive NATO imperialist bloc, on the territory of friendly Czechoslovakia, against whom the subversive centers of the West constantly conduct an unbridled antisocialist campaign. All this requires stepped-up attention to a further increase in vigilance, combat readiness and efficiency and to a strengthening of military discipline, and constant explanation of Lenin's statement that "in standing against the enormous front of imperialist powers, we fighters against imperialism represent an alliance requiring close military solidarity..." The strengthening of such an alliance with the Czechoslovak People's Army is one of the basic directions of our endeavors.



Cooperation with the CPA is accomplished in the form of an exchange of experience in organizing combat and political training during problems and exercises, meetings of officers and soldiers of various specialties, seminars, courses, and other joint activities. Joint seminars of political workers of the CGF and CPA held at various levels have firmly become part of the working practice of international indoctrination.

For example, there was a very useful seminar for chiefs of political entities of the CGF and CPA at which there was an exchange of experience in organizing party-political work to accomplish the tasks of combat and political training and socialist competition and to strengthen military discipline. Participants also learned much of interest at a joint seminar of political workers held in one of the Czechoslovak military units. CPA officers M. Horvak, F. Medved and J. Szeft shared working experience of the party and youth organizations in indoctrinating soldiers in revolutionary and combat traditions of the Czechoslovak workers and Armed Forces of the country, instilling a feeling of socialist internationalism in them and reinforcing the friendship of peoples and armies of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. In turn, our officers Ye. Ozerov, I. Lyubashov and V. Shkarban told the seminar participants how international indoctrination of service personnel is conducted in their unit during officer Marxist-Leninist training, warrant officers' political studies and political classes with privates and NCO's, and in lecture propaganda.

Meetings devoted to exchanging experience of combat training among privates and NCO's of related specialties have proven themselves. There was an instructive meeting of this sort in the subunit where Officer V. Krivtsov serves. Its participants shared the experience of servicing and maintaining combat equipment and weapons and told about successes achieved in combat and political training. Then there was a discussion by the Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers with a Great Patriotic War veteran and now a CPA officer, A. Zvidelik. He reminisced about the fighting at Stalingrad and told about the courage and valor of Soviet soldiers with whom he had occasion to defend the legendary city on the Volga. At the end of the meeting the Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers sang songs of the Great Patriotic War period and modern songs and exchanged souvenirs and pins.

A meeting of tank personnel in one of the CGF units also was meaningful and interesting. Czechoslovak soldiers visited the subunits and the company where Hero SU Sr Lt A. N. Khutoryanskiy is listed permanently on the rolls. They familiarized themselves with the work of Lenin rooms and attended Lenin readings on the subject "We are Patriots-Internationalists." Then a contest was arranged in tank driving and firing personal weapons.

Joint training of CGF and CPA soldiers arranged in the form of mutual visits became an effective form contributing to the strengthening of Soviet-Czechoslovak combat cooperation. According to a prearranged plan, let's say a company or battery of Czechoslovak soldiers visits Soviet friends and an equivalent subunit of ours heads for their place. The

guests take part with the hosts in classes on tactics, weapons training, combat vehicle driving, defense against mass destruction weapons, physical training and other disciplines. Competition for outstanding fulfillment of operational training missions and for bettering the norms unfolds among Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers in such classes. The joint training permits the soldiers to learn more about each other and establish close personal contact and friendly ties, and it allows commanders and political workers to better familiarize themselves with the combat and political training methodology, ideological indoctrination work and the organization of socialist competition.

Diverse political indoctrination, mass cultural and sports work is arranged in time off from training--evenings of friendship, topical evenings, appearances by amateur collectives, and athletic contests. All this contributes to a reinforcement of fraternal international ties of the soldiers of the two armies of friendly countries and largely contributes to an increase in the quality of combat and political training and level of military discipline and to maintaining high combat readiness.

Troop and command and staff exercises during which friendly relations are adjusted among officers and mass meetings of soldiers of the two fraternal armies take place serve to strengthen the combat cooperation of Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers. Joint actions, close contact in performing operational training missions, and friendly mutual assistance in preparing weapons and combat equipment for faultless and immediate use develop high moral-combat qualities in the personnel, have a favorable effect on improving military expertise and contribute to an increase in field schooling, and thus an increase in the combat readiness of subunits and units.

Exercises have a positive indoctrinational effect on personnel also through examples of courage, initiative and resourcefulness of the soldiers. For example, when Soviet and Czechoslovak ponton personnel were building a bridge over a water obstacle, the joining devices iced up, which hindered assembly of the bridge. To eliminate the hindrance, Sgt I. Karas', Pfc M. Dzyurakh and Pfc V. Taranenkov threw themselves into the icy water without a second thought. The exercise director, CIC of the CPA Western Military District Col Gen F. Vesely, awarded the brave ponton personnel the emblem "For Strengthening Friendship and Cooperation" for the courage they displayed.

The Group newspaper SOVETSKIY SOLDAT makes a substantial contribution to the cause of international indoctrination, the strengthening of friendship of CGF soldiers with CSSR workers and combat cooperation with CPA soldiers. It regularly publishes columns entitled "Brotherhood in Class, Brotherhood in Arms" and articles under the rubrics: "With CPA Soldiers," "In Those Fiery Years," "We are Internationalists," "For the Soldier about Czechoslovakia" and others. It is the practice to publish joint issues of SOVETSKIY SOLDAT with the newspaper OBRANA LIDU. Recently correspondents of the

Group newspaper and the journal of the CPA Main Political Directorate ZAPISNIK P. Lavruk and I. Drebotu visited sites of joint battles of units of the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak 1 Army Corps, which was activated in the USSR. They told the readers of their meeting and talks with participants of the Great Patriotic War and about their journalistic finds in travel essays devoted to the 35th Anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory over fascist Germany and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army.

Tours and trips through places of revolutionary and combat glory and familiarization with Czechoslovakia's historical and cultural sights are used widely to indoctrinate troop personnel in a spirit of socialist internationalism, friendship with CSSR workers and combat cooperation with CPA soldiers. This provides an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the historical past and present of the fraternal Czechoslovak people and their national culture, traditions, mores and customs.

The CGF Song and Dance Ensemble as well as amateur ensembles and collectives of garrison officers' clubs enjoy wide popularity among the CSSR populace and CPA soldiers. In 1979 over 600 concerts were given by them for the Czechoslovak comrades at which over 100,000 persons attended. And masters of art and workers of culture of Czechoslovakia, the CPA Ensemble and other creative collectives perform for Soviet soldiers.

Our Czechoslovak friends willingly visit the "Brotherhood in Class, Brotherhood in Arms" Memorial and the museums and rooms of combat glory of combined units and units. In 1979 alone the Memorial was visited by some 40,000 persons, and almost 400,000 Czechoslovak citizens have visited it since it was opened. Each year 30,000-40,000 CSSR citizens visit museums and rooms of combat glory of the CGF's combined units and units. The museum of combat glory of the Irkutsk-Pinsk, Orders of Lenin and October Revolution, Triple Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Guards Motorized Rifle Division Imeni Supreme Soviet of RSFSR enjoys special fame among Czechoslovak workers and CPA soldiers. Last year it was visited by over 16,500 persons.

Work of the Memorial, of the museums and rooms of combat glory, of the CGF's Song and Dance Ensemble, of officers' clubs and unit clubs permits a thorough familiarization of Czechoslovak friends with the history and culture of the Soviet people, the heroic past of their Armed Forces and the present military labor of defenders of the homeland of October, the homeland of Lenin. We attempt to do everything to meet the wishes of the CSSR's workers to strengthen ties with the Soviet Army, satisfy their interest in the USSR and reinforce our fraternal friendship with the Czechoslovak people and their soldiers.

The work of commanders and the party-political apparatus of the CGF to expand international ties with Czechoslovak toilers and soldiers finds full understanding and support of the populace and of the CSSR's party, state

and military entities. This is shown by the feelings of sincere friendship experienced by Czechoslovak friends for Soviet soldiers and by the constant attention of the CPCZ Central Committee, its General Secretary, CSSR President Comrade G. Husak, and Minister of National Defense Arm Gen M. Dzur toward the Group's service personnel and their life and everyday routine.

The results achieved in the international indoctrination of soldiers unquestionably gratify us. But we realize well that, as in any other matter, we cannot stand still here. For this reason the commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations of the Central Group of Forces constantly direct their efforts toward improving work forms and methods and increasing its effectiveness. To this end wide use is made of the high political activeness and patriotic enthusiasm of soldiers generated by decisions of the November (1979) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and by celebration of the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's birth, the 35th Anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the 35th Anniversary of Czechoslovakia's liberation by the Soviet Army.

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## POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: MILITARY REGULATIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 80 signed to press 17 Apr 80 pp 60-67

[Article by Col V. Kaburneyev: "For Political Study Group Instructors: USSR Armed Forces Regulations--Codex of Laws on the Life and Combat Work of Troops"<sup>1</sup> Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]

[Excerpts] Classes on this subject are intended to assist privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers learn in greater detail the essence and importance of USSR Armed Forces regulations in the daily life and combat training of military personnel and to ensure the steadfast fulfillment of regulation requirements and maintenance of strict regulation order in sub-units and units and aboard ships.

Eight hours are set aside for study of the topic. It is advisable to allocate this time as follows: two hours for lecture, two hours for independent training and four hours for seminar.

/In the lecture/ the following issues should be examined: 1. USSR Armed Forces regulations are the codex of laws on military service. Brief description and purpose of the regulations. 2. Soviet military regulations on the moral-political and combat qualities of soldiers. 3. Strictly fulfill requirements of military regulations and the orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs.

/In NCO political study groups/ the third question can be worded as follows: "Work of NCO's to indoctrinate subordinates in a spirit of strict observance of the demands of USSR Armed Forces' regulations."

It is important to emphasize /in the introduction/ that lately the international situation has become noticeably more complex. Imperialist forces headed by the United States as well as Peking's present leaders now acting as one with them are attempting to return the world to the gloomy "cold

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1. Material for political studies on the topic "The USSR Armed Forces Regulation--Codex of Laws on the Life and Combat Work of Troops. Steadfastly Fulfill the Demands of Military Regulations."

war" times. Concealed behind the false invention of the "Soviet threat," they are building up military budgets, whipping up the arms race and intervening in the internal affairs of other states.

The aggressive intrigues of imperialism and reaction are being countered by the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries in an invariably firm, vigorous and consistent struggle for peace, combining it with high vigilance, a strengthening of defenses and a constant readiness to repulse aggression no matter where it originates. Thanks to the concern of the party and all the Soviet people, the Soviet Armed Forces are at a level sufficient to ensure that no one can encroach on our Motherland's security with impunity or hinder the building of socialism and communism.

Soviet military regulations are of great importance in successful accomplishment of tasks facing Army and Navy personnel. They play an important part in achieving unity, precision and cohesiveness of actions by military collectives and a further strengthening of combat readiness of subunits, units, ships and the Armed Forces as a whole. It is the duty and obligation of all service personnel to fulfill regulation requirements steadfastly.

It can be said /in conclusion/ that the Soviet Army and Navy represent a powerful and disciplined force, a precisely adjusted fighting body capable of successfully accomplishing any mission in defense of the interests of our beloved Motherland and countries of the socialist community at any moment on order of the party and government. Synchronizing their every step with regulation requirements, Soviet military personnel follow the instructions of our party concerning a further strengthening of combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces and an increase in vigilance and combat readiness.

/During independent training/ it is recommended that the soldiers study Lenin's works "On Labor Discipline" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XI, 232), and "Letter to Workers and Peasants on Occasion of the Victory over Kolchak" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXIX, 151-159); the "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] (Articles 31-32, 59-65); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and Upcoming Party Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 75-76, 83); the training aid for political studies entitled "Na strazhe Rodiny" [Guarding the Motherland] (Voenizdat, 1978, pp 147-160, 173-184); and USSR Armed Forces Combined-Arms Regulations (Voenizdat, 1977).

In the evening hours and in classes it is useful to show students film strips entitled "Armed Forces Regulations are the Law of Life of Soviet Soldiers" and "Be a Brave and Disciplined Soldier."

It is also advisable to use sheets 11-16 of the album of visual aids for political studies entitled "V. I. Lenin on Defense of the Socialist Homeland" (Voenizdat, 1977).

/In the seminar/ the following questions can be raised for discussion:

1. V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party on the need for strict order for maintaining high combat readiness in the Army and Navy.
2. Basic requirements of the regulations for the private and seaman.
3. What moral-political and combat qualities should the Soviet soldier possess?
4. Why is every serviceman obligated to fulfill the demands of military regulations and the orders and instructions of commanders (chiefs) strictly?
5. What does it mean for a soldier to be personally responsible for fulfilling military duty of defending the Soviet Motherland?

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## **SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: MAOIST POLICIES CRITICIZED**

Moscow **KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENIYKH SSSR** in Russian No 9, May 80 signed to press 17 Apr 80 pp 75-81

[Article by Ma] Gen D. Volkogonov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor: "On International Theme: Irreconcilability Toward Maoism--the Ideology and Politics of War"]

[Text] The beginning of the eighth decade of the 20th century was marked by a serious worsening of the international situation through the fault of imperialist states, and the United States of America above all. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked in a speech to electors: "It has become obvious that the present U.S. leaders are following a line toward undermining detente and aggravating the international situation."

The Peking leadership, which has taken a position to the extreme right in the camp of world reaction, also is acting ever more closely as one with the forces of imperialism. This confirms once again the profound substantiation of the conclusion by the 25th CPSU Congress, which emphasized that now it is no longer enough to say that "Maoist ideology and politics are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist teaching. They are directly inimical to it" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 11).

### **The Militaristic Nature of the Ideology and Politics of Maoism**

The allegiance of Peking's present leaders to Maoist ideology is explained above all by the fact that this ideology conforms to the greatest extent to the mission which they have set for themselves of converting the PRC into one of the most powerful militaristic states by the end of the present century, one capable of influencing world destinies to a significant extent. The danger of the Maoist doctrine is explained above all by the fact that it is the theoretical, ideological platform of domestic and foreign policy of the Peking leaders, who have openly shifted into the camp of world reaction. With the help of dogmas of Maoism now being "mopped up" in Peking, the PRC's leaders continue to "justify" and "substantiate" their counterrevolutionary, militaristic steps.



It is generally known that Maoism as an ideology originated and formed chiefly on petty bourgeois soil. Its appearance and growth were determined by general reasons, which explain the activation of various forms of opportunism in different historic stages. One of these reasons is linked with a growth in the world revolutionary process. In his work entitled "Reformism in Russian Social Democracy," V. I. Lenin emphasized that as the scope of the revolutionary movement increases, it "inevitably attracts among its adherents a certain number of petty bourgeois elements enslaved by bourgeois ideology who have difficulty freeing themselves of it and who constantly fall into it again and again" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XX, 306).

More and more tens of millions of people are entering the arena of class struggle. Many of them are not politically tempered and introduce elements of petty-bourgeois spontaneity and pseudorevolutionary spirit into the revolutionary movement. This is nutritive soil for the growth of the most venomous opportunistic weeds. The ideology of Maoism is a typical side product, the "rejects" of the world revolutionary movement. Using the figurative words of K. Marx, it is possible to state with complete substantiation that Maoism is a "sick vestige" of genuine socialism.

A number of books and articles by Soviet authors provide a description of the ideology of Maoism and its evolution in a militaristic direction. But here we will recall that this ideology is very eclectic in the theoretical sense. It contains elements of social-chauvinism, Trotskyism, anarchism, and petty-bourgeois revolutionary spirit. On a political plane it reflects hegemonic, great-Khan aspirations of China's nationalistic leaders and has a clearly expressed antisoviet direction. Antisovietism presently reflects in practice the social-chauvinistic aim of the primary doctrinal lines of Maoism: aspiration for hegemony, territorial claims, readiness for aggression and support of the darkest forces of reaction.

Meanwhile, Maoism is a convenient ideological substantiation for militarism and it is its unique theoretical platform. It was on the basis of the ideology and politics of Maoism, deeply inimical to Marxism-Leninism, that a phenomenon such as militarism developed and ominously formed in China over the last two decades.

In analyzing the features of the Maoist-type militarism, it is important to consider a number of points characterizing its unique nature. It has its roots in China's distant past. The military always played the role of a leading social force in the history of this country. As a rule, the civilian and military administration was embodied in one person. A feudal lord and military leader always held the dominant position in society. Bourgeois historian He Pingdi noted that "the Chinese state always received its supreme authority from the army. This left an idea in people's awareness concerning the exceptional role of military force in society."

Over the last 2,000 years China has been shaken continuously by intestine wars which, in addition to their social-economic consequences, developed an impression in the public awareness of the inevitability and naturalness of military conflict. One cannot help but see that the popular revolution itself in China developed into a form of prolonged armed struggle during which the CCP always attached prime importance to military problems. These and certain other factors little by little shaped a stable view in the psychology of the Chinese nation of military force as the chief element of society's social structure, used to resolve domestic and foreign problems. The Peking leadership made maximum use of this feature of the traditional impression of the military's role by the illiterate masses in their chauvinistic plans.

In approaching a solution to the problems of class struggle, the social-economic development of society and the establishment of the country's superstructural elements, Maoism always proceeds from the decisive, determining role of military coercion as the universal method, a method of achieving any goals. Mao's primitive postulates: "The rifle generates power," "The one who possesses military force commands" and "An army is the best tool of power," used in the context of the Peking leadership's concrete aspirations for hegemony and dominance over its own and neighboring peoples, created an appearance of ideological substantiation of the need for social and spiritual violence and for maximum reliance on bayonets. Observance of these and other guidelines of the "Great Provider" led not only to a significant loss of the primary achievements of a socialist character, but also to the social rebirth of the PRC and the appearance of a special Maoist type of militarism. Today militarism determines to an enormous extent the ideological processes in the country and the entire domestic and foreign policy of its leaders.

The present situation in China is characterized by a further intensification of militaristic tendencies which make themselves known in the most diverse spheres of social life. At the same time, it is possible to trace a number of peculiarities and specific features in the broad process of militarization of the Chinese state. Thus by their content, the militaristic views in Maoism's ideology and politics now are aimed frankly against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

All party and state documents, the speeches of Peking's leaders, appearances by the PRC's representatives in the capitals of other states and in the United Nations, the press and the radio repeat one and the same dirty fabrication in different variants: China's military preparations are based on the growing "threat from the North."

The scope of this slander acquired astounding dimensions. Each month the three central press organs alone (the newspapers RENNIN RIBAO and GUANGMING RIBAO and the journal HONGQI) publish hundreds of antisoviet articles, commentaries and other materials. This muddy torrent increased even more with the intensification of imperialistic, Maoist intervention in

Afghanistan. Radio Peking also fills the airwaves with numerous antisoviet insinuations. One goal can be traced in the growing pressure of Maoist propaganda: to persuade their people and the peoples of other countries as to the presence of "mortal danger" to China on the part of the Soviet Union. The selection of "arguments" varies. The history of Sino-Russian and Sino-Soviet relations is broadly falsified, absurd theses are concocted about the "degeneration" of the nature of our society, antisoviet statements by various renegade, reactionary and conservative politicians of the West are rehearsed, fantastic accusations devoid of elementary logic are advanced concerning the CPSU, and the "details" of some kind of USSR military preparations are quoted. All this propagandistic shell is needed by Peking's politicians for the main purpose of substantiating their anti-soviet course and their slide downward into an alliance with imperialism, and justifying the new deprivations to which they are dooming simple Chinese citizens by shoving the country onto the dangerous path of military preparations and a forced arms race.

The militaristic concepts and conclusions in Maoism's ideology and politics are uncommon in form, since they continue to be clothed in "Marxist vestments" and use socialist phraseology, which in a number of instances hinders the unsophisticated people in seeing their openly reactionary character. Bourgeois propaganda also uses this feature of Chinese militarism for its own purposes in attempting to discredit Marxism-Leninism as a whole and "prove" that militarism allegedly also is objectively inherent to socialism. They are naturally fully silent over the fact that militaristic trends in China stood out only when it turned from the high road of socialist development.

Peking's leaders declare all their political steps and ideological vagaries to be a further development of the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. To this day they juggle the terms "dictatorship of the proletariat," "socialist revolution," "communist party," "interests of the workers" and so on. Rejecting the elective nature of party entities in fact, the Maoists term this "democracy"; in accomplishing one purge after another they trumpet the "regulation of style"; in ignoring the appeals by the world public to cease nuclear tests, they term the improvement of mass destruction weapons a "forced act" in the face of the "Soviet threat"; in striking up a bargain with the forces of imperialism, they declare this "an act of containing hegemonism" and so on.

In hanging such terminological tags on actions and ideas having nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, Peking's propaganda thus attempts to camouflage the PRC's political degeneration and its growing aggressiveness and chauvinism. But no matter the garb in which militarism is dressed, and in the given case it is Maoist garb, militarism remains militarism, i.e., a phenomenon fundamentally alien to Marxism-Leninism.

In the organizational sense the militarism of Maoist interpretation substantiates the "objective need" of military-administrative methods of

management and the replacement of many public institutions with military ones. The theory of Maoism attempts to prove importunately that the army is the ideal model of a social organization and a social structure. The slogan "learn from the army" periodically lauded to the skies means nothing else than an attempt to shift specific methods of the military organization's activities to the economic, party, cultural and spiritual fields. Concepts of a strictly military nature are widespread even in the production, scientific and agricultural terminology itself. There is nothing surprising in this. The course set by the present Chinese leadership toward converting the country into a powerful militaristic state is reflected heavily in all aspects of the life of society, inevitably generating ever newer forms of militarization of production, education and culture.

The further increase in rigidity of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship of the Maoists now is cloaked by the slogan about the so-called "four modernizations"--in the field of industry, agriculture, science and military affairs. In reality, however, the subject is full militarization of Chinese society in the interests of implementing the hegemonic goals of its present leaders. This is what "modernizations" in other spheres are subordinated to.

In recent years Peking has set an open course toward military rapprochement with the United States, NATO and other imperialist countries to strengthen the antisoviet front and for converting the PRC more rapidly into a militaristic power. In January of this year U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown held talks in Peking with Chinese leaders. Recently there was a visit to Washington by the PRC's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wenjin. The U.S. State Department timed the Chinese guest's arrival on the shores of the Potomac with one other demonstrative step: For the first time it officially sanctioned the sale to China of American military gear, including transport aircraft, helicopters, radars and communications facilities. It is planned to hold talks on deliveries of other kinds of military equipment in May or June, when Gong Biao, Vice Premier of the PRC State Council, arrives in the United States. All this represents an especially great threat to the cause of peace.

#### Convergence with the Forces of Imperialist Reaction

Having taken the path of betrayal of the interests of the proletariat, Peking's leaders are going ever farther along it. They have shifted from a political game with imperialism to entering a direct bloc with it on an antisoviet basis. The 25th CPSU Congress noted that Peking's policy now not only is aimed against the majority of socialist states, but converges directly with the position of the most extreme reaction throughout the world. China has been transformed from a potential reserve of imperialism essentially into its ally. The anticommunist, antisoviet thinking and politics of the PRC's present leaders play a decisive role in this evolution.



The fact is that Peking sees in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries the primary obstacle in achieving its great-power, hegemonic goals. That is how it was under Mao and that is how it has remained under his successors. In the book entitled "Mao's Heirs" by West German politologist K. Mehnert, he states that "Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping are strictly fulfilling the two main guidelines of the Provider: Enemy number one is the USSR and China's ally is anyone who acts against the Soviet Union." This importunate idea, which is the basis of Peking's specific political actions, leaves its imprint literally on all steps and motives of its leaders. The Soviet Union's consistent course aimed at strengthening peace and real socialism and at disrupting the aggressive impulses of any reactionary forces presents an insurmountable barrier on the path of Peking's adventurist plans in the eyes of the Maoist leaders. Therefore antisovietism became a universal criterion for them: Everything damaging to the Soviet Union is true and acceptable. Considering Peking's goals, aimed in the final account at achieving world hegemony, and our fundamental irreconcilability with such a course, it can be regarded that antisovietism in the ideology and politics of the Maoists does not bear a temporary, tactical nature, but a strategic one.

In adhering to antisoviet positions, China's leaders not only are attempting to use this to conceal their profound deviation from the ideals of socialism, but also to acquire new "friends" in the camp of imperialist reaction and among the militaristic circles of bourgeois societies and dictatorial regimes. The Maoists love to conceal their ideological lack of principle with Confucian aphorisms or with sayings very doubtful in the political sense, such as: "It is unimportant whether it be a white or a black cat. The only good cat is one that loves mice." It is with the help of such "arguments" that Deng Xiaoping and the other Peking leaders try to justify their antisoviet, antisocialist course and the forming of a direct bloc with imperialism.

The adherence of the Maoist leadership to zoological antisovietism attests not only to its deep renegade nature, but also to an attempt to find a common platform for close rapprochement with imperialism. This is what was mentioned openly in Peking during the aforementioned visit there by U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown. It is clear from the joint statements that the parties see a common platform in the "coordinate opposition to the USSR, stemming from the closeness of strategic interests of the United States and China."

Although not officially formulated, the outlines of the new military-political alliance stand out rather well. The appearance of this Maoist-imperialist hybrid is one of the reasons for the serious worsening of the international situation of late. The rapprochement with the capitalist world makes Peking's obstructionist policy with respect to the most important problems of modern times even more rigid. Suffice it to say that the Maoists have not signed and do not recognize a single international treaty limiting nuclear weapons testing or their nonproliferation or

agreements on checking the strategic arms race. It cannot help but be seen that the rapprochement of the PRC and NATO countries in the military sphere is already having a very negative effect on the entire international situation and is making the world more unstable and explosive. The negative consequences of this rapprochement appear in many aspects.

Above all, the new unofficial alliance is whipping up the arms race in the capitalist world and in the PRC. It is known that the United States of America, based on military-political guidelines advanced by President Carter, in fact decided to increase its military budget annually by more than five percent. The creation of new models and kinds of weapons, expansion of base strategy, the creation of mobile operational combined units and the regeneration of a number of imperialistic military alliances that had disintegrated are intended to introduce a disbalance in the existing correlation of forces. Having taken the path of aggravating the international situation, the NATO states simultaneously are contributing to a twist of the flywheel of the arms race in the PRC as well, where even today over 40 percent of appropriations in the state budget go to cover military expenditures. The atmosphere of militaristic psychosis clearly is playing into Peking's hands, since under its conditions Peking hopes to obtain more rapid access to the NATO arsenals. And truly feverish efforts are being undertaken in this direction.

In the last year or two Chinese emissaries have not left the western capitals. First one then another highly placed delegation is becoming familiar with military plants, new equipment models and possibilities of technological assimilation. The West German WELT DER ARBEIT wrote: "Chinese officials and the military are attempting to procure modern machinery, electronic equipment and weapons, beginning with tractors and ending with jet fighters." According to western press reports, the number of contracts between the PRC and capitalist countries will increase. China vigorously joined in the process of a costly arms race, pursuing its own goals which are extremely dangerous to the cause of peace.

The negative influence of the Maoist-imperialistic alliance also is seen in the increasingly impudent intervention by the United States, China and some NATO countries in the affairs of various nations and states. A retrospective glance into the past persuades one that in all crisis situations which arose in a particular part of the planet in the last two decades, Peking always attempted to find a method for aggravating the conflicts and openly taking the side of imperialistic and the most reactionary forces. That was how it was during the crises in the Near East, in the area of the Caribbean Sea, in Chile, Angola, in the African Horn and in other parts of the globe. Today Peking and Washington openly coordinate their subversive efforts against democratic Afghanistan by training and sending bands of mercenaries onto the territory of a sovereign country. It is their activities which are the primary source of tension in this region.

It becomes obvious that a certain military-political mechanism of agreement, coordination and development of decisions on various international problems and crisis situations dangerous to the cause of peace is taking shape between Peking and Washington. This is indicated by the facts. Soon after Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States and his talks with American leaders, there followed the impudent Chinese aggression against Vietnam. After H. Brown's visit to Peking the Sino-American subversive actions noticeably stepped up against Afghanistan. Many such examples can be given. All this is evidence, as noted by the French bourgeois newspaper LE MONDE, that "relations have been established between China and the United States and also with NATO which are close to a military alliance." Even today the presence of such cooperation is leading to the aggravation of crisis situations in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East and in a number of regions of Africa.

The open rejection of detente by the Maoists and the most reactionary imperialist circles not only creates an additional sphere of their "parallel interests," but also really aggravates the international situation by regenerating numerous relapses of the "cold war." The agreement between Peking and NATO attests to a further turn to the right of the Maoists' course: From now on they are conducting an openly pro-imperialistic foreign policy. We see a qualitatively new advance of a counterrevolutionary nature leading to Peking's direct cooperation with imperialism. The alliance being formed, in which antisovietism acts as the chief uniting factor for both sides, in the presence of their own strictly nationalistic, hegemonic goals, is exceptionally dangerous for the cause of peace and socialism.

By willingly heading for rapprochement with aggressive imperialistic circles, the Chinese side thus is pursuing very specific hegemonic goals: to weaken the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, and to secure economic, technical, financial and military assistance from NATO, thus forcing the process of converting the PRC into a powerful militaristic state. Meanwhile, it should be borne in mind that the coincidence of Peking and NATO goals is to a significant extent the result of conditions at hand. In addition to common antisocialist, antisoviet goals, the Maoist leadership and the ruling circles of imperialistic powers also pursue their own narrowly nationalistic interests. This is seen in the fact that there are a number of contradictions difficult to overcome between the converging sides. Among them can be included carefully concealed suspicions with respect to each other's long-range goals, the difference of political and social-economic systems of members of the alliance in question and its unequal character, since Peking's leaders are attempting to reinforce their military-technical base at the cost of political and ideological concessions to imperialism. It is impossible to ignore in particular the differing approach of the sides to the fate of Taiwan, to policy with respect to the Philippines and Indonesia, and so on.

In other words, in stating the indisputable fact of the military-political rapprochement between Peking and NATO taking place on the soil of anti-vietnam and hegemonic plans, it would be incorrect to depict this alliance as complete, homogeneous, formulated once and for all and so on. Although it now has a strategic significance in the assessment of the correlation of forces in the world, its vitality is very problematical, especially for the long range. The United States cannot help but consider that as early as the mid-1980's Maoist China may (under specific conditions) represent a threat both for the United States of America itself and for other imperialist countries. Our party repeatedly cautioned the world public that connivance in Peking's hegemonic politics may lead to a situation fraught with serious danger not only for peace-loving forces, but also for those who are intensively playing the "Chinese card" without giving full consideration to whom they are dealing with.

### The CPSU on Irreconcilable Struggle against Maoism

The world of socialism is considering the situation where China, calling itself a socialist country, in reality is in the camp of the enemies of socialism. No ideological Maoist camouflage is capable of concealing the real state of affairs. Therefore the CPSU sets an important task for the ideological cadres: to expose the reactionary, anti-Marxist character of Maoism's ideology and politics, to show the tragic evolution of the regime from the posing of socialist goals to the counterrevolutionary degeneration of the PRC through the fault of its leaders, and to uncover the enormous danger of Peking's course for aggravating the international situation and shoving mankind to a world war. It is already obvious today that Peking's leaders are fostering ideas of world domination. While continuing to wave the socialist banner and continuing to use revolutionary phraseology, at the same time they led China to a new stage, the uniqueness of which must be considered in the continuing struggle of progressive forces against the Maoist danger.

In explaining the fundamental reorientation of Peking toward cooperation with imperialism, it is necessary to reveal the essence and reasons for the counterrevolutionary changes occurring in the PRC's domestic and foreign policy by relying on the conclusions and evaluations of the 25th CPSU Congress with respect to Maoism. Special attention should be given to the fact that the counterrevolutionary shift to the right is continuing in all spheres of the PRC's domestic and foreign policy. While 10-15 years ago Peking's theorists attempted to place themselves over the primary contradiction of the era--that between capitalism and socialism--now they actually have shifted into the camp of the most reactionary forces of modern times. This was manifested with special force when Peking's militarists made piratic raids on socialist Vietnam. Such acts by Peking again and again confirm the profound correctness of the 25th party congress conclusions that a further rapprochement of Maoist China is continuing with the bitterest enemies of socialism, democracy and progress.



Another important point in explaining our attitude toward the intrigues of Maoism is the demonstration of Peking's feverish attempts to split the socialist community, undermine the world communist and working movement and weaken the world revolutionary process as a whole. Peking's leaders see in the powerful revolutionary forces of modern times the chief obstacle on the path to world hegemony. Maoist China conducts especially furious attacks against the USSR, Vietnam, Cuba and the Mongolian Peoples' Republic. Peking's leaders act in a differentiated manner by attempting to set one country in opposition to another. All this once again indicates the deep social-political degeneration of the institutions of power in China and the deep hostility to Marxism-Leninism of Maoism's ideology and politics.

It is also important to reveal the danger to the cause of peace and socialism of Peking's attempts to knock together and form a broad antisoviet alliance of Chinese militarism and the forces of imperialist reaction. The peace-loving forces cannot help but be placed on guard by the process of the PRC's accelerated "feeding," especially in the military sphere, by the West's imperialist monopolies and by certain Japanese circles. Therefore exposure of the consequences of this agreement and the danger of a further militarization of the PRC is of special importance in ideological work.

One of the fundamental provisions of Marxism-Leninism states that ideas become a physical force in taking possession of the masses. The truest ideas, expressing fundamental class interests of the workers in a theoretical form and acting as a scientific program of their social actions, are the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. They now not only are a theory, but also the practice of hundreds of millions of people on our planet. It was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress that "development of the countries of socialism, the growth in their power and a strengthening of the beneficial effect of international policy they conduct--this is what now comprises the chief direction of mankind's social progress" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 27). The great light of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism finds physical embodiment in the deeds and achievements of the toiling masses and graphically shows the entire world the invincibility of these ideas.

At the same time, history knows instances where under certain conditions false, reactionary ideas also became a physical force--as a result of the demagogic manipulation of the masses' social awareness on the part of ruling classes or a certain criminal clique. All this turned out to be an enormous social disaster not only for the forces of progress and freedom of other nations, but also for the country where these ideas "materialize." History's memory cannot forget fascism with its ideology of anticommunism, misanthropy, racism and chauvinism. There are many other historic parallels, but in the final account the false ideologies, reactionary social-political institutions and militaristic concepts always suffered inevitable failure. It will be no exception for the ideology and politics of Maoism. There is no socialist future for China on the paths of Maoism. Such is the inexorable logic of the historic process, the logic of the natural movement of mankind along the path of fundamental social rejuvenation, of the invincible movement toward communism.

The struggle against Maoism is an important component of the struggle for strengthening the world positions of socialism. And at the same time it is a specific form of assistance to the Chinese people, who are experiencing a period of difficult social tragedy. All true friends of the Chinese people are sure that sooner or later the dark page in its history will be turned. Our party and our state are doing everything to normalize relations with the PRC. "...If Peking should return to the politics actually based on Marxism-Leninism, should it reject the course hostile to socialist countries and take the path of cooperation and solidarity with world socialism," it was stressed at the 25th CPSU Congress, "then this will find a corresponding response on our part and will open up an opportunity to develop good relations between the USSR and the PRC corresponding to the principles of socialist internationalism" ("Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS," p 11).

But for now Peking is responding to all our peaceful proposals with the growing rigidity of its antisoviet, antisocialist course and with obstructionist steps over any initiatives of the socialist countries. The Maoists' antisovietism is constantly reflected in militaristic statements of the PRC's party and state figures, in acts hostile to the Soviet Union in all international organizations, and the United Nations above all, and in splitting actions in the world communist and workers' movement. All the USSR's proposals aimed at deepening detente, limiting the arms race and creating a climate of trust among states invariably are given a hostile reception by Peking's representatives. By the way, the Chinese delegation to the United Nations has not introduced a single constructive proposal for examination by the world community since 1971 (the moment the PRC's rights in the United Nations were restored). And at the same time it has not missed an opportunity to speak against any peaceloving proposal, especially if it was advanced by our country. Peking does not tire of reiterating that the USSR represents a threat to China. But not one sensible person can understand why the Soviet Union should quarrel with the PRC and not have it among its friends and allies. Numerous facts attest that statements of Peking's politicians about the USSR's hostility are false from beginning to end. We will mention just a few of them.

The Sino-Soviet talks on border issues begun at the USSR's initiative in 1969 have not been completed even today. The reason? Peking's ultimatum, obstructionist position in attempting to impose deliberately unsuitable conditions on the USSR. The Soviet side repeatedly has suggested holding high-level talks to discuss questions of normalizing relations between the USSR and the PRC. Such proposals were advanced in 1970, 1973 and 1978. The last of these initiatives suggested elaboration of a joint text on principles of relations between the USSR and the PRC on the basis of peaceful coexistence. In 1971 the USSR proposed to China conclusion of a treaty on nonuse of force in relations between the two countries, and in 1973 it suggested a treaty on nonaggression and advanced proposals for renewing cooperation in various areas. But the Chinese side did not once come halfway toward the displays of good will on the part of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, on 3 April 1979 the PRC decided not to extend the force of the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PRC dated 1950. Talks begun with the Chinese side in Moscow in the latter half of 1979 and which were to be continued in Peking now have been postponed by the Maoist leadership for an unspecified time period. These are only some of the facts which hardly require explanation.

The brief examination of only a few of the aspects of Maoist ideology and politics indicates that China has become a continuous source of international tension. This is why the reasoned exposure of militaristic steps and military preparations of the Peking hierarchy is an important task of ideological work. This exposure must be accomplished in a number of directions.

First of all, it is important to show in ideological and political work how enormous are the efforts applied by the Soviet Union and fraternal countries of socialism to give comprehensive international assistance to the Chinese people in their struggle for national liberation. It should be emphasized here what kind of reactionary role was played by the clique of Mao Zedong, which curtailed friendly cooperation with socialist countries and turned China's political rudder on an anti-Marxist course. October 1979 marked 30 years from the day the PRC was proclaimed. The evolution was tragic for the Chinese people: The socialist beginning accomplished with the help of the USSR and other socialist countries was gradually abolished by the Peking clique. China now has openly gone to the side of the class barricade where militarism has dug in.

Secondly, in studying documents and materials of CPSU congresses and Party Central Committee plenums, the speeches and works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other political literature, it is necessary to reveal the social and ideological sources of the recreancy of the Peking leadership and the hidden springs of its betrayal and desertion. Familiarization with the history of revolutionary struggle in China shows that for a long while, in addition to the true Marxist line adhered to by genuine internationalists, there also existed a nationalistic line headed by Mao Zedong, which took the upper hand at a specific stage, unfortunately for the Chinese people and their friends.

Thirdly, the exposure and criticism of the anti-Marxist course of today's Peking leaders also permits seeing the entire deep damage and reactionary nature of the actions of the present hierarchy in China. The innumerable experiments in which the hard-working Chinese people have been involved (the commune movement, the "Great Leap," the "cultural revolution," the "four modernizations" and so on) doom the workers to terrible deprivations. A role has been prepared for them only as subservient extras--performers of an alien ill will. A critical familiarization with various aspects of the PRC's foreign policy highlights the important elements: Peking's present course has become dangerous not just for the cause of socialism in China itself, but also for universal peace. The doctrine of Maoism is an

anticommunist doctrine of war, a doctrine of militarism, bearing a great potential threat to all progressive forces. The explanation of these propositions is an important condition for a proper party understanding of the present situation in China and for instilling profound, fundamental irreconcilability toward Maoism--the ideology and politics of war and anti-communism.

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